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Recent U.S. and International Judicial
Protection of Individual Rights: A
Comparative Legal Process Analysis
and Proposed Synthesis
by NADINE STROSSEN*
As nature abhors a vacuum, constitutional documents abhor strait-
jackets. Great ideas cannot be imprisoned; they must be able to move
freely from one part of the earth to another.1
Recently there has been a surge of enthusiasm for utilizing interna-
tional human rights norms in domestic litigation. Some scholars and
judges support the notion that these norms should be deemed directly
binding on federal and state courts. Such a relatively powerful use of
international human rights principles, however, has met with widespread
resistance from many courts and commentators. Given the isolationist
bent of the American legal system, it is unlikely that international human
rights law will be directly incorporated into U.S. law.
A more modest-but nevertheless important--claim for the contri-
bution of international human rights standards to the domestic legal sys-
tem is more promising and should be widely accepted by federal and
state courts. Under this approach, the international standards may pro-
vide guiding principles for interpreting federal and state constitutions
and statutes. Indeed, this Article makes an even more limited, but still
significant, claim: that international human rights principles may guide
the determination of "legal process" issues concerning judicial review of
constitutional rights claims.2 The international norms would inform the
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1. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than
States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 14 (1982).
2. For a helpful recent description of legal process analysis, see Amar, Book Review,
102 HARV. L. REV. 688, 691 (1989) (reviewing P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(1988)):
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process-the analytical or methodological questions-rather than the
substance of domestic individual rights adjudication. This proposed use
of international human rights norms is apparently novel and no judicial
or scholarly commentary has addressed it directly.3 There is widespread
support, however, for the interpretive use of international standards to
resolve issues of constitutional substance.4 This Article's more modest
interpretive use of these standards to resolve issues of constitutional pro-
cess, therefore, should gain easy acceptance. A domestic role for interna-
tional human rights norms is consistent not only with the U.S.
Government's active promotion of international human rights since
World War II, but also with the longstanding practice of U.S. courts
concerning the domestic role of international law in general. 5
International human rights precepts should be invoked only to ex-
pand, rather than to limit, protections of individual rights under domes-
tic law. 6 The U.S. Government consistently has defended its refusal to
ratify important international human rights treaties by asserting that do-
mestic law provides more protection than its international counterparts. 7
While this claim is true with respect to many rights, there are significant
areas where U.S. law is less protective of individual freedom than inter-
national law. 8 In particular, the analytical methodology for reviewing a
The legal process school [of legal thought] focuses primary attention on who is, or
ought, to make a given legal decision, and how that decision is, or ought, to be made
. . . . The question what is or ought to be the substantive law governing citizen
behavior in a given area is no longer the sole, or even the dominant, object of legal
analysis. Rather, legal process analysis illuminates how substantive norms governing
primary conduct shape, and are in turn shaped by, organizational structure and pro-
cedural rules.
See also id. at 694 (legal process theories "pay[ ] strict attention to second-order rules allocat-
ing power between federal courts and other institutions").
3. Professor Gordon A. Christenson has suggested a similar interpretive domestic role
for international human rights standards. See infra text accompanying notes 148-55.
4. See Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Rights Precepts in U.S. History and
the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 651 (1989)
("[A]ny lingering question whether [human rights] precepts can be used in private litigation
and judicial decisionmaking should shift to the question of how such precepts can be used...
more effectively.").
5. See infra text accompanying notes 89-100.
6. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 89 (1957).
7. See Rusk, Reflection on International Covenants, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 515, 520
(1981); Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L.
REV. 35, 45 (1978).
8. For example, in contrast with international human rights instruments, the U.S. Con-
stitution contains no explicit privacy guarantee. Moreover, the privacy rights that the
Supreme Court has found to be implicit in the Constitution are in some important respects
narrower than those guaranteed under international documents. See infra text accompanying
notes 306-10. See also Warbrick, "Federal" Aspects of the European Convention on Human
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claimed rights violation used in the international approach is more pro-
tective of individual rights than the judicial review recently applied by
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's recent constitutional rights decisions have
tended to employ analytical techniques that take a narrow view of judi-
cial power to protect individual rights and a correspondingly broad view
of the power of the other governmental branches to invade such rights.9
This constricting perspective on the scope of judicial review could have
long-range adverse consequences upon individual freedom far beyond the
particular substantive holdings. While this trend has been developing
since the 1970s, it gathered substantial momentum during the Court's
1988-89 Term. This Article discusses decisions from that Term as illus-
trative of the long-range trend.
The international human rights law approach to legal process ap-
pears to be moving in the opposite direction: toward modes of judicial
review that result in more expansive interpretations of rights and more
restrictive interpretations of the government's power to circumscribe
those rights. Because international human rights instruments were sub-
stantially influenced by the U.S. Constitution and are susceptible to the
same range of interpretations regarding legal process issues, it is instruc-
tive to assess the process dimensions of U.S. individual rights cases in
light of the corresponding, but contrasting, international trends.
The most developed body of international human rights jurispru-
dence emanates from the two tribunals that enforce the European Con-
vention on Human Rights:' 0 the European Commission of Human
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. This Article, there-
fore, focuses on decisions of the Convention organs. This is consistent
with U.S. court rulings that have relied on the European Convention and
the cases implementing it as a major source of international human rights
law. I" The methodological approaches employed by the European Coin-
Rights, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 698, 698 (1989) (U.S. Supreme Court has not found any constitu-
tional limits on state power to allow corporal punishment in schools, whereas judgments under
European Convention have essentially outlawed such punishment).
9. See infra Part IV.
10. [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European
Convention].
11. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 n.16 (2d Cir. 1980) (court recognized
that one source of customary international law is judicial decisions; only judicial decision it
cited was issued by European Court of Human Rights); accord Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F.
Supp. 787, 797 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (cited European Conven-
tion as among "principal sources of fundamental human rights" and "indicative of the customs
and usages of civilized nations").
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mission and Court, however, parallel those employed under other instru-
ments embodying international human rights norms. Canada's
counterpart to the U.S. Bill of Rights, the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, for example, which was adopted in 1982, borrows much language
from the European Convention. 12 Convention jurisprudence is therefore
relevant to Charter interpretation, and vice versa.
For the sake of brevity, this Article concentrates on European Com-
mission and Court decisions concerning one particular substantive right:
privacy. In terms of judicial process, however, the Convention organs'
privacy decisions are consistent with their decisions construing other
substantive freedoms. 13 Accordingly, the methodological approaches
that characterize the European Commission's and Court's privacy deci-
sions should guide U.S. courts in analyzing claimed infringements of all
individual rights, not just privacy.
The dichotomy between the U.S. and international human rights
law, in terms of legal process, is paradoxical. The Bill of Rights in the
U.S. Constitution is enforceable directly against government officials
throughout the U.S., and has been judicially enforced for almost two cen-
turies. By contrast, neither the European Convention nor other interna-
tional human rights instruments have any direct force within any
national legal system. Furthermore, these international agreements have
been subject to a more limited judicial review power than the U.S. Bill of
Rights, both in scope and duration. Accordingly, one would expect U.S.
courts to exercise more intense judicial review processes than interna-
tional tribunals.
This disparity is not explicable in terms of the express language of
the relevant human rights instruments.14 Because the U.S. Constitution
served as an important model for the subsequent international human
rights instruments,' 5 much of the language in the international instru-
ments is similar to that in the Constitution. The language is often ambig-
uous and subject to differing interpretations.' 6 Indeed, the differences
12. See Gibson, Reasonable Limits Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
15 MANITOBA L.J. 27, 27 (1985).
13. See Hovius, The Limitation Clauses of the European Convention on Human Rights: A
Guide for the Application of Section 1 of the Charter?, 17 OTTAWA L. REV. 213, 223 (1985)
(referring to similarity of European Convention articles 8-11, which protect, respectively: pri-
vacy; freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of expression; and freedom of
peaceful assembly and association).
14. See Warbrick, supra note 8, at 699 (U.S. Supreme Court and European Court have
ruled differently on permissibility of corporal punishment, despite similar governing language
in U.S. Constitution and European Convention).
15. See Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 415 (1979).
16. Indeed, opponents of the domestic use of human rights principles in international
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between the terms of the respective instruments suggest that the Bill of
Rights should be construed as more rights protective than international
agreements, such as the European Convention. Similar to other interna-
tional human rights instruments, the Convention contains express limita-
tions clauses prescribing the circumstances in which government may
restrict prima facie protected rights.'7 By contrast, many U.S. constitu-
tional guarantees are phrased in absolute terms. Arguably, the U.S.
Supreme Court should be especially reluctant to infer such limitations,
and should do so only narrowly.
Part I of this Article argues that international norms may play a
significant role in domestic jurisprudence by providing directly binding
decisional rules. Part II demonstrates that, a fortiori, international
norms may be invoked to fulfill a more limited role: informing the inter-
pretation of domestic legal rules, including rules of judicial process. Part
III analyzes contemporary international human rights law from a legal
process perspective, focusing, by way of illustration, on the European
Convention privacy jurisprudence. Finally, Part IV applies the legal pro-
cess perspective to recent constitutional rights decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court, contrasts the Court's evolving methodological approach
with the developing international one, and shows that the latter is more
consistent with U.S. constitutional traditions than the former. The Arti-
cle concludes that by using international human rights norms to resolve
judicial process issues, U.S. courts would be faithful both to the bur-
geoning movement for the internationalization of individual rights and to
our nation's own constitutional precedents.
I. Incorporation of International Human Rights Norms as
Directly Binding Domestic Legal Standards
This Article makes a relatively modest and uncontroversial claim
about the role that international human rights norms should play in do-
mestic adjudication. To put the limited nature of that claim into per-
spective, the Article first surveys arguments advocating a more
prominent domestic role for international human rights. Although these
arguments have been controverted, they have received significant support
treaties have argued that these provisions are too vague to permit judicial enforcement absent
implementing legislation. See Oliver, The Treaty Power and National Foreign Policy as Vehi-
cles for the Enforcement of Human Rights in the United States, 9 HOESTRA L. REv. 411
(1981). But see Paust, Book Review 56 N.Y.U. L. REv 227, 239 (1981) (contending that U.N.
Charter is sufficiently specific to be self executing).
17. See infra Part III.
from both scholars and judges. I8 To the extent that these arguments sup-
port the proposition that certain international human rights norms
should be directly binding on U.S. courts, they support the more modest
proposition that such norms provide significant interpretive guidance in
implementing domestic law. The purpose of canvassing these arguments
is not to make another contribution to the flourishing debate about
whether international legal norms should play a direct role in U.S. law,
but rather, to show that the mere existence of this debate reinforces the
conclusion that international law should at a minimum play an indirect,
interpretive role in U.S. law.
A. Potentially Binding Effect of Treaties Protecting Human Rights
The argument that state and federal courts in the U.S. are bound
directly by human rights principles in treaties is, for two reasons, rela-
tively unpromising as a means of integrating international principles into
domestic law. First, the only treaties that could be directly binding
would be those the U.S. has ratified, as well as signed. 19 Of the more than
forty human rights agreements to which the U.S. could be a party,20
18. For a thorough list of recent legal scholarship on this issue, see Lockwood, The
United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L.
REV. 901, 901 n.1 (1984).
19. The U.S. may have some obligation with respect to international instruments that it
has signed but not ratified. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 686 (1969) (art. 18: "A State is obliged to
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed
the treaty ... or (b) expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty ....").
The U.S. has signed but not ratified the Vienna Convention, as well as several major
international human rights treaties. See infra note 20. Thus, the U.S. arguably is bound to
refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the purposes of these treaties. See Burke, Coliver, de
la Vega & Rosenbaum, Application of International Human Rights Law in State and Federal
Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 291, 309 (1983); Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 147 (1981) (quotes letter dated Sept. 12,
1980 from State Department Legal Advisor to Senator Adlai Stevenson, stating, in part,
"While the United States has not yet ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
we consistently apply those of its terms which constitute a codification of customary interna-
tional law"); Paust, supra note 4, at 645 n.593 (U.S. accepts view that Vienna Convention is
presumptively customary). For a discussion of customary international law, see infra text
accompanying notes 44-88.
20. The U.S. has signed but not ratified the following human rights agreements:
-International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
U.N. GAOR Res. A/2106 (Dec. 12, 1965) Annex, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4,
1969);
-International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR];
-International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16,
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however, it has ratified only twelve.21 The international human rights
agreements that the U.S. has not ratified include two major U.N. instru-
ments that, together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR),22 constitute the "International Bill of Rights: '23 the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)24 and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.25 The U.S.
1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966), 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
For a complete list, see R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION
OF TREATIES, AGREEMENTS & DECLARATIONS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE UNITED
STATES, vii (rev. ed. 1988).
21. The U.S. has ratified the following human rights treaties:
1) U.N. CHARTER;
2) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (en-
tered into force Oct. 21, 1950);
3) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949, opened for signature Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950);
4) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950);
5) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of
August 12, 1949, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950);
6) The Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S. 253,
as amended July 7, 1955. (entered into force Mar. 9, 1927);
7) Protocol to the Slavery Convention, December 7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, T.I.A.S. No.
3532, 182 U.N.T.S. 51 & 212 U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1953);
8) Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institu-
tions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Apr. 30, 1957);
9) Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967);
10) Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for signature Mar. 31, 1953, 27
U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force July 7, 1954);
11) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in force
Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (in force for U.S. Feb. 23, 1989);
12) Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights of Women, May 2,
1948, 27 U.S.T. 3301, T.I.A.S. No. 8365 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1949).
22. The United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the UDHR as an elabo-
ration of the Charter's human rights provisions. See Sohn, supra note 1, at 14-15.
23. See L. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 207 (1989).
24. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1967), 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
25. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1967), 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
also has not ratified the major applicable regional human rights accord,
the American Convention on Human Rights.2
6
The second reason why it will be difficult to incorporate interna-
tional human rights norms directly into U.S. law via treaties results from
a judicial doctrine. Initiated by Chief Justice John Marshall, 27 the "self-
executing treaty" doctrine stipulates that not even the few U.S.-ratified
human rights treaties would necessarily be binding on domestic courts.
Unless a court deems a treaty to be "self-executing," 28 the treaty will
bind domestic courts only if Congress has passed legislation for the spe-
cific purpose of implementing the treaty provisions domestically.
Although some Supreme Court decisions have ignored this doctrine
29
26. Done Nov. 22, 1969, 36 O.A.S.T.S. 1, OEA/ser. A/16 (English) (1970), reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 673 (1970).
Other human rights instruments to which the U.S. has not become a party include:
-Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 34) at 88, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975);
-Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel Treatment, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/
10034 (1975);
-Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, G.A. Res. 2856, 26 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 93, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971);
-International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195;
-Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959);
-Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, First U.N. Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. Annex L.A at 67, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/
6/1 (1956), adopted July 31, 1957, by the U.N. Economic and Social Council, E.S.C. Res.
663C (XXIV), 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doc. E/13048 (1957).
27. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829):
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an Act of the Legislature, whenever it
operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of
the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a
particular act the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department;
and the Legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the
court.
28. See Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (when treaty does not
explicitly create private right of action, court looks to treaty as whole to determine whether it
evidences intent to provide such right).
29. See Nielson v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1928); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S.
332, 341 (1924) (treaty law "operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or na-
tional, and it will be applied and given authoritative effect by the courts"); see also Paust,
International Law and Control of the Media: Terror, Repression, and the Alternatives, 53 IND.
L.J. 621, 666-68 (1978) (while some commentators have construed these cases as having as-
pumed the self-executing nature of relevant treaties, it is more accurate to recognize that the
Court has issued, and not reconciled, two separate lines of cases).
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and it has been subject to criticism,30 it is apparently accepted as
settled.
31
With respect to the few human rights treaties that the U.S. has rati-
fied, the judicial rulings on point (though also subject to criticism) have
generally held that these treaties are neither self-executing nor the subject
of implementing legislation. 32 Hence, the treaties are regarded as lacking
direct legal force in domestic courts. The leading case on this point is Sei
Fujii v. California, 33 in which the California Supreme Court held that the
U.N. Charter is not self-executing. Of the various international instru-
ments to which the U.S. is party, the U.N. Charter was potentially the
most fruitful source of rights protections in domestic courts. 34 There-
fore, Sei Fujii was particularly damaging to the prospective domestic in-
corporation of international human rights law.
It is noteworthy that the California Supreme Court's holding in Sei
Fujii overturned a contrary ruling by the California District Court of
30. See Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 passim (1988).
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 131 (1987) (U.S. courts are bound to give effect to international law, except that a "non-self-
executing" agreement will be given effect only after necessary implementing legislation has
been adopted.).
32. See United States v. Terraza-Carrasco, 861 F.2d 93, 96-97 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1988)
(UDHR does not create cause of action); Dickens v. Lewis, 750 F.2d 1251, 1253-54 (5th Cir.
1984) (no cause of action created by U.N. Charter, UDHR, or ICCPR); Bertrand v. Sava, 684
F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982) (U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is not self-
executing treaty, although Congress implemented it, at least in part, through Refugee Act of
1980); Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.) (Hague Conventions are not self-
executing), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425
(C.D. Cal. 1985) (neither Geneva nor Hague Convention is self-executing) Haitian Refugee
Center, Inc. v. Gracey, 600 F. Supp. 1396, 1406 (D.D.C. 1985) (UDHR provides no right of
action), aff'd, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987); In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp.
544, 590, 592-93 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (neither OAS Amended Charter nor U.N. Charter can dis-
place inconsistent state laws); Davis v. District Director, INS, 481 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 n.7
(D.D.C. 1979) (neither U.N. Charter nor UDHR supersedes U.S. law); United States v. Gon-
zalez-Vargas, 370 F. Supp. 908, 914-15 (D.P.R. 1974) (U.N. Charter art. 73(a) is not self-
executing), vacated, 558 F.2d 631 (Ist Cir. 1977); Jamur Productions Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc.
2d 501, 273 N.Y.S. 348, 356 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (UDHR creates no cause of action).
33. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 721-22, 242 P.2d 617, 619-21 (1952). The lower court had invalidated
California's Alien Land Law, which discriminated against Japanese-Americans, on the ground
that it conflicted with the U.N. Charter's anti-discrimination provisions. 217 P.2d 481, 488
(1950), reh'g denied, 218 P.2d 595 (1950). The lower court explained that, under the Constitu-
tion's Supremacy Clause, the Charter was part of the supreme law of the land, and any incon-
sistent state law was invalid. Although the California Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's conclusion that the Alien Land Law was invalid, it based this holding on the fourteenth
amendment. Reasoning that none of the U.N. Charter's human rights provisions are self-
executing, the California Supreme Court expressly repudiated the lower court's holding that
the Charter governed this case. Sei Fujii, 38 Cal. 2d at 722, 242 P.2d at 620.
34. See Lockwood, supra note 18, at 912.
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Appeal 35 and has been criticized severely by international law scholars. 36
It is also noteworthy that the Sei Fujii decision was not appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court, nor has the Supreme Court ever expressly ad-
dressed the U.N. Charter's domestic enforceability in any other case.
Consequently, Sei Fujii constitutes binding authority in California only.
Indeed, four U.S. Supreme Court Justices endorsed the notion that the
U.N. Charter should be binding on U.S. courts. 37 Nevertheless, most
subsequent decisions throughout the U.S. have uncritically followed Sei
Fujii in holding that the U.N. Charter's human rights provisions are not
self-executing, and therefore not directly incorporated into U.S. law.
38
Judges and scholars have criticized each element of the self-execut-
ing treaty doctrine as applied in the international human rights context.
First, some have argued that the self-executing treaty doctrine is inher-
ently incoherent and that all ratified treaties concerning individual rights
should be incorporated automatically into domestic law. 39 Second, even
35. See supra note 33.
36. See, e.g., Hudson, Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law, 44 AM. J.
INT'L L. 543 (1950); Paust, supra note 16, at 239 (1981) (two primary rationales for Sei Fujii
holding-that Charter's human rights provisions were not obligatory and lacked specificity-
are both incorrect); Wright, National Courts and Human Rights-The Fujii Case, 45 AM. J.
INT'L L. 62 (1951) (discussion of result of Fujii and its effect on international law and legal
policy).
It has been suggested that a significant factor affecting the result in Sei Fujii was that it
was decided before Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), interpreted the four-
teenth amendment as proscribing state-sponsored racial discrimination, and that if Sei Fujii
had been decided today, its outcome would be different. See Note, The Domestic Application of
International Human Rights Law: Evolving the Species, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
161, 195-96 (1982) (authored by Jeffrey Hadley Louden).
37. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1948) (Black, J., concurring) (major-
ity invalidated California's Alien Land Law, as applied in this case, under fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause, but did not reach law's underlying constitutionality; Black
concurrence would have invalidated law, partly on ground that it violates U.S. obligations
under U.N. Charter); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring) (same).
Justice Black's concurring opinion stated:
[W]e have recently pledged ourselves to cooperate with the United Nations to "pro-
mote... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights... for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." How can this nation be faithful to
this international pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by
aliens on account of race are permitted to be enforced?
Id. at 649-50 (citing U.N. CHARTER).
38. See, e.g., Hitai v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 343 F.2d 466, 468 (2d Cir.
1965); Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398, 400 (7th Cir. 1959); Puerto Rico v. Muskie, 507 F.
Supp. 1035, 1064 (D.P.R.), vacated, 668 F.2d 611 (1981); Davis v. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Serv., 481 F. Supp. 1178, 1183 n.7 (D.D.C. 1979); Camacho v. Rodgers, 199 F. Supp.
155, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 157-58,
60 N.W.2d 110, 116-17 (1953), aff'd, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), vacated, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
39. See Note, supra note 36, at 190-91, 208; Wright, supra note 36, at 68-69; see also
Sayre, Shelley v. Kraemer and United Nations Law, 34 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 (1948) (criticized
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if this doctrine has force in other contexts, it is. inapplicable to human
rights provisions of U.S.-ratified treaties because such provisions are in
fact self-executing.4° Third, even if these human rights guarantees are
not self-executing, Congress has passed implementing legislation making
them effective anyway. 41 Furthermore, consistent with the critique of Sei
Fujii and its progeny, some U.S. Government officials have treated the
U.S. as being bound by the U.N. Charter's human rights clauses.
42
Despite the flaws in the application of the self-executing treaty doc-
trine in the international human rights context, critics recognize that this
doctrine has become so widely accepted that it is unlikely to be repudi-
ated in the foreseeable future.
43
B. Potentially Binding Effect of International Human Rights Norms as
Customary International Law
A more promising route for directly incorporating international
human rights norms into U.S. law is the argument that these norms are
binding as customary international law. But while the principles under-
lying the customary international law approach are quite solidly en-
trenched as a matter of theory and received widespread judicial
Supreme Court's failure to rely on U.S. treaty obligations under U.N. Charter as basis for
refusing to enforce racially restrictive covenant, noting that Charter "is now not only part of
our Constitution, but by our constitutional act we are part of the United Nations.... [W]e are
morally and legally bound to give them all [the Charter's provisions] full effect all the time."
(footnotes omitted)).
Support for the notion that treaties become binding law without the passage of imple-
menting legislation can be inferred from Congress's failure to pass a constitutional amendment
proposed by Ohio Senator John Bricker in 1953, which provided in part, "A treaty shall be-
come effective as internal law in the United States only through the enactment of appropriate
legislation." See S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. REC. 6777 (1953).
40. See Paust, Does Your Police Force Use Illegal Weapons? A Configurative Approach to
Decision Integrating International and Domestic Law, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 19, 40-41 (1977)
(U.N. Charter human rights guarantees are directly binding law in U.S.); Note, supra note 36,
at 200-07 (language of U.N. Charter, circumstances surrounding its creation, and additional
contextual and policy considerations indicate that its human rights provisions were intended to
be self-executing).
41. See Paust, supra note 40, at 40-41 n.81 (arguing that 1964 Civil Rights Act imple-
mented "general human rights law," and noting that Senate committee that drafted it "seemed
intent on implementing the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter").
42. See Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U.
CIN. L. REv. 367, 380 n.63 (1985) (during Ford and Carter Administrations, U.S. consistently
took position that human rights clauses of U.N. Charter have legal effect and thus must be
complied with by all countries, including U.S.); see also Helsinki Accords, done Aug. 1, 1975,
art. l(a)(VII), U.S. Dept. of State, Pub. No. 826, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295 (1975)
(U.S. pledged to "fulfill [its] obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agree-
ments in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by
which [it] may be bound.").
43. See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
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enforcement early in our nation's history, as a matter of actual practice
they have been invoked only rarely in human rights cases in recent years.
Therefore, this possible alternative route for domesticating international
human rights law, although theoretically sound, should not be expected
to produce widespread practical results in the immediate future.
Customary norms of international law are those that are so widely
accepted by the international community that they are binding even on
states that have not ratified treaties embodying them. 44 Treaty provi-
sions are not themselves sources of customary international norms.
Rather, they constitute evidence that such norms exist. The three classic
types of evidence of a customary norm, as enumerated by the Supreme
Court, are "the works of jurists[;] . . . the general usage and practice of
nations; [and] . . . judicial decisions." 4 5 Other types of evidence include
resolutions of international bodies, national legislation, public utterances
by international and national officials, and diplomatic correspondence
and instructions. 46  Indeed, relevant evidence for demonstrating the
existence of customary international law standards includes "[e]very rec-
ord of act or spoken word which presents an authentic picture of the
practice of states in their international dealings."
'4 7
It is usually difficult to document that a principle has achieved the
general recognition necessary to constitute a customary international law
norm.4 8 Nevertheless, credible arguments have been made that most, if
not all, international human rights standards satisfy this test. Indeed,
judges and scholars have made the stronger argument that most interna-
tional human rights principles are included in a subset of customary
44. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 102(2): "Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice
of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."
45. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820); see also Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38 (1945), 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945):
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
46. See L. CHEN, supra note 23, at 362.
47. G. FINCH, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (1937) (quoting WALKER,
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS vol. 1, ch.2 (1899)).
48. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 430 (1964) (high standard of
mutual assent between civilized nations is required before rule may be said to be part of cus-
tomary international law).
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norms that are so fundamental that they are nonderogable.49 Referred to
as "peremptory" norms or '"us cogens," these standards cannot be
changed by agreement.50 The human rights values embodied in the U.N.
Charter, 51 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,52 and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights53 are all elements of cus-
tomary international law that are "rapidly establishing" themselves asjus
cogens, if they have not already achieved that status. 54 Similarly, the
International Court of Justice has declared that rules concerning the ba-
sic human rights are "obligations erga omnes" (owing by each state to all
49. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 301
(Ammoun, J., concurring) ("protection of human rights ... has been considered to be capable
of constituting a legal norm"); id. at 304 (principles in U.N. Charter preamble arejus cogens);
The South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.; Liberia v. S. Afr.) 1966 I.C.J. 6, 298
(Tanaka, J., dissenting) (whole of human rights law constitutes jus cogens); L. CHEN, supra
note 23, at 215 ("the great bulk of the contemporary human rights prescriptions" should be
regarded as jus cogens); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
DIGNrrY 345 (1980) (same); Parker & Neyloh, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human
Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 441-42 (1989) (all human rights norms are
binding as customary international law, and most are peremptory); Comment, A Theory for the
Application of the Customary International Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13
YALE J. INT'L L. 332, 346, 365 (1988) (authored by David F. Klien) (principles protecting
human rights constitute peremptory international norms).
50. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 698-99 (1969) (art. 53 defines "peremptory norm of gen-
eral international law (jus cogens)" as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same char-
acter"; provides that treaty that conflicts with peremptory norm is void).
51. Sohn, supra note 1, at 13-14 (U.N. Charter's basic human rights provisions constitute
jus cogens).
52. See L. CHEN, supra note 23, at 367-68 (although UDHR was only aspirational rather
than authoritative when originally adopted, it has become "part of customary international
law, a vital component ofjus cogens, and an indispensable component of the developing global
bill of human rights"); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, supra note 49, at 345
("great bulk of contemporary human rights prescriptions" establishing themselves as jus
cogens); Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The
Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53, 69-70 & n.75
(1981) (UDHR, although recommendatory at its inception, is now considered authoritative
interpretation of Charter, binding as customary international law); Nayar, Introduction:
Human Rights: The United Nations and United States Foreign Policy, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J.
813, 815-17 (1978) (whole UDHR is customary international law); Sohn, supra note 1, at 17
(UDHR "has become basic component of international customary law, binding on all states,
not only" U.N. members); Paust, supra note 4, at 570 & n.182.
53. Parker & Neylon, supra note 49, at 419 n.40 (ICCPR is widely viewed as codification
of customary international law; "only one of the Covenant's nonderogable rights ... may not
yet be universally accepted asjus cogens"); Sohn, supra note 1, at 32 (virtually all provisions of
ICCPR can be consideredjus cogens).
54. Parker & Neylon, supra note 49, at 442.
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persons). 55 Not all commentators agree that all of these international
human rights principles presently constitute nonderogable norms.
5 6
There appears to be a consensus, however, that all such principles are
included in customary international law.57 The U.S. Government has
taken the position that all three instruments embody customary law
principles. 58
The willingness of U.S. courts to enforce customary international
law principles has gone through a cyclical pattern during the course of
U.S. history. Early in our nation's history, the courts vigorously en-
forced customary international law standards, viewing them as being in-
corporated in domestic law. By contrast, from about the mid-nineteenth
century until the mid-twentieth century, reflecting a generally constricted
view of international law, customary international law norms played a
less vital part in domestic adjudication. Since World War II, however,
the pattern has come full circle and courts have again resorted to custom-
ary international law standards-including human rights standards-
with renewed frequency. As two commentators observed, this historical
pattern "has created substantial parallels between the late twentieth cen-
tury and the period around 1789"59 in terms of the domestic role of cus-
tomary international law. Such a parallel should be particularly
55. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 ("In
view of the importance of the rights involved, all states can be held to have a legal interest in
their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.").
56. See T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION 58-60 (1987) (derogable human rights in treaties are not jus cogens); Higgins,
Derogation Under Human Rights Treaties, 1976-77 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 282 ("[C]ertain rights
... are so fundamental that no derogation can be made [but this does not lead] to the view that
all human rights arejus cogens.").
57. See Sohn, supra note 1, at 12 (U.N. Charter, UDHR, Covenants, as well as about 50
additional declarations and conventions concerning especially important human rights issues,
"have become a part of international customary law and ... are binding on all states.").
58. See Memorial of the United States of America before the International Court of Jus-
tice, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (United States
of America v. Iran) (Final Order) 1980 I.C.J. 3 [hereinafter Memorial] (arguing that these
principles were violated by Iran's alleged failure to provide U.S. nationals with the "most
constant protection and security" in connection with hostage-taking at U.S. Embassy):
The existence of such fundamental rights for all human beings ... and the existence
of a corresponding duty on the part of every State to respect and observe them, are
now reflected, inter alia, in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and corresponding portions of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, regional conventions and other instruments defining basic
human rights ....
quoted in 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 101, 111 & n.52 (1981); accord Memorandum for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, at 3-7, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980),
reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 587-601 (May 1980).
59. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 52, at 56.
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significant to those who emphasize the intent of the U.S. Constitution's
framers in interpreting that document.
There is much evidence that the framers intended customary inter-
national law, then referred to as "the law of nations," to be incorporated
in U.S. domestic law. 6° This "law of nations" included protection for
human rights, then designated the "rights of man." 61 During the pre-
Revolutionary period and the early days of the American Republic,
courts as well as other government bodies regularly treated customary
law as an enforceable element of domestic law. 62 Chief Justice Marshall
wrote in 1815 that "the Court is bound by the law of nations which is
part of the law of the land."' 63 The framers' receptivity to incorporating
the unwritten law of nations into domestic law is one particular manifes-
tation of their natural law philosophy, under which unwritten fundamen-
tal principles were deemed binding and judicially enforceable,
notwithstanding the specification of some rights in the Constitution."
60. See Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REV.
819, 820, 825 (1989) (many leading figures during era of Constitution's framing made declara-
tions to effect that law of nations was part of American law and in important respects binding
on our government). But see Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Customary International Law
in the United States, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450, 460 (1989) ("No scholar has yet successfully
demonstrated that the United States' Government's decision-making authority... was con-
ferred by the people subject to the limitations created by an international legal regime.").
61. See Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Rev-
olutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843, 858-61 (1978) (founding generation constitutional
theorists believed in unwritten fundamental constitution, whose tenets were reflected in the
universal law of nations, and which was supreme over positive law); Paust, Litigating Human
Rights: A Commentary on the Comments, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 81, 88-89 (1981); Paust, supra
note 40, at 50 ("[A] basic expectation of the Founding Fathers was that the Rights of Man
were to be protected under the Constitution.").
62. See Jay, supra note 60, at 825 (in early years of American Republic, federal judges,
leading political figures, and commentators commonly stated that law of nations was part of
U.S. law). For a frequently quoted Supreme Court enunciation of this principle, see The Pa-
quete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900):
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts... as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented
.... [W]here there is no treaty .... resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators
See also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (under peace treaty with Britain, custom
demanded repayment of obligations to British citizen, state law or state constitution notwith-
standing); Comment, supra note 49, at 337-38 (customary international law is part of British
common law, according to Blackstone).
63. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
64. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 715-16
(1975):
For the generation that framed the Constitution, the concept of a "higher law," pro-
tecting "natural rights," and taking precedence over ordinary positive law ... was
widely shared and deeply felt. An essential element of American constitutionalism
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It has been argued that the reliance upon customary international
law early in U.S. history is not relevant in assessing the role that such law
should play under contemporary circumstances. 65 In any event, even if
customary international law is incorporated into domestic law as a mat-
ter of principle, since the late nineteenth century this principle only
rarely has been invoked and enforced in actual practice. 66 The courts'
decreasing enforcement of customary international law beginning in the
late 1800s reflected the philosophy of legal "positivism," which had then
gained ascendancy over the naturalist school of thought.67 The courts'
decreasing reliance on customary international law is also a facet of the
"conservative" or "classical" approach to international law that became
prevalent by 1900. This approach emphasized states' absolute sover-
eignty and took a correspondingly restrictive view of the sphere of inter-
national law.6 8 The "conservative" construction of international law
coalesced with legal positivism to deny legal force to any international
law principles except the relatively small subset that were enumerated in
technically binding treaties.
The conservative, positivist view of international law has been in
decline since World War II. Correspondingly, there has been a return to
the previous treatment of customary international law as an element of
domestic law, binding in U.S. courts. This revitalization of customary
international law, specifically in the human rights context, is illustrated
by two significant recent events: the U.S. Government's filing of a brief
with the International Court of Justice in which it contended that certain
human rights treaties embodied enforceable customary law norms; 69 and
the decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Filar-
was the reduction to written form-and hence to positive law-of some of the princi-
ples of natural rights. But at the same time, it was generally recognized that written
constitutions could not completely codify the higher law.
65. See Jay, supra note 60, at 849 (contextual difference between U.S. position in world
affairs during early American history and at present "should lead us to view the various state-
ments about the law of nations from that era as having no bearing on modern controversies").
66. See Maier, supra note 60, at 463 (whatever may have been case in 1789, modem
decisions make clear that international legal regime is not incorporated in U.S. law); Note,
supra note 36, at 166 ("While these principles [that international customary law is included
within American common law] appear strong and unequivocal, their application has been
weak and ambiguous.").
67. See Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International Norms
Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655, 676 n.77 (1983);
Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L.
REV. 231, 236 (1975).
68. See Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 52, at 64-66; Note, Toward an International Law
of Human Rights Based upon the Mutual Expectations of States, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 185, 190
(1980) (authored by G. David Fensterheim).
69. See Memorial, supra note 58.
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tiga v. Pena-Irala, 70 which held that a rarely used federal jurisdictional
statute created an implied cause of action for a violation of customary
international human rights standards.
The International Court of Justice case had been instituted by the
U.S. against Iran. The U.S. argued that Iran, by allowing its citizens to
hold personnel hostage at the American Embassy in Teheran, violated
customary international human rights principles evidenced by various
multilateral declarations and treaties. 71 Significantly, the U.S. relied on
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which the U.S. has not ratified. Pursuant to the principle of reciprocity
in international law, in which one state will not be held to a higher stan-
dard of behavior than another state asserting a claim against it, the U.S.
assertion that the ICCPR creates an obligation on Iran's part implies
that the U.S. also would deem itself bound by the ICCPR, notwithstand-
ing its non-ratification of that Covenant. 72
In its Filartiga decision in 1980,73 the Second Circuit revived the
incorporationist approach to customary international law, prevalent ear-
lier in our history, but which had fallen into disuse since the nineteenth
century. The Filartiga court recognized that the "law of nations" is a
dynamic concept, which should be construed in accordancewith the cur-
rent customs and usages of civilized nations, as articulated by jurists and
commentators. 74 It held specifically that U.S. law directly incorporated
customary international law principles prohibiting deliberate government
torture.75 Moreover, in the most controversial aspect of its opinion, the
Filartiga court held that an old and rarely invoked federal jurisdictional
statute, the "Alien Tort Statute,"' 76 created an implied right of action for
violations of customary international law.77 In Filartiga, the U.S. Gov-
ernment again supported an incorporationist view of customary interna-
tional law, as it had done in the Iranian hostage case.78
70. 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980).
71. See Memorial, supra note 58.
72. Note, supra note 68, at 188-89 n.13.
73. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
74. Id. at 884.
75. Id. at 884-85.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) (codifying the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 9b, 1 Stat.
73, 77 (1789)) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."). Prior to Filartiga, section 1350 had been held to provide federal jurisdiction in only
two cases. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887 & n.21.
77. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 886.
78. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090) (joint amicus brief of Departments of State and
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Despite some predictions that Filartiga heralded a trend toward
wholesale domestic incorporation of customary international human
rights law, 79 that development has not yet materialized. 80 Some subse-
quent opinions by federal8I and state82 court judges also have treated
customary international human rights norms as directly enforceable, and
commentators have praised this approach. 83 Other subsequent decisions
and commentary, however, have criticized Filartiga's holding that the
Alien Tort Statute automatically provides a cause of action for violation
of established customary international law norms. 84 Moreover, even
Justice arguing that Alien Tort Statute vests federal courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate
claimed violations of customary international law).
79. See Scheebaum, Recent Judicial Developments in Human Rights Law, L. GROUP
DOCKET 1, 7 (Spring 1981) ("[T]he effect of Filartiga is to direct American lawyers and judges
to international sources of the rights of litigants."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 2 (1987).
80. See Christenson, The Uses of Human Rights Norms to Inform Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 39, 40 (1981) (claim that human rights provisions of international
instruments are part of federal common law is overbroad and aspirational).
81. See United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370, 375 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (suggests that
alien may assert denial of justice in U.S. criminal justice process if that process does not com-
ply with ICCPR); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 710 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (recognizes
customary international law norm against "disappearance," citing UDHR and ICCPR); Forti
v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (recognizes customary interna-
tional law norm proscribing summary execution or murder by government, citing UDHR,
ICCPR, and American Convention); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115, 1122, n.2
(N.D. Ga. 1983) (customary international law principles prohibiting prolonged detention are
binding on U.S., citing UDHR, ICCPR, and American Convention) (dictum); Lareau v. Man-
son, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980) (customary international law, as evidenced
by U.N. Charter and U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, are part
of U.S. law) (dictum); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795 (D. Kan. 1980) (custom-
ary international law, as reflected in U.N. treaties and American Convention, secures to ex-
cluded alien the right to be free of arbitrary detention even though U.S. Constitution and
statutes have been interpreted as affording no protection to such individuals), aff'd sub. nom.
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981); Schneider v. Rusk, 218 F.
Supp. 302, 319 (D.D.C. 1963) (Fahy, J., dissenting) (citing UDHR, concludes that there is
fundamental right to nationality).
82. See Wong v. Tenneco, 39 Cal. 3d 126, 142-43, 702 P.2d 570, 581, 216 Cal. Rptr. 412,
423 (1985) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (court should not enforce Mexican statute that violates
UDHR).
83. See, e.g., Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 52, at 112-13.
84. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 810-23 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring); see also Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1427 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (with-
out citing Filartiga, holds that no implied cause of action arises merely from breach of custom-
ary international law; there must be specific implementing legislation). But see Paust, supra
note 4, at 628, 649-50 (criticizes Tel-Oren opinions of Judges Bork and Edwards as "deviant,"
"ludicrous," "false, arrogant nonsense," and "patently erroneous").
Significantly, the authors of the Tel-Oren and Artukovic opinions did not challenge Filar-
tiga's other important holdings about customary international law. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
820 (Bork, J., concurring) (agrees with following major propositions established in Filartiga:
that "law of nations" is not stagnant and should be construed as it exists today; that one source
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some courts and commentators agreeing with this holding have empha-
sized that few norms have been established widely enough to be recog-
nized as part of customary international law. 5
In summary, there is much scholarly support for the view that most
international human rights norms constitute at least binding rules of cus-
tomary law if not, indeed, nonderogable rules orjus cogens. 86 Accord-
ingly, commentators have argued that various international human
rights norms should be viewed as controlling in U.S. litigation.87 Rela-
tively few courts, however, actually have enforced this theory in specific
cases. 8
8
of that law is customs and usages of civilized nations, as articulated by jurists and commenta-
tors; that international law today confers fundamental rights upon all people to be free from
torture; and that section 1350 opens federal courts for adjudication of rights already recog-
nized by international law; disagrees with Filartiga only to extent that it assumes section 1350
not only confers jurisdiction, but also creates private cause of action for any violation of law of
nations; instead argues that section 1350 merely confers jurisdiction to enforce international
norm that itself provides cause of action).
85. See United States v. Covos, 872 F.2d 805, 808 (8th Cir. 1989) (insufficient evidence to
demonstrate that customary international law prohibits warrantless use of pen register to track
all calls made from telephone); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 964 n.4 (lth Cir. 1984) (there is
apparently no customary international law norm against detention of uninvited aliens); Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795-96 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concur-
ring) (distinguished Filartiga on ground that, unlike torture, politically motivated terrorism
does not violate customary international law); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647
F.2d 320, 325 n.16 (2d Cir. 1981) (distinguished Filartiga on ground that, unlike torture, com-
mercial acts at issue did not violate customary international law) rev'd, 461 U.S. 480 (1983); In
re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544, 596 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (right to education not
recognized as customary international law principle); see also Hartman, supra note 67, at 665
(practical use of customary international law "may be restricted to rather narrow range of
issues as to which international consensus has developed adequately").
86. See supra text accompanying notes 49-58.
87. See Hartman, supra note 67, at 659-87 (customary international norms prohibiting
execution of individual who was juvenile at time of offense is incorporated into federal com-
mon law and supreme over inconsistent state legislation); Paust, supra note 40, at 53 (uniform
international prohibition on hollow-point ammunition should provide basis for proscribing po-
lice use of such ammunition in U.S.); Comment, Customary International Law and Women's
Rights: The Equal Rights Amendment as a Fait Accompli, 1 DET. C.L. REV. 121, 125, 148-49
(1987) (authored by Judith Guertin) (as part of customary international law, principles man-
dating equal rights for women, including reduction of disparity between women's and men's
economic conditions, are part of U.S. law, controlling in U.S. courts). The foregoing authori-
ties also argue, in the alternative, for a "weaker" indirect theory of domestic incorporation:
that the applicable international norms should provide guidance in interpreting domestic legal
provisions. See infra text accompanying notes 144-47.
88. Another potential avenue for incorporating international human rights standards was
recently discussed-and rejected-in In re Alien Children Educ. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.
Tex. 1980). Plaintiffs argued that a state statute prohibiting the use of state funds to educate
undocumented alien children should be invalidated under the Constitution's supremacy clause
because it impermissibly interfered with U.S. foreign policy. They maintained that the eradi-
cation of illiteracy and the expansion of educational opportunities constitute elemen6 of U.S.
II. Interpretive Use of International Human Rights Norms
In contrast to U.S. courts' current reluctance to view themselves as
bound directly by international human rights principles on substantive
issues, they are much more willing to invoke such principles-whether
embodied in treaties or in other manifestations of customary interna-
tional law-to guide the interpretation of domestic legal norms. 89 There
is also a scholarly consensus supporting this interpretive use of interna-
tional human rights norms in domestic litigation.90 Even apostles of pos-
foreign policy, as evidenced by the government's signature of treaties and its active support for
the international recognition of human rights. Id. at 590.
The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' contention that "the federal recognition of
human rights, by itself, prevents the states from interfering with the enjoyment of these
rights." Id. at 594. It distinguished the three Supreme Court decisions upon which plaintiffs
relied by stressing that the state policies those cases invalidated posed direct threats to central
U.S. foreign policy concerns and purported to assess the legitimacy of foreign governments,
thus potentially causing friction with such governments. See id. at 594 (citing Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (striking down Oregon statute conditioning foreign resident's right
to inherit property in Oregon on "democracy quotient" of foreign regime); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 231 (1942) (New York policy "refuses to give effect or recognition in New
York to acts of the Soviet Government which the United States by its policy of recognition
agreed no longer to question"); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (New York
could not undermine compact between U.S. and Soviet Union)).
89. International law norms are identified through the same types of evidence, see supra
text accompanying notes 45-47, when the norms are used for interpretive purposes as when
they are asserted to be directly binding. See Hartman, Enforcement of International Human
Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 741, 748-50 (1985).
90. See, e.g., Linde, Comments, 18 INT'L LAW. 77, 80-81 (1984):
[I]f you are to succeed with your argument that a provision of human rights law is
law in a domestic court, you must be able to show that the national lawmakers...
intended this effect .... But often there is no need to take on that burden.
If instead, you argue that a court should look to international instruments to
assist it in interpreting a domestic statute or constitution, then you are asking the
court to do what it is empowered to do and using international law in the process.
Moreover, an advocate wishing to invoke international human rights norms reason-
ably could argue that an applicable domestic law already contains the protections
that the claimant contends, but that, if the court were not to accept this view, then
the court might well find itself running afoul of national policy as expressed by the
United States government through its participation in international human rights
activities and declarations.
See also Claydon, The Use of International Human Rights Law to Interpret Canada's Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 349, 359 (1987) (urges more use of international
sources for persuasive purposes, in interpreting Canadian Charter, without direct implementa-
tion); Hoffman, The Application of International Human Rights Law in State Courts: A View
from California, 18 INT'L LAW. 61, 61 (1984) (the use of international human rights law that
is most likely to be accepted by state court judges, and which in author's opinion is most
appropriate, is to provide specific content to broad norms such as equal protection or due
process); Maier, supra note 60, at 481 ("Encouraging incremental acceptance of international
law into the domestic legal system is the best and surest way to maintain its stability ....
[S]eeking to endow it with too much authority too quickly can only be detrimental .... ");
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itivism concede that judges should be free to resolve ambiguities, or to fill
gaps, in positive law by reference to universally accepted legal
principles. 91
Acceptable as is the interpretive use of international human rights
standards for construing the substantive content of domestic law princi-
ples, such use should be even more acceptable for construing the method-
ological approach toward enforcing domestic law principles. The role
that international law would play in guiding analytical techniques is even
more attenuated than its role in guiding substantive interpretations.
Therefore, that role should be palatable even to jurists of an isolationist
inclination, who resist assigning to international law any powerful posi-
tion in the domestic arena. The modesty of the proposed role for interna-
tional human rights norms should not, however, belie its significance.
The increasingly rich jurisprudence under the European Convention and
the Canadian Charter, in particular, provide important insights into legal
process issues in U.S. individual rights adjudication.
The resort to international human rights standards for purposes of
construing domestic statutes and constitutions is fully consistent with,
and justified by: U.S. foreign policy stances; the intent of the framers of
the U.S. Constitution; the early practice of U.S. courts and other govern-
ment officials; the concerns of jurists who take an "interpretivist" view of
constitutional adjudication; the practice of courts in other countries; the
recommendations of international law scholars; and the consistent prac-
tice of federal and state courts throughout the U.S. Each of these justifi-
cations for the interpretive use of international human rights norms is
discussed in turn below. Thereafter, the Article shows why these justifi-
cations are especially weighty in the specific context of process issues.
A. Consistency with U.S. Foreign Policy
To assign to international human rights norms at least an indirect,
interpretive role in domestic litigation is seemly in light of the U.S. Gov-
Paust, supra note 40, at 42 (use of customary international norms for interpreting constitu-
tional terms is especially useful "in this age of global interdependence which creates transna-
tional patterns of subjectivity and a more detailed manifestation of uniform expectations about
the content of basic human rights"); Paust, supra note 4, at 593-94 & n.359 (discussing the
need for more effectively using human rights precepts in private litigation).
91. See H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 438-40 (W. Tucker ed. 1966);
see also H. KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 353-55 (M. Knight trans. 1967) (author considers
international law together with national law as one system of norms); H. KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 145-49 (A. Wedberg trans. 1961); MacCormick, A Moralistic
Case for A-Moralistic Law?, 20 VAL. U.L. REV. 1, 20 (1985) ("All [legal questions] are morally
loaded. None can be answered without staking out some moral position.").
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ernment's asserted championship of international human rights. Our
government was a major force in forming the United Nations and draft-
ing the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter.92 We also have
taken a leading role in drafting, and getting other countries to sign and
ratify, approximately forty other international human rights instru-
ments. 93 U.S. government officials profess outrage when international
human rights norms are violated,94 and on occasion manifest this outrage
in concrete terms, for example, by withholding foreign aid or trade privi-
leges. 95 The U.S. is one of the first nations in the world to enact a sub-
stantial body of domestic law designed to increase the enforcement of
internationally guaranteed human rights through economic incentives
and sanctions.96 These laws have served as models for similar legislation,
92. See L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 506-09 (1973); Rusk, supra note 7, at 515.
93. Comment, supra note 87, at 133.
94. See Christenson, supra note 80, at 46 (noting "paradox that while court-cited provin-
cial (their own) sources of law lead us to become juridically isolated, our perceptions refer
nonetheless to the interconnectedness of global reality as justification for universal norms ....
We are outraged when these norms are violated.").
95. See, e.g., § 502B(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended 22 U.S.C.
§ 2304 (1982)) and § 116(a) of the same Act (22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1982)) (denying military or
security assistance, or economic aid, respectively, to countries that demonstrate "a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights"). Other U.S. statutes
that curtail military or economic assistance to states that violate human rights include: Inter-
national Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729
(1976) (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.); International Development and Food
Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-424, 92 Stat. 937 (codified in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.); Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-426, 92 Stat.
965 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 1, 5, 8, 16, 20, 22, & 44 U.S.C.); International
Monetary Fund Supplementary Financing Facility, Pub. L. No. 95-435, 92 Stat. 1051 (Oct. 10,
1978) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286(a), (e); Appropriation for Foreign Assistance and Related
Programs, Pub. L. No. 95-481, 92 Stat. 1599 (1979) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 262, 2169);
Export-Import Bank Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 5, 12, 15, 18, 31 & 42 U.S.C.); Inter-American Development Act and African
Development Fund, Pub. L. No. 94-302, 90 Stat. 591 (1976) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 283,
290(g), 2101).
Furthermore, legislation governing U.S. participation in international financial institu-
tions such as the World Bank also requires the U.S. representatives to vote against aid to
countries whose governments engage in gross human rights violations. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.
§ 262(d) (1986).
In addition to the foregoing generally applicable legislation, Congress has enacted various
country-specific laws aimed at forcing the Executive Branch to cut off aid to a particular coun-
try to which the general laws are not, in Congress' view, being applied as strictly as they
should be. See Buergenthal, The U.S. and International Human Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. L.J. 141,
156-57 (1988).
96. Congress, however, has not consistently enforced this human rights legislation. See
D. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 51-
79 (1988).
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that other nations are now beginning to adopt.97 As one observer com-
mented, since 1970 the status of human rights in other countries has be-
come "a central factor in United States foreign policy ... second only to
overriding considerations of national security."' 98
Consistent with the leadership role that the U.S. has assumed in
promoting the worldwide acceptance and implementation of human
rights norms, it is appropriate that such norms be observed in domestic
litigation at least to the limited extent of being considered in interpreting
and applying ambiguous provisions of domestic positive law. To deny
international human rights norms even this modest role could seem hyp-
ocritical99 in view of the U.S. insistence that other nations directly adopt
and enforce such norms.I °O
B. Consistency with Framers' Intent and Early Judicial Practice
The suggestion that domestic courts make interpretive use of cus-
tomary international human rights norms "has an historic basis older
even than the United States Constitution."' 101 As discussed above, dur-
ing our nation's pre-Revolutionary and early constitutional history, cus-
tomary international law was generally assumed to play an even more
significant role in domestic jurisprudence; at that early stage, such law
was regularly treated as directly binding on, and enforceable in, domestic
courts. 10 2 The frequency with which U.S. courts treated international
97. See Buergenthal, supra note 95, at 141.
98. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 52, at 80 n.114 (citing Congressional Research Ser-
vice, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Human Rights and U.S. Policy Issues
(May 6, 1977, updated April 19, 1979); see also Human Rights: An Important Concern of US.
Foreign Policy, 76 DEP'T ST. BULL. 289, 290 (1977) (statement by Deputy Secretary of State
Warren Christopher) (during Carter Administration, concern for human rights was "an inte-
gral part of our foreign policy").
99. See Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1250 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J., dissent-
ing) ("That any judicial tribunal ... would choose to place a class of persons outside the
protection against human rights violations... is surprising. That it should be an American
court will.., embarrass our Government."); see also U.S. Government brief in the Filartiga
case, supra note 58, at 922 (refusal to recognize private cause of action for human rights viola-
tion in U.S. federal courts might seriously damage U.S. credibility in human rights field).
100. See § 502B(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C.
§ 2304(a)(1)), which enunciates the policy considerations underlying U.S. legislation condi-
tioning benefits on enforcement of international human rights:
The United States shall, in accordance with its international obligations as set forth
in the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the constitutional heritage
and traditions of the United States, promote and encourage increased respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world.... Accordingly, a
principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote the in-
creased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries.
101. Paust, supra note 40, at 92.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64; see also Paust, supra note 4, at 651.
norms as directly binding was greater during the country's early history
and declined during the nineteenth century. The frequency with which
U.S. courts have used international norms for interpretive guidance has
followed this same historic pattern. This pattern may have reflected the
initial paucity, followed by a growing availability, of domestic legal
sources.103 It also was reinforced by the relatively restrictive, positivist
conception of international law that became increasingly dominant dur-
ing the late nineteenth century.104 But this "conservative" or "classical"
conception was on the wane by the middle of the twentieth century.
0 5
At that point, courts again became more receptive to considering interna-
tional standards in interpreting domestic legal norms.
C. Consistency with Practice in Other Nations
Consistent with the generally increasing tendency of countries
around the world to recognize international human rights norms, courts
in other countries are more frequently using such norms to construe do-
mestic legislation and constitutions. For example, at the conclusion of a
1988 colloquium among judges of British Commonwealth countries, the
participating jurists recognized " 'a growing tendency for national courts
to have regard to these international norms [protecting human rights] for
the purpose of deciding cases where the domestic law-whether constitu-
tional, statute or common law-is uncertain or incomplete.' "o106 The
participants welcomed this development and urged courts and lawyers to
make even more vigorous interpretive use of international human rights
norms in the future.1
0 7
103. See Wright, supra note 36, at 81.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
105. See Parker & Neylon, supra note 49, at 422.
106. Kirby, The Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of International Human
Rights Norms, 14 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1196, 1197 (1988).
107. It is within the proper nature of the judicial process and well established judicial
functions for national courts to have regard to international obligations which a
country undertakes-whether or not they have been incorporated into domestic
law-for the purpose of removing ambiguity or uncertainty from national constitu-
tions, legislation, or common law.
Id.
Even where domestic or "national" law is not incomplete or ambiguous, the participants
urged that it should still be evaluated in light of applicable international human rights norms,
and if necessary, modified to conform to such norms. They stated:
[W]here national law is clear, and inconsistent with the international obligations of
the State concerned, in common law countries the national court is obliged to give
effect to national law. In such cases the court should draw such inconsistencies to
the attention of the appropriate authorities since the supremacy of national law in no
way mitigates a breach of an international legal obligation which is undertaken by a
country.
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Canadian courts and lawyers regularly have invoked international
human rights standards in interpreting Canada's Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. °10  One survey of the first five years of Charter jurisprudence
concluded that international human rights standards were actually out-
come-determinative in about five percent of all Charter cases in which
such standards were invoked and influential to the outcome in about
thirty percent of these cases.' 0 9 More strikingly, even before Canadian
liberties were entrenched through the Charter, a Canadian court relied
on the U.N. Charter to interpret Canadian "public policy" in a rights
protective fashion. Three years before the U.S. Supreme Court invoked
the fourteenth amendment to justify its refusal to enforce a racially re-
strictive covenant in Shelley v. Kraemer, 110 the Ontario High Court re-
fused to enforce an anti-Semitic restrictive covenant on the ground that it
violated the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter and thus was
contrary to Canadian public policy.1 '
The domestic interpretive use of international human rights norms
is common in other countries outside the British Commonwealth as well.
The standards embodied in the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights have had a significant effect on the domestic jurispru-
dence of many European countries. 12 Similarly, even absent a written
declaration of rights binding on the European Economic Community, its
European Court of Justice has undertaken to enforce "basic individual
Id.
108. See Claydon, supra note 90, at 349; Hovius, supra note 13, at 218.
109. Claydon, supra note 90, at 357. The total number of reported Charter cases in which
the judges referred to international human rights law was "more than seventy." Id.
The Canadian Charter expressly calls for interpretation in light of standards beyond Can-
ada's own jurisprudence, insofar as article I sanctions limitations on Charter rights that are
necessary in a "free and democratic society." Moreover, norms embodied in several interna-
tional human rights treaties strongly influenced the Charter-drafting process. See id. at 349.
Both of these factors distinguish the U.S. Bill of Rights from the Canadian Charter. Neither
factor, however, should warrant a less significant role for international norms in interpreting
Bill of Rights, in contrast with Charter, provisions. First, although the U.S. Constitution does
not expressly advert to norms common to "free" or "democratic" societies, the Supreme Court
consistently has relied on such widely shared standards in protecting certain implied funda-
mental rights. See infra text accompanying notes 133-35. Second, just as the recently enacted
Canadian Charter was influenced by earlier international human rights instruments, so the
latter were influenced by the even earlier U.S. Bill of Rights. Furthermore, the Bill of Rights
exerted an important influence on the Canadian Charter. See Claydon, supra note 90, at 350.
Consequently, the judicial interpretations of any of these interrelated norms should be equally
relevant in construing any of the others.
110. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
111. In re Drummond Wren, 4 D.L.R. 674 (Ontario High Ct. 1945).
112. See Jensen, The Impact of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights on National Law, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 760, 790 (1983).
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rights" that are "implicit in the general principles of Community law" " I3
by interpreting those "general principles" in light of the "constitutional
traditions common to member states."" 4  Moreover, the European
Court of Justice has found these implied principles by referring to the
European Convention, even when that instrument was not binding on all
Community member states." 15
D. Consistency with Interpretivist Concerns
From the perspective of an interpretivist-someone who believes the
Constitution and statutes should be construed relatively strictly accord-
ing to their literal terms-there are advantages to using international
human rights norms to interpret ambiguous or incomplete domestic legal
standards. The existence and acceptance of international human rights
norms are matters susceptible to objective determination. Such norms
are manifested in both written instruments and the actual practices of
nations. Moreover, whether a particular norm is reflected in a multilat-
eral treaty that has been explicitly ratified by multiple nations, or
whether it is reflected in widely shared practices around the world, the
norm requires the acquiescence of numerous societies. Therefore, judi-
cial interpretation of international human rights norms avoids a signifi-
cant potential danger involved in judicial interpretations of ambiguous or
open-ended positive law provisions: that the judges will rely on their
own subjective, individualistic notions of morality." 16
113. Stauder v. City of Ulm, 15 Receuil 419 (1970), 7 COMMON MKT. L.R. 342 (1970).
114. Pescatore, The Protection of Human Rights in the European Communities, 9 CoM-
MON MKT. L.R. 73, 77 (1972) (written communication submitted on behalf of European Court
of Justice by one judge of that Court, at Parliamentary Conference on Human Rights organ-
ized by Council of Europe on October 18-20, 1970).
115. See id. at 79.
116. Two international law scholars who have urged U.S. courts to interpret particular
constitutional standards in light of international norms have cogently explained the interpre-
tivist appeal of such an approach. See Hartman, supra note 67, at 691-93 (footnotes omitted):
[U]sing established international norms to inform the meaning of constitutional pro-
visions deflects some of the more telling criticisms of noninterpretive review. Peg-
ging constitutional definitions to objectively verifiable customary norms permits
progressive development of constitutional law while minimizing the subjective contri-
bution of the individual judge in identifying shared community values. Even some
theorists who are, at heart, interpretivists yearn for workable noninterpretive stan-
dards for those constitutional principles they regard as crucial, albeit imprecise or
historically unprecedented....
... The "natural law" and shared moral precepts components found in human
rights norms complement the strong positivist component, which is keyed to objec-
tively demonstrable state practice and clear articulation in authoritative international
instruments.... The ruling moral choice embodied in the norm is more compelling
than the product of ordinary, noninterpretive review, because it results from an elab-
[Vol. 41
April 1990] U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL PROTECTION 831
E. Consistency with U.S. Judicial Practice
The preceding discussion has elaborated on a number of rationales
for the conclusion that U.S. courts should make interpretive use of inter-
national human rights standards. In fact, throughout U.S. history, fed-
eral and state courts have invoked international legal norms in
interpreting provisions of domestic constitutions and statutes. Both
lower federal courts and state supreme courts may initiate interpretive
use of international standards, independent of the U.S. Supreme Court's
leadership in this area. There is no hierarchy of courts in interpreting
international law in contrast to domestic law." 7 Accordingly, some state
and lower federal courts have made significant contributions to this
emerging area of jurisprudence.' 8
Moreover, state and local executive and legislative branch officials
have issued directives reflecting international human rights norms.' 19
orate process for the formation of international consensus, not the lonely "prophecy"
of a single judge.
See Paust, supra note 67, at 236-37:
With a comprehensive perspective, the courts could more easily and more ra-
tionally discover the content of rights which are not specifically enumerated in the
Constitution .... A court which uses these sorts of indicia of "rights" content
would not be acting arbitrarily, deferring to transcendental sources, or expounding a
personal social preference. On the contrary, it would be rationally implementing
social demands and expectations which are generally shared and which are empiri-
cally discernible.... [A] court [which invoked universally shared norms] can recap-
ture the broader jurisprudential perspective thought necessary by the Framers of the
Constitution, without resorting to the evils of a naturalist school--e.g., ad hocery,
autonomous concepts, personal viewpoints, arbitrary decision-making, and so forth
Accord i. at 259-60; Paust, supra note 40, at 51.
The use of international human rights norms to inform the interpretation of domestic
legal standards is advantageous from the perspective of international, as well as domestic, law.
See Woloshyn, To What Extent Can Canadian Courts be Expected to Enforce International
Human Rights Law in Civil Litigation?, 50 SASKATCHEWAN L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1985):
Since World War II, international law in general, and international human
rights law in particular, has developed... in many ways.... Nevertheless the status
of individuals before international tribunals is still very limited. Lawyers interested
in human rights issues, while hopeful of an expansion of remedies on the interna-
tional front, must seek to import beneficial international law principles into domestic
courts as these are the fora most readily available to individual litigants, as well as
being the ones before which they must appear against their will.
117. Hoffman, supra note 90, at 67.
118. Over the course of U.S. judicial history, state courts traditionally have taken the lead
in enforcing fundamental rights. Not only was the leadership role that the Warren Court
exercised in this regard unusual in the context of the Supreme Court's general history, but even
many Warren Court decisions had been presaged by rights-protective state court decisions. Id.
at 66-67.
119. See Paust, supra note 40, at 21 (in 1974, Connecticut State Adjutant General declared
that police use of hollow-nosed ammunition would violate international law and should be
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Further, neither the Supreme Court nor any other U.S. federal or state
court deliberately has declined to invoke international human rights
standards in an interpretive vein. 120 It is also noteworthy that the U.S.
Government has contended, in briefs submitted to the Supreme Court,
that the human rights principles in the U.N. Charter represent U.S. pub-
lic policy and hence should guide the Court's constitutional
interpretation. 121
This section surveys Supreme Court and lower court decisions ex-
pressly relying on international norms of human rights law in interpret-
ing both constitutional and statutory provisions. The opinions in which
courts have acknowledged explicitly the role played by international
human rights standards are merely a subset of the opinions that such
standards actually have influenced. As observed by a lawyer who sought
to evaluate the European Convention's influence on the domestic law of
European countries, "judges seldom reveal--indeed they may not even
be aware of-their real motivations for adhering to certain principles." 122
Similarly, a study of the impact of U.N. Charter provisions outlawing
racial discrimination on U.S. Supreme Court decisions concluded that
the Charter provisions played a more significant role than is indicated
simply by explicit Supreme Court references to them. 123
(1) Supreme Court Decisions
In a recently published comprehensive survey of the use of interna-
tional human rights norms by U.S. courts throughout American history,
Professor Paust concluded that "most of the Supreme Court Justices
throughout our constitutional history have recognized that human rights
prohibited throughout the state; Hartford City Council, adverting to international law pro-
scription, unanimously denounced use of such ammunition by state or local police).
120. See infra text accompanying notes 128-29 (Supreme Court plurality opinion says in-
ternational human rights standards should not be dispositive of eighth amendment issue, but
are relevant); cf. Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti, 515 F. Supp. 1049, 1061 n.18 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(stated that there was no need to rely on customary international human rights law in constru-
ing domestic legal principles, as petitioner had requested; relying simply on domestic authori-
ties, court already had concluded that petitioner was entitled to relief he sought).
121. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 92, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (No. 72).
122. Jensen, supra note 112, at 761.
123. See Lockwood, supra note 18, at 948-49:
[T]he courts were fully cognizant of the central antiracial discrimination norms of
the Charter and of the international ramifications of continued segregation at
home .... [I]t is a fair inference ... that these factors ... played a role in helping
American courts to redefine constitutional provisions that previously had been held
not to reach segregation. ... One senses that the Charter was an important influence
on the judiciary, sub silentio.
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can provide useful content for the identification, clarification and supple-
mentation of constitutional or statutory norms." 124 Moreover, Professor
Paust demonstrated that, throughout U.S. history, the Supreme Court's
interpretive reliance on international human rights norms has been in-
creasing steadily. 125 He has also shown that the many Supreme Court
Justices who have invoked human rights concepts have spanned dispa-
rate jurisprudential approaches, that nearly all of the Court's present
members have invoked such precepts, and that none of the present Jus-
tices has repudiated the interpretive use of human rights norms.126
a. Constitutional Interpretation
In the constitutional domain, the Supreme Court has invoked inter-
national human rights norms most consistently in determining whether a
death penalty is cruel and unusual in violation of the eighth amend-
ment. 127 In one of the death penalty decisions issued during the Court's
1988-89 Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion cautioned that
neither international human rights norms nor the legal standards of
other countries should be dispositive of the eighth amendment issue. In-
stead, these standards should serve only to corroborate those inferable
from U.S. law. 128 In contrast, the dissenting Justices noted that previous
Supreme Court decisions had accorded more weight to international and
transnational legal standards.129 In another eighth amendment con-
124. Paust, supra note 4, at 596.
125. See id. at 584, 588-89 (since 1930, Supreme Court's invocation of human rights
precepts has increased five-fold over Court's preceding history; further, Court's use of these
precepts has increased in last 25 years; Supreme Court used "human rights" or equivalent
phrases in 50 cases from 1793 to 1893, and in 93 cases from 1925 to 1989, with nearly half the
latter occurring in the last 20 years).
126. See id. at 590.
127. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 593 n.4, 596, n.10 (1974).
128. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2975 n.1 (1989) ("While 'the practices of
other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to detehnining whether a prac-
tice uniform among our people is not merely an historical accident, but rather so "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" that it occupies a place not merely in our mores, but.., in our
Constitution as well,' they cannot... establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that
the practice is accepted among our people.") (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 2985 & n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Our cases recognize that objective in-
dicators of contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation in other countries is
also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis.... In addition..., three leading human
rights treaties ratified or signed by the United States explicitly prohibit juvenile death
penalties.").
text, 130 the court has referred to international legal standards in invali-
dating the "infliction of unneccessary suffering upon prisoners."' 131
Beyond the eighth amendment context, both the Court as a whole
and individual Supreme Court Justices have relied on international
human rights norms to construe the fifth and sixth amendment's fair
criminal process guarantees 132 and the fifth and fourteenth amendment's
due process and equal protection guarantees. Although not expressly re-
lying on international human rights norms, many Supreme Court deci-
sions evaluating whether a right is sufficiently "fundamental" to be
protected under the fourteenth amendment have referred to the "univer-
sal sense of justice" 133 and similar formulations 34 that are strikingly sim-
ilar to characterizations of customary international law. 135
b. Statutory Interpretation
In 1804 Chief Justice John Marshall declared, "an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other
possible construction remains."' 136  The Court has continued to invoke
130. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
131. Id. at 103 n.8.
132. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 161 n.16, 164-66 (1963) (cites UDHR
to support conclusion that federal statute violates fifth and sixth amendments).
133. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
134. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) ("universally thought");
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (the virtual unanimity of the "civilized nations of the
world"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169, 172-73 (1952) (norms of "human rights"
law; "shocks the conscience"); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (police con-
duct had to conform to "civilized standards"); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) (gov-
ernment cannot act in way that "den[ies] fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense
of justice"); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898) ("certain immutable principles of
justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may
disregard"); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("expe-
rience with the requirements of a free society"); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459, 469 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("standards of decency more or less univer-
sally accepted").
135. See, e.g., Hague Convention No. IV, preamble, 1 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNA-
TIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 633 (compiled by
C. BEVANS); Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277,
T.S. No. 539 (Feb. 28, 1910) (defines "the law of nations" as "result[ing] from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the
public conscience").
It is also noteworthy that the U.S. Government has contended in Supreme Court briefs
that the human rights principles in the U.N. Charter represent U.S. public policy and hence
should guide the Court's constitutional interpretation. See Brief for the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 97-101 (1948) (Docket No. 72).
136. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
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this precept through the present day, 137 specifically in the context of
human rights guarantees.
138
(2) Lower Court Decisions
As previously noted, both lower federal courts and state courts may
independently invoke international human rights norms for interpretive
purposes, regardless of whether the Supreme Court takes the lead in this
direction. 39 Lower federal court judges actually have relied on interna-
tional human rights standards in construing both constitutional 40 and
statutory provisions, 14 and state court judges have done the same.' 42
137. See, eg., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
571, 578 (1953). This principle is also embodied in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 134 (1987).
138. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1214
(1987) (term "refugee" in Refugee Act of 1980 was to be interpreted in conformance with
definition in U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24,
34 (1948) (in construing 1866 Civil Rights Act to preclude judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants in District of Columbia, Court noted that, even absent Act, judicial en-
forcement of covenants would contravene U.S. public policy, and that U.N. treaties are a
source for determining content of public policy); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern
Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 549 n.5 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (refers to UDHR
art. 20(2)).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
140. See Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1248-50 (3rd Cir. 1981) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (in light of international agreements proscribing experimentation on human sub-
jects, such conduct violates U.S. and state constitutions and laws); Rodriguez-Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388-90 (10th Cir. 1981) (indefinite detention violates due process
clause of fifth amendment, citing provisions of UDHR and American Convention) (dictum);
United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 277-80, reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974)
(Milligan, J., dissenting) (U.S. agents' abduction of alien defendant from Uruguay would vio-
late provisions in U.N. and O.A.S. Charters, thus violating his rights under fifth amendment
due process clause; proof of such abduction would require dismissal of charges against defend-
ant); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9 (D. Conn. 1980) (cites U.N. Charter and
U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners as relevant to interpreting
requisite standards for treatment of prisoners under due process clause); Tayyari v. New Mex-
ico State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1378-79 (D. N.M. 1980) (in interpreting President's consti-
tutional power to conduct foreign affairs, refers to UDHR and International Convention on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights); Copeland v. Secretary of State, 226 F. Supp. 20, 32
n.16 (S.D.N.Y.) (in interpreting constitutional right to travel, cites UDHR), vacated, 378 U.S.
588 (1964).
141. See Cerillo-Perez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 809 F.2d 1419, 1423 (9th
Cir. 1987) (uses UDHR to interpret provision of federal immigration statute concerning de-
portation); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1389-90 (10th Cir. 1981) (cites
"accepted international law principles" to support construction of Immigration and Naturali-
zation Act; in doing so, rejected orthodox interpretation established by long line of cases); In
Re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439, 461 (8th Cir. 1970) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (federal naturaliza-
tion statute should be interpreted consistently with UDHR); United States v. Williams, 480 F.
Supp. 482, 486 n.3 (D. Mass.) (in interpreting statute regarding extradition, considers UDHR
and ICCPR), rev'd, 611 F.2d 914 (Ist Cir. 1979); see also Paust, Book Review, 60 CORNELL L.
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Professor Paust's recent exhaustive survey concluded that the gener-
alizations regarding the Supreme Court's reliance on international
human rights standards, summarized above, apply as well to lower fed-
eral court opinions.
14 3
REV. 231, 242 (1975) (Filartiga case illustrates indirect, as well as direct, incorporation of
international human rights law to extent meaning of Alien Tort Statute is unclear and interna-
tional law is relevant to its interpretation).
142. The following state court decisions relied on international human rights norms in
construing constitutional provisions: City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130
n.2, 610 P.2d 436, 439 n.2, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542 n.2 (1980) (refers to UDHR in defining
scope of state constitutional right of privacy as invalidating zoning ordinance that prohibits
more than five nonrelated individuals from cohabiting); American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Em-
ployment & Hous. Comm'n, 32 Cal. 3d 603, 608 n.4, 651 P.2d 1151, 1154 n.4, 186 Cal. Rptr.
345, 348 n.4 (1982) (constitutional provision prohibiting employment discrimination should be
interpreted in light of UDHR) (dictum); People v. Levins, 22 Cal. 3d 620, 625, 568 P.2d 939,
942, 150 Cal. Rptr 458, 461, (1978) (Newman, J., concurring) (in interpreting equal protection
guarantee, cites UDHR and ICCPR) (dictum); Cramer v. Tyars, 23 Cal. 3d 131, 151 n. 1, 588
P.2d 793, 805 n.1, 151 Cal. Rptr. 653, 665 n.1 (1979) (Newman, J., dissenting) (in interpreting
state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, refers to UDHR); Sei Fujii v. State, 38
Cal. 2d 718, 725-35, 242 P.2d 617, 622-28 (1952) (invokes U.N. Charter's non-discrimination
norms to interpret evolving standards under fourteenth amendment); Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.
2d 711, 732-33, 198 P.2d 17, 29-30 (1948) (Carter, J., concurring) (in joining court's opinion to
invalidate miscegenation statute under fourteenth amendment equal protection clause, relies
on U.N. Charter); In re Barbara White, 97 Cal. App. 3d 141, 149 n.4, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567
n.4 (1979) (in finding implied constitutional right to intrastate travel, cites UDHR); Sheridan
Rd. Baptist Church v. Department of Educ., 426 Mich. 462, 537 n.30, 396 N.W.2d 373, 408 n.
30 (1986) (in construing scope of parents' constitutional right to direct children's education
under due process and free exercise guarantees, cites UDHR), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050
(1978); Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 622 n.21, 625 P.2d 123, 131 n.21 (1981) (in interpreting
state constitutional provision protecting imprisoned individuals from "unnecessary rigor" as
prohibiting female guards from searching intimate bodily areas of male prisoners, relies on
customary international standard of respect for dignity of prisoners and cites UDHR, ICCPR,
European Convention, and American Convention); Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579, 604, 204
P.2d 569, 579 (1949) (Oregon statute prohibiting aliens from owning land held to violate four-
teenth amendment equal protection clause, as interpreted in light of U.N. Charter); Eggert v.
City of Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 840, 841, 505 P.2d 801, 802 (1973) (in interpreting implied consti-
tutional right to travel, relies on UDHR); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 864 n.5 (W. Va.
1979) (in interpreting federal and state equal protection guarantees as protecting fundamental
right to education, cites UDHR); Wilson v. Hacker, 200 Misc. 124, 135, 101 N.Y.S.2d 461,
473 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (cites article 2 of UDHR, which prohibits sex discrimination, as
"[i]ndicative of the spirit of our times").
One state court opinion relied on international human rights norms in interpreting statu-
tory provisions: Boehm v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 3d 494, 502, 223 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721
(1986) (relies on UDHR to interpret California welfare statute as guaranteeing funds for cloth-
ing, transportation, and medical care).
143. See Paust, supra note 4, at 594 (human rights precepts have been referred to in over
90 circuit court opinions, including some from every circuit, since 1930, and in over 1000
lower federal court opinions overall; about half the relevant circuit court opinions were written
in the last ten years).
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F. Consistency with Scholarly Recommendations
In addition to the specific areas where U.S. courts already have re-
lied upon international human rights norms to interpret domestic law,
further recommendations for such use have been made by international
law experts. Professor Paust has urged, for example, that the clear inter-
national prohibition upon hollow-point ammunition should provide U.S.
decisionmakers with a ground for prohibiting police use of such weap-
ons.14" More generally, Professor Paust also has urged U.S. courts to
refer to international human rights principles in giving content to the
broadly phrased guarantees contained in the ninth amendment. 145 Pro-
fessor Hartman has advocated recourse to international human rights
principles proscribing the juvenile death penalty in interpreting the
eighth amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments."1 4
6
And a student commentator recently argued that equal treatment for wo-
men should be protected by U.S. constitutional guarantees interpreted in
light of gender equality principles under international law. 147
G. Interpretive Use of International Human Rights Norms for Resolving
Legal Process Issues
As the preceding discussion shows, the interpretive use of interna-
tional human rights norms to supply substantive content to domestic
legal provisions is well justified in theory, as well as long and widely
accepted in practice. The interpretive use of such norms to 'determine
methodological or analytical approaches for applying substantive stan-
dards is at least as well justified in theory, and should be even more ac-
ceptable in practice. All of the theoretical justifications for interpretive
use of international human rights norms in the substantive context-con-
sistency with U.S. foreign policy, the constitutional framers' intent, early
American judicial practice, practice in other nations, interpretivist con-
cerns, U.S. judicial practice, and scholarly recommendations-should
apply a fortiori in the process context. Such a limited role for interna-
tional standards should be acceptable even to judges of a particularly
isolationist inclination, while nevertheless providing a valuable broader
144. See Paust, supra note 40, at 53. Professor Paust also argues that the international
proscription should be directly binding on U.S. courts. See id. at 53.
145. Paust, supra note 141, at 237.
146. See Hartman, supra note 67, at 659, 687-98. Professor Hartman also argues, in the
alternative, that the proscription of the juvenile death penalty should be regarded as a directly
binding norm of customary international law. See id. at 659-87.
147. See Comment, supra note 87, at 125, 148-49. The comment also argues that gender
equality norms are part of customary international law, directly binding on U.S. courts. See
id. at 148.
perspective upon the appropriate judicial role in resolving individual
rights claims. The suggested use of international norms is one that is
sensitive to, and strikes a balance between, concerns of both national sov-
ereignty and individual liberty.
At present, there appears to be no explicit judicial discussion of the
proposed process-interpretive role for international human rights norms.
This vacuum may be due to the failure of lawyers and scholars to com-
mend such a possible use to judges' attention. The author is aware of
only one scholarly work that recommends a similar use of international
human rights standards: Professor Gordon A. Christenson's thoughtful
proposal that human rights norms should inform the levels of scrutiny
applied to government action under the due process and equal protection
standards of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 
148
Professor Christenson illustrates his proposed process-oriented in-
terpretive role for international norms through a discussion of Plyler v.
Doe. 149 In Plyler, the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause was violated by a Texas statute that de-
nied local school districts reimbursement for funds spent to educate
children not legally in the U.S. 150 Some human rights activists urged the
Court to hold for the first time that the Constitution guarantees a funda-
mental right to education.15 1 They argued that the U.S. is directly bound
by customary human rights principles, embodied in international instru-
ments, that recognize such a right.152 As Professor Christenson explains,
however, these arguments went beyond what was needed for interna-
tional human rights norms to inform domestic law in a fashion that
would be sensitive to both individual rights and national sovereignty and
would take account of both judicial responsibility and legislative power:
If children are denied education solely by reason of their status as ille-
gal aliens... a stronger argument would be that specific human rights
provisions binding upon many nation-states through external sources
of custom or agreement, justify application of a stricter standard of
scrutiny to discriminatory classifications burdening these rights. This
argument is more persuasive than the argument that an autonomous
148. Christenson, supra note 80, at 40; see also Paust, supra note 4, at 602.
149. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
150. Id. at 220.
151. Christenson, supra note 80, at 53.
152. The following international instruments provide that all children have a right of ac-
cess to free public education: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A.
Res. 217A (III), 3 U.N. GAOR 71, 76, art. 26(1), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 20, at art. 13(1); UNESCO
Convention on Discrimination in Education, arts. 3(e), 4, 429 U.N.T.S. 93 (1960); Declaration
of the Rights of the Child, principle 7, supra note 27, at 20.
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human rights norm such as free public education, never recognized as
such in United States constitutional law, limits state action.
153
Professor Christenson reasons that even if the Court did not find
that the U.S. Constitution implicitly guarantees a right just because that
right is widely recognized under international law, it still should evaluate
deprivations of such a right under some form of heightened scrutiny.
Heightened scrutiny also would be appropriate, in his view, with respect
to classifications thaf burden groups protected by international norms of
nondiscrimination.1 54 In short, he urges that the two triggers of equal
protection clause strict scrutiny-"fundamental rights" and "suspect
classifications"-be defined in light of international human rights
norms. 155
This Article builds upon Professor Christenson's specific proposal
and urge more generally that U.S. courts seek guidance from interna-
tional human rights jurisprudence in developing their overall judicial
process for reviewing claimed infringements of any constitutional rights.
Legal process issues that could be illuminated by the approaches for im-
plementing international human rights norms would include not only
the general level of judicial scrutiny, as Professor Christenson suggests,
but also the following specific issues:
-the scope accorded to a protected right, as a prima facie matter;
-whether a right is defined in negative terms only, or also in posi-
tive terms-i.e., whether it only. prohibits the state from interfering with
its exercise, or whether it also requires the state to afford any affirmative
protections, including protections against interference by private actors;
-how carefully designed or narrowly tailored a challenged govern-
ment measure should be for promoting the alleged government interest-
i.e., whether the measure should be necessary for that purpose, whether
153. Christenson, supra note 80, at 53.
154. See id. at 54:
Human rights norms indicate the consensus of civilized nations that education and
[equal treatment for aliens] are important values.... [D]iscriminatory classification
that burdens a fundamental value recognized by these international norms should...
trigger heightened scrutiny.
155. The Supreme Court currently uses heightened scrutiny to review government actions
that burden only a few rights deemed "fundamental," or that discriminate on the basis of only
a few classifications deemed "suspect." The Court has held fundamental rights to include-in
addition to enumerated constitutional guarantees-certain intimate personal choices about
child-bearing and child-rearing, interstate travel, voting, and access to certain judicial proce-
dures. It has held that fundamental rights do not include access to education or welfare bene-
fits, or engaging in consensual homosexual relations. The Court has held that "suspect"
classifications are those based on race, ethnicity, and alienage. It has held that classifications
based on illegitimacy, gender, age, or wealth are not suspect. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW ch. 16, at 1436 (2d ed. 1988).
it need only be useful, or whether it should satisfy some intermediate
standard in this regard;
-whether an asserted government justification for limiting a right
should be assessed in light of democratic values-i.e ., whether certain
government means or ends should be rejected as incompatible with such
values;
-how much weight should be assigned to the existence of alterna-
tive measures for pursuing an asserted government goal that are less in-
trusive on rights-i.e., whether the government should be required to
utilize the least restrictive alternative measure, or a less restrictive one;
-whether courts should assess the proportionality between a chal-
lenged measure's incursion on rights and its promotion of governmental
goals;
-the extent to which a government-imposed limitation on rights
must be clearly expressed in law, thus circumscribing government deci-
sionmakers' discretion in enforcing it;
-the extent to which courts should defer to the determinations of
decisionmakers in the other branches of government concerning the im-
portance of the countervailing government interest or the appropriate-
ness of the means chosen to advance that interest;
-which party bears the burden of proof, and what quantum and
type of evidence are necessary to meet that burden;
-how broadly a right is interpreted in temporal terms-i.e.,
whether it is interpreted in light of current norms, or instead in light of
evolving norms;
-the extent to which an alleged government interest is evaluated
not only in terms of laws in effect, but also in terms of whether, and how
consistently, any such laws are actually enforced;
-how broadly a right is interpreted in geographic terms-i.e.,
whether it is interpreted in light of more localized norms or in light of
norms prevalent in a broader geographic context;
-the amount and type of evidence that courts should demand to
evaluate a government interest allegedly promoted by a rights-infringing
measure-i.e., whether the government should adduce actual evidence of
tangible harm absent the measure or whether speculation about such
harm suffices;
-whether the government's asserted justification for a rights-in-
fringing measure should be the actual, good-faith motivation for the gov-
ernment's adoption of such measure; and
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-how important the government's asserted countervailing interest
must be.
The next Part of this Article analyzes the international law stan-
dards concerning these legal process issues. It focuses on the privacy
decisions of the European Commission and the European Court.
156
Although the following discussion concentrates on the European Con-
vention organs' privacy jurisprudence, the applicable process principles
have a broader significance in two respects. First, the Convention or-
gans' analytical approach to privacy claims parallels their approach to
claims regarding other rights. Second, the Convention organs' method-
ological strategies reflect broadly shared international standards. The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for example, which was
strongly influenced by the European Convention, incorporates similar
process standards, both on its face and as judicially interpreted.1 57 To
underscore that the European Convention privacy jurisprudence illus-
trates the legal process applicable to claims under international human
rights instruments more generally, the following discussion contains oc-
casional references both to rights other than privacy and to rights-protec-
tive instruments other than the European Convention.
1 58
III. Legal Process Analysis of International Human Rights
Jurisprudence
Article 8 of the European Convention, which protects privacy,1 59 is
structurally typical of the Convention's rights-protecting provisions.
Each of these provisions contains two sections: the first defining the
scope of the rights entitled to protection as a prima facie matter, and the
second delineating the grounds on which the government may limit such
156. See infra Part III.
157. See Gibson, supra note 12, at 27-28.
158. References to the Canadian Charter are particularly numerous for the same reason
that the European Convention is stressed: both instruments are enforceable, at the behest of
individuals, by relatively active tribunals, and therefore both have given rise to significant bod-
ies of jurisprudence.
159. Article 8 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
European Convention, supra note 10, at art. 8.
rights. 160 In evaluating whether challenged government conduct violates
article 8, both the Commission and the Court employ a relatively strict
form of scrutiny. 161 This strict standard is manifested both in the Con-
vention organs' relatively broad reading of article 8(1)'s rights-defining
language and in their relatively narrow reading of article 8(2)'s rights-
limiting language. A similarly strict scrutiny is applied under other Con-
vention provisions1 62 and other human rights instruments.
1 63
A. Broad Definition of Prima Facie Rights
The European Commission and Court liberally interpret article 8's
first clause, which defines privacy rights, t64 in two ways: first, as encom-
passing a wide range of rights and second, as imposing upon the govern-
ment the affirmative duty to protect individual privacy against
interference, including interference by non-state actors.
(1) Wide Range of Rights Secured
The European Commission and Court consistently have given a
broad scope to the rights that the Convention protects as a prima facie
matter. In the Commission's words, both Convention tribunals hold that
"the provisions of the Convention should not be interpreted restrictively
so as to prevent its aims and objects being achieved."'
65
160. This structural similarity among the various Convention provisions accounts for the
similar interpretive approaches that the Convention organs have employed in construing them
and makes a decision concerning one particular provision significant in terms of shedding light
on other, parallel provisions.
161. This generalization applies as well to the Convention organs' evaluation of alleged
violations of other Convention provisions. Throughout the remainder of this Article, the refer-
ences to article 8 should be construed as illustrative only; the statements also apply to structur-
ally similar Convention provisions unless expressly qualified.
162. See Warbrick, supra note 8, at 711 (European Court has construed Convention's pur-
pose as broadly protective of individual rights, at expense of state sovereignty).
163. See Bender, Justification for Limiting Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights and Free-
doms: Some Remarks About the Proper Role of Section One of the Canadian Charter, 13 MAN-
ITOBA L. REV. 669, 679 (1983):
Section l's reference to limits that can be "demonstrably justified suggests to me that
Charter balancing tests ought to be closer in character to the U.S. brand of "strict"
judicial scrutiny than to U.S. "minimum" scrutiny. The burden of showing an ade-
quate justification, that is, should be on the proponent of limiting Charter rights; that
burden, moreover, should be a heavy one-it should have factual (rather than specu-
lative) support in a substantial or compelling (rather than merely legitimate) govern-
mental or societal interest. I would think that care should be taken that limits on
protected rights and freedoms be no greater than demonstrably necessary to serve the
relevant governmental concerns.
164. Article 8(1) provides: "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence."
165. Golder Case, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. B) (1975).
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In accordance with the generally broad perspective on rights se-
cured by the Convention, 66 the Commission and Court have uniformly
recognized that it protects privacy rights beyond those expressly enumer-
ated in article 8. For example, although article 8-in contrast with the
corresponding provisions of other international human rights instru-
ments' 67-does not expressly protect "honor," "dignity," or "reputa-
tion," it has been interpreted as impliedly covering such concepts. 168
The European Commission's first description of the rights protected
by article 8, in a 1976 opinion that has been widely quoted in subsequent
Commission and Court rulings, 169 encompassed a broad array of rights:
For numerous anglo-saxon and French authors the right to respect for
"private life" is the right to privacy, the right to live, as far as one
wishes, protected from publicity .... In the opinion of the Commis-
sion, however, the right to respect for private life does not end there.
It comprises also, to a certain degree, the right to establish and develop
relationships with other human beings, especially in the emotional field
for the development and fulfillment of one's own personality.
170
Subsequent Commission rulings have amplified this broad descrip-
tion of privacy rights still further. The Commission has ruled that any
human relationships are protected, including sexual relationships.
71
Further, the Commission has stated that privacy entails an individual's
166. For an example of another decision that found an unenumerated right to be implicitly
protected by another Convention provision, see id. (article 10 guaranteeing freedom of speech,
secures right of access to court).
167. See UDHR art. 12, supra note 152, at 73 ("No one shall be subjected to ... attacks
upon his honour and reputation."); ICCPR art. 17, supra note 20, at 177 (same); American
Convention on Human Rights art. 11, supra note 26, at 5 ("Everyone has the right to have his
honor respected and his dignity recognized.").
168. See Rees v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 78, 87 (1984); Van Oosterwijck
Case, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 23-26 (1979-80) (report of the Comm'n) (governments must
allow individuals who have undergone sex-change surgery to obtain altered official identifica-
tion documents, to protect them from embarrassment caused by apparent discrepancy between
physical appearances and documents' gender identifications); see also X v. Belgium, 46 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 216 (1974); X v. Norway, 14 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 228 (1979) (disclosing person's
criminal record to others interferes with article 8(1) rights).
As another example of the Convention organs' expansive interpretation of article 8(1), see
Case of Klass and Others, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1978) (although telephone calls not
expressly mentioned in article 8(l), they are embraced within "private life" and
"correspondence").
169. See, eg., Bruggeman & Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, 5 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. 103, 115 (1976), 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 100, 116 (1978); McFeeley v. United Kingdom,
20 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 44, 91 (1980); X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 27 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. 243, 245 (1982); Van Oosterwijck Case, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 25-26 (1980) (Report
of the Comm'n).
170. X v. Iceland, 5 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 86, 87 (1976).
171. See Bruggemann, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 100.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
right to "freely pursue the development and fulfillment of his personal-
ity" through channels other than human relationships.
72
The European Convention organs have interpreted article 8(l)'s
concept of "family life" as broadly as they have interpreted its concept of
"private life." In the 1979 Marckx case,'173 the Court held that this
notion embraced "illegitimate" family relationships such as those be-
tween a parent and a child born out of wedlock 174 and between such a
child and its grandparents.
17 5
One can gain more precise sense of how generously the Convention
organs have construed article 8(1) by considering some specific relation-
ships or conduct that they have held it to encompass. As previously
noted, the Commission and Court have protected various family relation-
ships, including "natural" or "illegitimate" ones. 176 They also have se-
cured a range of privacy rights for prisoners, including their rights to
send and receive correspondence." 77 Another dimension of privacy that
has been protected under Article 8 is that secured by the fourth amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution: the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. 1
78
Finally, the Commission and Court have held article 8 to guarantee
the aspect of privacy that involves making basic choices about such inti-
mate matters as sexual orientation and reproduction-what Professor
Laurence Tribe has termed the rights of "personhood." 79 Parallel to the
172. See Andre Deklerck v. Belgium, 21 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 116, 124 (1981) (article 8(1)
applied to law that prevented certain individuals from keeping alcoholic beverages in their
homes).
173. Marckx Case, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
174. Id. at 19.
175. Id. at 21.
176. See also Hendriks v. The Netherlands, 29 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 5, 14 (1982) (article 8
protects "right of a divorced parent, who is deprived of custody ... to have access to or
contact with his child").
177. Case of Campbell & Fell, 80 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 48-49 (1984) (rule requiring
completion of internal prison review procedures before prisoner could correspond with outside
world about prison event violated article 8); Golder Case, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20
(1975) (same); Case of Silver & Others, 61 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1983) (prisoners were
wrongfully deprived of their right to send mail). See also X v. United Kingdom, 39 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 63 (1972); X v. United Kingdom, 42 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 140, 140-41 (1972)
(article 8 protects prisoners' right to attend family funerals); Draper v. United Kingdom, 24
Eur. Comm'n H.R. 72, 78 (1980) (article 12 protects prisoners' right to get married); Hamer v.
United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 5 (1979) (same).
178. Malone Case, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984) (article 8 was violated by British
practices permitting government interception of mail and telephone calls, as well as authoriz-
ing "pen register," which records numbers to which telephone calls were placed); cf Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737, 745-46 (1979) (fourth amendment not implicated by police use
of pen register for criminal investigation or prosecution).
179. L. TRIBE, supra note 155, at § 15-1 (1988). Other international human rights instru-
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U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 180 the European Commission has
held that a woman's choice whether or not to have an abortion is pro-
tected under this rubric, although the Commission-much like the U.S.
Supreme Court-found that the woman's right is limited by the counter-
vailing interest in protecting the fetus. 8" In other respects, the European
Convention organs have defined the personal autonomy branch of pri-
vacy more expansively than has the U.S. Supreme Court. First, they
have extended this form of privacy protection to transsexuals who have
undergone sex-change surgery. 18 2 Second, they have upheld the claim
that the U.S. Supreme Court expressly rejected in Bowers v. Hardwick:
183
that the right to privacy shelters homosexual relations between con-
senting adults.1
84
ments also protect this aspect of privacy. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, supra, note 20, at art. 6(2) (refers to "economic, social and cultural develop-
ment"). Although this provision applies to development of the larger society, it has been con-
strued as also embracing the development of the individual person. See Sohn, supra note 1, at
46.
180. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). A woman's right to choose an abortion free from government
regulation, which was recognized in Roe, was recently limited in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs. See infra text accompanying notes 322-34.
181. See Bruggeman & Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, 10 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
100 (1978); see also Paton v. United Kingdom, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 244 (1980) (in affirming
English High Court decision permitting abortions, Commission ruled that fetus is not pro-
tected under Convention provisions protecting right to life).
Other international human rights agreements have been interpreted as protecting a wo-
man's right to choose an abortion, notwithstanding arguments that the protected right to life
encompasses fetal life. See Case 2141, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 25, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 rev.
1 (1981) (Massachusetts statute permitting abortion did not violate American Declaration on
the Rights and Duties of Man, because it does not protect right to life from moment of
conception).
182. See Rees, reprinted in 7 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 429, 433-34 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum.
Rts.) (1985) (article 8 was violated by law that did not permit designation of sex on birth
certificate to be changed after sex-altering medical treatment); Van Oosterwijck Case, 36 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 23-26 (1980) (Report of the Comm'n). The U.S. Supreme Court has not
faced this issue, and lower federal and state courts have resolved it against privacy claims. See
Taitz, Judicial Determination of the Sexual Identity of Post-Operative Transsexuals: A New
Form of Sex Discrimination, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 53, 53 (1984) (case law in U.S. prevents post-
operative transsexuals from gaining legal recognition); see also Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742
F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 1984) (Title VII does not protect transsexuals from employment
discrimination), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1017 (1985); In re Paula M. Grossman, 127 N.J. Super.
13, 33-34 (Super. Ct. App. Div.) (dismissal of tenured teacher who underwent sex-reassign-
ment surgery did not violate teacher's equal protection rights), cert. denied, 65 N.J. 292, 321
A.2d 253 (1974).
183. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
184. See Norris Case, 129 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988) (invalidating similar Irish statute,
when applicant's homosexual activities had not been subject of any government action, includ-
ing investigation); Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981) (invalidating Northern
Ireland law criminalizing consensual homosexual conduct between adult males, when appli-
cant's homosexual activities had been investigated, but not prosecuted).
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The notion that judicial bodies legitimately may protect rights not
specifically enumerated in a written, rights-declaring instrument has been
extended even further by the European Court of Justice, the European
Economic Community's supreme judicial body. The Community has not
adopted any express declaration of rights comparable to the European
Convention. Furthermore, the European Court of Justice has as its pri-
mary responsibility the interpretation of instruments enunciating eco-
nomic and trade relationships. 185 Nevertheless, the Court of Justice has
found that "basic individual rights [are] implicit in the general principles
of Community law," and it has declared that it will "ensure" that these
implied rights "shall be observed." 186
(2) Government's Affirmative Obligation to Protect Rights
The second manner in which the European Convention organs
broadly define article 8(l)'s prima facie privacy right is by extending the
state's obligation beyond mere noninterference. In some circumstances,
the Convention organs have ruled that the state additionally has an af-
firmative duty to protect privacy against interference by not only state
agents, but also nongovernmental actors. Like other aspects of the legal
process applicable to article 8, this imposition of affirmative obligations is
not commanded by the provision's express language. To the contrary,
the article's only explicit directive to the government is negative, barring
"interference ... with the exercise of [the privacy] right" except under
specified limited circumstances. 187 Moreover, in framing this purely neg-
ative language, article 8's drafters apparently deliberately eschewed the
additional language contained in article 12 of the Universal Declaration.
While article 8 contains many similarities to article 12's first sentence, 188
it entirely omits any parallel to article 12's second sentence, which guar-
antees "the protection of the law against . . . interference" with
privacy. 189
185. Pescatore, supra note 114, at 73.
186. Stauder v. City of Ulm, 15 Recueil 419 (1970), 7 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 342 (1970)
quoted in Pescatore, supra note 114, at 77; accord Internationale Handelgesellschaft mbH v.
Vorratstelle ftir Getreide und Futtermittel, Frankfurt/Main, 16 Recueil 1125, 8 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 250 (1971) (discussed in Pescatore, supra note 114, at 77-78).
187. European Convention, supra note 10, art. 8(1).
188. Article 12's first sentence provides: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interfer-
ence with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation."
189. As previously noted, article 8 also omits article 12's express reference to "honour and
reputation," but the Convention organs still deemed these interests to be implicitly protected
under article 8. See supra text accompanying notes 167-70.
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The affirmative government duty aspect of the legal process applica-
ble to article 8 also pertains to other European Convention guarantees' 90
and to provisions in additional international human rights instruments.
Indeed, as indicated above, other international instruments contain lan-
guage that more clearly assigns to the government an affirmative rights-
protecting duty.' 91 Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, for example, requires each State Party not only to re-
spect, but also to "ensure" the recognized rights of all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction. 192 The Covenant drafters con-
strue it as requiring states "to protect human life against unwarranted
actions by public authorities as well as by private persons."'
193
The first case in which the European Court expressly recognized the
state's occasional affirmative obligation to ensure privacy was the 1979
Marckx case. As one commentator observed, this ruling signalled the
Court's adoption of a judicial "activism" that transcends the case's im-
mediate factual context. 94 The Marckx Court invalidated Belgian laws
that denied children born out of wedlock certain legal relationships with
their parents and other family members and also discriminated against
them in terms of inheritance rights. The European Court ordered the
Belgian Government to undertake the necessary domestic law reforms to
terminate this discriminatory treatment. The Court acknowledged that
compelling a respondent government to undertake affirmative acts was
relatively unusual, but it nevertheless found such a remedial order com-
patible with article 8.195
190. See Warbrick, supra note 8, at 711 (European Court has interpreted Convention as
imposing more than mere formal duty on states, but as further requiring states effectively to
protect individual rights). The construction of article 8 as imposing affirmative obligations on
governments may well be aided by article 8's formulation of the privacy right as encompassing
"the right to respect for.., private ... life." Other Convention rights are also phrased in
affirmative terms, in contrast with the U.S. Bill of Rights, which enjoins government interfer-
ence with rights. Compare, e.g., European Convention art. 10(1), supra note 10, at 231 ("Eve-
ryone has the right to freedom of expression.") with U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ... .
191. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
192. Supra note 20, at 173.
193. Annotations on the Text of the Draft of the International Covenants on Human Rights,
10 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 28, pt. II) at 30, U.N. Doe. A/2929 (1955).
194. Salzberg, The Marckx Case: The Impact on European Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights' 1979 Marckx Decision Declaring Belgian Illegitimacy Statutes Viola-
tive of the European Convention on Human Rights, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 283, 288
(1984).
195. See Marckx Case, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1979):
[T]he object of [article 8] is "essentially" that of protecting the individual against
arbitrary interference by the public authorities. Nevertheless, it does not merely
compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily
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In another 1979 decision, to facilitate privacy rights, the European
Court also imposed an affirmative obligation upon a national govern-
ment. 196 In the Airey case, the Court held that Ireland should provide
legal aid for individuals seeking judicially recognized marriage separa-
tions. 197 Although Irish law does not permit divorces, it does enable cer-
tain spouses to be relieved of the duty of cohabiting by a judicial
separation decree, which will be granted only upon proof of a specified
matrimonial offense. While individuals may represent themselves in
seeking such decrees, the Court noted that in all recent separation pro-
ceedings, petitioners had been represented by lawyers. 198 The Court also
noted the significant cost involved in securing an attorney's services for
such proceedings, and that the Airey applicant could not afford these
fees. 199 By not affirmatively facilitating the applicant's judicial separa-
tion, the Court concluded, Ireland had violated her article 8 rights.200
Since these two 1979 decisions, both the Commission 201 and the
Court20 2 repeatedly have imposed upon states other positive obligations
to facilitate individuals' enjoyment of their privacy rights. One such de-
negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective "re-
spect" for family life.
This means, amongst other things, that when the State determines in its domes-
tic legal system the regime applicable to certain family ties such as those between an
unmarried mother and her child, it must act in a manner calculated to allow those
concerned to lead a normal family life.... [R]espect for family life implies in particu-
lar, in the Court's view, the existence in domestic law of legal safeguards that render
possible as from the moment of birth the child's integration in his family.
(citation omitted)
196. Airey Case, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
197. Id. at 15.
198. Id. at 13.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 17.
201. See Rees v. United Kingdom, reprinted in 7 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 429 (Eur. Comm'n
on Hum. Rts.) (1985) (ordered government to permit individuals who have undergone sex-
change operations to obtain birth certificates and other official documents that reflect appropri-
ate gender); Van Oosterwijck Case, 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1979-80) (Report of the
Comm'n); Johnston v. Ireland, reprinted in 8 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 214, 219-21 (Eur. Comm'n
on Hum. Rts.) (1985) (in country that makes no provision for divorce, state was required to
grant legal recognition to family ties of child born to married man, who had been separated
from his wife, and woman with whom he was living); Draper v. United Kingdom, 20 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 72, 78 (1980) (ordered prison officials to make arrangements for prisoners to get
married; prison officials must take affirmative steps to facilitate prisoners' exercise of other
privacy rights, including corresponding with legal advisers and others, receiving visits from
family members, and attending family funerals); Hamer v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. 5 (1979).
202. Case of Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkanaldi, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31-34 (1985)
(under certain circumstances state may be required to admit to its territory alien spouse of
settled immigrant to secure couple's effective enjoyment of their family life) (dictum).
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cision by the European Court is particularly noteworthy because it re-
quired the state to protect privacy against invasions by non governmental
actors. In X & Y v. The Netherlands, 203 the Court required the Dutch
Government to alter its criminal law to allow the prosecution of a man
who had allegedly raped a mentally retarded sixteen-year-old girl.2°4
There was a gap in the Dutch criminal law, in that it deemed a mentally
retarded rape victim incapable of initiating a prosecution, but also for-
bade anyone else, such as her father, from instigating a prosecution on
her behalf.20 5 The European Court held this lacuna in Dutch law to vio-
late the father's and daughter's privacy rights, notwithstanding the avail-
ability of a civil action against the alleged rapist.206 The Court expressly
declared that a state's "positive obligations inherent in an effective re-
spect for private or family life... may involve the adoption of measures
designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the rela-
tions of individuals betweeii themselves. '20 7
B. Narrow Construction of Permissible Government Limits on Prima Facie
Rights
The foregoing discussion shows that the European Convention or-
gans strictly scrutinize privacy-infringing measures by broadly defining
the conduct and choices that are deemed protected, at least as a prima
facie matter, by article 8(1). There is also a second dimension to the
Convention tribunals' strict scrutiny of privacy infringements: their cor-
respondingly narrow interpretation of permissible government limita-
tions on privacy rights, as defined in article 8(2).2°8 Article 8(2) contains
language identical to that in other Convention provisions regarding addi-
tional rights.20 9 Therefore, the Convention organs' analytical methods
for reviewing a government measure under article 8(2) are applicable to
government measures limiting other rights as well.
203. Case of X & Y v. The Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985).
204. Id. at 14.
205. Id. at 13.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 11.
208. Article 8(2) provides:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right [to
privacy] except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
European Convention, supra note 10, art. 8(2), at 230.
209. See id, art. 9(2), at 230 (freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs), art. 10(2), at
230 (freedom of expression), art. 11(2), at 231 (freedom of peaceful assembly and association).
The European Court has stated expressly that, as a general princi-
ple, the Convention's rights-limiting clauses must be narrowly inter-
preted. 210 This generally narrow interpretation has been manifested in a
number of specific analytical standards and methods that the Convention
tribunals have developed, under article 8(2) and similar provisions, for
reviewing government measures that intrude on prima facie rights.
(1) Necessity Standard
The European Court has stressed that government limitations on
privacy must be necessary to promote the asserted government interest
and that mere convenience or desirability is an inadequate justifica-
tion.2 11 Indeed, on occasion the Court has said that section 2 sets a stan-
dard of "strict necessity." The Court has taken this more stringent
approach when the challenged privacy limitations are viewed as particu-
larly incompatible with a democracy and more characteristic of a "police
state. ' 212 The Court, for example, applied this more demanding stan-
dard in reviewing secret police surveillance through telephone wiretaps
and mail interception.
21 3
The rule that European Convention rights may be interfered with
only on grounds of necessity mirrors rules enunciated under other inter-
national human rights instruments.21 4 The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, for example, generally requires restrictions to
be at least "necessary" to promote certain enumerated government inter-
ests.2 15 With respect to restrictions on some rights, the ICCPR demands
210. See Case of Klass and Others, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (1978) ("[Article 8(2)],
since it provides for an exception to a right guaranteed by the Convention, is to be narrowly
interpreted.") accord, e.g., Case of Winterwerp, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) at 16 (1980).
211. See Handyside Case, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1976) (while " 'necessary'... is
not synonymous with 'indispensable' . , . , neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as
'admissible,' 'ordinary' ....., 'useful'.'... reasonable' ... or 'desirable' ... it implies here the
existence of a 'pressing social need' ").
212. See Klass, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1978) (purpose of strictly enforcing article
8(2) conditions for permissible limitations on rights is "to ensure that the society does not slide
imperceptibly towards totalitarianism").
213. Id. at 21 ("Powers of secret surveillance of citizens, characterising as they do the
police state, are tolerable under the Convention only in so far as strictly necessary for safe-
guarding the democratic institutions."). Consistent with this strict necessity standard, the
Klass opinion stated that the challenged surveillance measures had to be "in all respects within
the bounds of necessity," id. at 22, and upheld these measures because they reduced surveil-
lance to an "unavoidable minimum." Id. at 28.
214. See, e.g., Paust, supra note 40, at 29 (under international law, one of the basic princi-
ples regulating use of weapons is that of necessity).
215. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 12, at 176 (liberty of movement and freedom to
choose residence), art. 18(3), at 178 (religious freedom), art. 19(3), at 178 (freedom of expres-
sion), art. 21, at 178 (right of peaceful assembly), art. 22, at 178 (freedom of association).
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the greater justification of "strict" necessity.216 Similarly, the American
Convention on Human Rights expressly provides that the exercise of cer-
tain rights may be restricted only insofar as "necessary" to promote spec-
ified government concerns. 217  Likewise, although the Canadian
Charter's general limitations clause does not explicitly prescribe a neces-
sity standard, it has been interpreted as imposing such a standard.218
(2) Context of Democratic Society
As noted above, the European Commission and Court maintain a
special vigilance against government intrusions that smack of totalitari-
anism. 219 This aspect of their legal process is consistent with article
8(2)'s explicit definition of necessity in terms of protecting a democratic
society.220 Thus, the Commission and Court have warned governments
that they will not tolerate privacy limitations that actually would dam-
age democratic values for the purported purpose of promoting them. 221
In this context, the Convention tribunals have defined a "democratic so-
ciety" as embodying principles of not only majority rule, but also protec-
tion of individual and minority group rights against majoritarian
incursions.222 Similarly, the European Court has observed that "two
216. See, eg., id. art. 4(l), at 174 (in public emergency, states may derogate certain pro-
tected rights to extent "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation"), art. 14, at 176
(press and public may be excluded from trial to extent "strictly necessary" to avoid prejudicing
proceedings).
217. See American Convention on Human Rights, done Nov. 22, 1969, art. 16(2), 36
O.A.S.T.S. 1, 6 OEA/ser. A/16 (English) (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673, 679 (1970) (free-
dom of association); art. 22(3), at 7, 9 I.L.M. at 680 (rights to move and reside).
218. Section 1 of the Charter provides that all the guaranteed rights are "subject only to
such... limits as can be demonstrably justified .... ." This language has been construed to
require that any rights-limiting measure be necessary to promote the government's asserted
interest. See Quebec Ass'n of Protestant School Bd. v. A.-G. Quebec (No. 2) (1983), 140
D.L.R.3d 33, 89 (Que. S.C.) (government must "convincingly demonstrate[ ]" that challenged
measure is "necessary to achieve" government aim), aff'd, 1 D.L.R.4th 573 (C.A. 1984);
Bender, supra note 163, at 679; Hovius, supra note 13, at 241-44.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 212-13.
220. Under article 8(2), the only permissible government interferences with privacy are
those that are, inter alia, "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national secur-
ity, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others." European Convention, supra note 10, at 230.
221. See Case of Klass and Others, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 232 (1978):
The Court, being aware of the danger such a law [authorizing secret police surveil-
lance to protect national security] poses of undermining or even destroying democ-
racy on the ground of defending it, affirms that the Contracting States may not, in
the name of the struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures
they deem appropriate.
222. See Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1981) ("It would be quite con-
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hallmarks" of a "democratic society" are "tolerance and broad-
mindedness. 2 23 Accordingly, the Convention organs have found that
the "necessary in a democratic society" standard is not satisfied by a
restriction whose asserted justification is to shield majorities from con-
duct that they might find offensive, but which causes no tangible
harm.
224
The requirement that any limitation on a prima facie right be neces-
sary specifically in the context of a democratic society is also expressed in
other international human rights instruments, including the Universal
Declaration 225 and several provisions of the ICCPR.226 The travaux
preparatoires indicate that this requirement should be interpreted as the
European Commission and Court have interpreted the European Con-
vention's corresponding provision.2 27 The Canadian Charter's general
trary [to the right to respect for private life] to interpret Article 8(2) as allowing a majority an
unqualified right to impose its standards of private sexual morality on the whole of society.").
223. Id. at 21.
224. Id. at 24 ("Although members of the public who regard homosexuality as immoral
may be shocked, offended or disturbed by the commission by others of private homosexual
acts, this cannot on its own warrant the application of penal sanctions when it is consenting
adults alone who are involved."); accord id. at 22 ("The Court is not concerned with making
any value-judgment as to the morality of homosexual relations between adult males."). But see
Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1976) (even though many States parties to Conven-
tion had permitted publication of The Little Red Schoolbook, and even though some 18,000
copies had been sold in Britain without prosecution, "the competent English judges were enti-
tled, in the exercise of their discretion, to think.., that the Schoolbook would have pernicious
effects on the morals of many of the children ... who would read it."); see also Hovius, supra
note 13, at 245 (Commission gives more deference to domestic authorities' decisions regarding
obscenity, as distinguished from other, legislation).
225. See UDHRsupra note 152, art. 29(2), at 77 ("[E]veryone shall be subject only to such
limitations.., solely for [certain specified purposes] in a democratic society. (emphasis added)).
226. See ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 14(1), at 176 ("the Press and the public may be ex-
cluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order.., or national security in a
democratic society"); art. 21, at 178 ("No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this
right [peaceful assembly] other than those ... which are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security or public safety, public order .... the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."); art. 22(1), at 178
(same regarding freedom of association).
227. See Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human Rights,
10 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 28, pt. II) at 54, U.N. Doc. A/2929 (1955) (in response
to objection that "democracy" might be interpreted differently in various countries, it was
argued that "democratic" society respects principles of U.N. Charter, UDHR, and human
rights Covenants).
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limitations clause also contains the same language,228 which the Cana-
dian courts likewise have interpreted in a rights-protective spirit.
229
(3) Least Intrusive Alternative Requirement
Another essential component of the Convention tribunals' judicial
review process is their enforcement of the "least intrusive alternative"
requirement. 230 The European Commission and Court refuse to deem
any privacy limitation to be justified unless no alternative measure, less
intrusive on privacy, is available to promote the countervailing govern-
ment interest. In upholding Germany's law that authorizes secret sur-
veillance to protect national security and combat terrorism, for example,
the Court stressed that the law reduced surveillance to an "unavoidable
minimum." 2
31
The least intrusive alternative rule also has been enforced with re-
spect to European Convention rights other than privacy,232 and with re-
spect to various freedoms under other international human rights
instruments.233 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms also has
been construed as imposing this rule.234
228. Section I of the Canadian Charter allows only those limitations that, inter alia, "can
be justified in a free and democratic society." CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREE-
DOMS, CONSTITUTION ACT, Part I (as enacted by the Canada Act, 1982, c.11 (U.K.) § 1)
[hereinafter CANADIAN CHARTER].
229. See Gibson, supra note 12, at 40 (although there was risk that this phrase would be
used to justify every measure that had previously been sanctioned in Canada or other free and
democratic societies, that risk has not materialized in practice).
230. A variation on this standard requires the government to employ a less restrictive
alternative, even if not the least restrictive one. The most common verbal variations for
describing this requirement include one word from each of the following three categories:
"least" or "less"; "drastic," "intrusive," or "restrictive"; and "alternatives" or "means."
231. Case of Klass and Others, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 28 (1978).
232. The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-42 (1985) (invalidated, as
overbroad, absolute rule that any media coverage of issue before courts constituted contempt,
irrespective of circumstances). For examples of decisions enforcing the least intrusive means
test with respect to other rights under the European Convention, see, e.g., Christians Against
Racism and Fascism v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 138, 150 (1980) (complete
ban on parades and processions can be justified only if it can be shown that less stringent
measures would not serve public purpose of preventing disorder); Case of Young, James &
Webster, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25-26 (1981) (unions that entered into closed shop agree-
ment could have protected adequately members' interests without legislation compelling cur-
rent employees to join union, so detriment suffered by latter went further than necessary);
Barthold Case, 90 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23-26 (1985) (restriction on press interviews about
matters of public concern hampered free expression more than necessary to prevent publicity-
seeking by professionals).
233. See Paust, supra note 40, at 29 (international law regulates use of weapons in accord-
ance with principle of humanity, or prohibition against unnecessary suffering).
234. See, eg., Re Southam Inc. & The Queen (No. 1), 146 D.L.R.3d 408, 429 (Ont. C.A.
1983) (absolute ban on public and press attendance at juvenile trials struck down as overbroad,
(4) Proportionality Requirement
The European Commission and Court have enforced the necessity
and least intrusive alternative standards as necessary, but not sufficient,
justifications for any limitation on privacy or other rights. This facet of
the Convention tribunals' legal process is demonstrated by their enforce-
ment of a proportionality requirement in interpreting article 8(2), as well
as other limitations clauses. Under this criterion, a rights limitation will
be invalidated if the extent to which it abridges freedom is disproportion-
ate to the extent to which it advances a competing government inter-
est.235 Even if a privacy limitation were necessary for promoting the
asserted government interest, and the least intrusive measure for doing
so, that measure still would be prohibited if the resulting privacy inva-
sion outweighed the promotion of the countervailing interest.
2 36
The Convention organs' invalidation of privacy restrictions pursu-
ant to proportionality analysis is illustrated by the Dudgeon case, which
nullified Northern Ireland's statute proscribing homosexual relations be-
tween consenting adult males.2 37 A dissenting opinion disagreed specifi-
cally with the majority's view that a law disproportionately invasive of
privacy cannot be sustained simply because there is no other measure for
effectively advancing the government's asserted interest.2 38 The Court
because discretionary ban would sufficiently promote interests at stake); R. v. Big M Drug
Mart Ltd., 58 N.R. 31 (S.C.C.) (1985) ("The court may wish to ask whether the means
adopted to achieve the end sought to do so by impairing as little as possible the right ... in
question."); R.v. Bryant, 48 O.R. 2d 732, 985 (C.A. 1984) ("The standard by which the rea-
sonableness of the limitation of the Charter right must be assessed [includes] ...that the
limitation is restricted to that which is necessary for the attainment of the desired objective.");
see also Bender, supra note 163, at 679.
235. See, e.g., Handyside Case, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976) ("every .. . 'restriction'
... must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued").
236. See Hovius, supra note 13, at 251:
In these cases [Young and Barthold], the Court did not in fact conclude that any
equally effective but less restrictive means was available to reach the legitimate goal
pursued by the domestic authorities. Instead, the Court insisted that the value of the
right at stake required the domestic authorities to settle for less effective means.
237. See Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1981):
On the issue of proportionality, the Court considers that such justifications as there
are for retaining the law... are outweighed by the detrimental effects which the very
existence of the legislative provisions ... can have on the life of a person of homosex-
ual orientation ....
[T]he restriction imposed on Mr. Dudgeon under Northern Ireland law, by rea-
son of its breadth and absolute character, is, quite apart from the severity of the
possible penalties provided for, disproportionate to the aims sought to be achieved.
238. See id. at 33 (Matscher, J., dissenting) ("To my mind .. .once it has been granted
that an aim is legitimate for the purposes of Article 8 (2), any measure directed towards the
accomplishment of that aim is necessary if failure to take the measure would create a risk that
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majority steadfastly has refused to attribute such significant weight to
government efficiency concerns.
The proportionality component of the Convention tribunals' legal
process mirrors other international human rights norms, 239 including
those set forth under the Canadian Charter.24° Further, both the Euro-
pean Convention and other human rights agreements recognize that the
proportionality test is a separate requirement above and beyond the ne-
cessity and least restrictive alternative standards. In other words, the
government's end alone cannot justify its means. The European Conven-
tion, for example, provides generally that "[i]n time of ... public emer-
gency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may
take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to
the extent strictly required." 241 The Convention stipulates, however,
that certain rights are nonderogable even under these exigent circum-
stances: the right to life; freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment; freedom from slavery or involuntary servitude;
and freedom from retroactive criminal punishment.242 The ICCPR con-
tains similar terms.
243
(5) Requirement of Specific Legal Standards Constraining Discretion
Another element of the Convention organs' judicial process is the
requirement that rights limitations be narrowly drawn and precisely
worded, thus clearly cabining government discretiom This requirement
derives from the phrase in article 8(2) (and other limitations clauses) dic-
tating that any measure interfering with rights must be "in accordance
that aim would not be achieved."). This view is similar to that adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in several recent decisions rejecting the least intrusive alternative and proportionality
requirements in individual rights adjudication. See infra text accompanying notes 391-431.
239. See Paust, supra note 40, at 29 (international law regulates weapons use in accord-
ance with proportionality principle).
240. See Quebec Assoc. of Protestant School Bds. v. A.-G. Quebec (No. 2), 140 D.L.R.3d
33 (Que. S.C. 1983), aff'd; 1 D.L.R.4th 573, at 89 (C.A. 1984) (government must "convinc-
ingly demonstrate" that "rigour of [challenged measure] is not disproportionate to its
purpose").
241. European Convention, supra note 10, art. 15(1), at 232.
242. Id. art 15(2), at 232.
243. See ICCPR, supra note 20, art. 4(1), at 174 (when "strictly required" during a "pub-
lic emergency which threatens the life of the nation," government may derogate from some
protected rights); art. 4(2), at 174 (certain rights are absolutely nonderogable, even if this strict
necessity test could be met: right to life; freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment; freedom from slavery or involuntary servitude; freedom from im-
prisonment on ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation; freedom from retroactive
criminal punishment; right to recognition as person before law; and freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion).
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with the law." The European Court first construed this phrase in The
Sunday Times Case, 244 which involved freedom of the press. The Court
stated that the phrase comprises two requirements. First, the law must
be "accessible:" that is, individuals must have an adequate indication of
the legal rules applicable in a given situation.2 45 Second, a norm must be
formulated with sufficient precision to enable individuals to regulate their
conduct; they must be able to foresee the consequences that a given ac-
tion may entail.
246
The more a government measure intrudes upon a Convention right,
the more precision the European Court will require. In the Malone case,
for example, the Court held that a high degree of precision was necessary
to validate the secret police surveillance measures at issue. It found an
article 8 violation because the law did not define the police power with
sufficient clarity.2
47
Other international human rights instruments provide analogous
limitations on government's power to circumscribe rights. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, for example, provides that rights "shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law."' 248 Similarly,
the Canadian Charter's general limitations clause provides that any justi-
fiable limitation on a protected right must be "prescribed by law.
'2 49
This language has been equated to the Convention's corresponding
phrase, and in construing it, Canadian authorities have relied on the
above-described Convention jurisprudence.2 50  Accordingly, Canadian
courts have nullified laws that grant government authorities broad dis-
cretionary powers to limit Charter rights.25'
244. 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30-31 (1979).
245. Id. at 31.
246. Id.
247. Malone Case, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1984).
248. U.D.H.R., supra note 22, at 77.
249. Art. 1.
250. See Gibson, supra note 12, at 43-45.
251. See Re Ontario Film & Video Appreciation Soc. & Ontario Bd. of Censors, 147
D.L.R.3d 58, 67 (Ont. H.C. 1983) ("Any limits placed on the freedom of expression cannot be
left to the whim of an official; such limits must be articulated with some precision or they
cannot be considered to be law."), aff'd, 5 D.L.R.4th 766 (Out. C.A. 1984). Significantly, the
Ontario Film court found that the requirement that rights limitations be prescribed by law was
not satisfied by written standards contained in pamphlets that the censorship board used to
implement the statute and regulations. Although the court acknowledged that these published
standards did provide guidance to filmmakers as to how their films would be judged, it stressed
that "[t]hey have no legislative or legal force of any kind" and therefore "do not qualify" as the
"law" necessary to justify any limitation on Charter rights. Id. at 67. This aspect of the
decision was approved by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Reference Re Education Act, 10
D.L.R.4th 491, 520 (Ont. C.A. 1984). This ruling contrasts starkly with the U.S. Supreme
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(6) Limited Deference to Other Government Decisionmakers: Burden of Proof
on Government
As an additional component of their judicial process, the Conven-
tion organs have accorded decreasing deference to government deci-
sionmakers with respect to either the importance of the interests
assertedly promoted by the challenged actions or the efficacy of such ac-
tions in promoting these interests. Rather, the European Commission
and Court have tended to subject government assertions on such points
to increasingly vigorous scrutiny.252 In short, the government bears the
burden of proof regarding its asserted justifications for rights-limiting
measures.
The Convention tribunals have stated that national government
decisionmakers are entitled to more deference-or, to use their rubric, a
wider "margin of appreciation"-regarding certain kinds of decisions
that are traditionally consigned to a particular community's power of
self-determination. Even with respect to some of these decisions, how-
ever, the European Court and Commission have refused to defer to the
national government. In both the Dudgeon and the Norris cases, for ex-
ample, which invalidated laws proscribing consensual adult male homo-
sexuality, the Court acknowledged that
the view taken... of the requirements of morals varies from time to
time and from place to place, especially in our era, [and that] by reason
of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their
countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of those
requirements.
253
Nevertheless, the Court refused in each case to attribute significant
weight to the government's determination that consensual adult male ho-
mosexuality offended the majority of people in that particular country.
Thus, the Dudgeon Court acknowledged the "genuine and sincere con-
viction shared by a large number of responsible members of the Northern
Irish community that a change in the law [to legalize such homosexual
Court's ruling in the recent case of Ward v. Rock Against Racism. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 409-12.
252. See Doswald-Beck, The Meaning of the "Right to Respect for Private Life" Under the
European Convention on Human Rights, 4 HUM. RTs. L.J. 283, 301-03 (1983). When they first
began to function, the Convention organs may well have exercised more self-restraint in order
to encroach less on national sovereignty, but as their power has become more firmly en-
trenched, such self-restraint has become less important for maintaining their legitimacy. See
id. at 303; Hovius, supra note 13, at 261. Courts within a single country should not feel it
necessary to exercise self-restraint similar to that practiced in early European Commission and
Court rulings, since rulings by domestic courts do not entail any threat to sovereignty. See id.
253. Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21 (quoting the Handyside judgment, 24
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1976)).
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activities] would be seriously damaging to the moral fabric of society. '254
It nevertheless ruled that "it is for the Court to make the final evaluation
as to whether" the restriction on private activity was justified by the soci-
etal moral concern, 255 and it reached a negative conclusion on this
issue.
256
Another example of the European Court's refusal to defer to na-
tional determinations, even concerning matters that are generally due a
relatively great "margin of appreciation," is afforded by X & Y v. the
Netherlands. 257 In this case, the national law afforded only a civil rem-
edy for a sixteen year-old mentally retarded girl who had been raped, but
did not permit the alleged rapist to be criminally prosecuted. The Court
acknowledged that "the choice of the means calculated to secure compli-
ance with Article 8 in the sphere of the relations of individuals between
themselves is in principle a matter that falls within the Contracting
States' margin of appreciation. ' 258 The Court further recognized that
"[r]ecourse to the criminal law is not necessarily the only answer. ' 259
Nonetheless, it decided that the civil law remedy was inadequate and
required the Netherlands to protect one individual from another's pri-
vacy-invading action specifically by enacting criminal sanctions. 260
The Convention organs' slight deference to government deci-
sionmakers, and their corresponding imposition of a high burden of
proof on those decisionmakers, have parallels under other human rights
instruments. Canadian courts, for example, have held that the govern-
254. Id.
255. Id. at 23. A dissenting opinion took issue specifically with this aspect of the major-
ity's analysis. See id. at 30-31.
256. Accord Norris Case, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1988) (Court rejected govern-
ment argument that "the moral fibre of a democratic nation is a matter for its own institu-
tions"). A significant factor in the Court's determination not to grant a wider margin of
appreciation to the national moral judgments reflected in the statutes challenged in the Dudg-
eon and Norris cases was the fact that these statutes severely intruded on "a most intimate
aspect of private life." Id. at 21.
257. Case of X & Y v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1985).
258. Id. at 8.
259. Id.
260. Id. (reasoning that effective deterrence could be achieved only through criminal law
measures). For an example of a case where a Convention organ did defer to a government
decision of a sort said to be entitled to an especially significant margin of appreciation, see the
Case of Abdulaziz, Cabales & Balkanaldi, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6 (1985) (there should
be wider margin of appreciation regarding state's positive obligations under article 8, especially
concerning extent of its obligations to admit to its territory relatives of settled immigrants; as
well-established international law principle, state has right to control entry of non-nationals
into its territory).
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ment must bear a substantial burden to justify any encroachment on
Charter rights.
261
The European tribunals' pattern of according less deference to the
determinations of other government decisionmakers reflects their ten-
dency to view any challenged decision in a context that is increasingly
broad along both temporal and geographic dimensions. The Commission
and Court are decreasingly willing to defer to concerns particular to a
specific country or moment in time. Instead, they evaluate these con-
cerns in the broader context of evolving, European-wide standards and
practices.
(7) Temporal Trends and Actual Enforcement Practice
As one scholar of the European human rights system has observed,
the Convention organs refuse to be bound by the original intentions of
the Convention framers: "now the Commission and Court principally
look at contemporary attitudes. 2 62 Indeed, another scholar has ob-
served that refusal to take a static view of acceptable government ratio-
nales for limiting Convention rights is consistent with the framers' intent,
which was "to protect the individual against the threats of the future, as
well as the threats of the past."' 263 This intention is reflected in the pre-
amble to the Statute of the Council of Europe, since it refers not only to
the "maintenance" of human rights, but also to their "further realisa-
tion. ' 264 Consistent with this purpose, the Convention tribunals are cog-
nizant of their responsibility not only to resolve the immediate conflict
between the parties, but also, "more generally, to elucidate, safeguard
and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing
to the observance by the States of the engagements undertaken by
them." 2
65
The dynamic approach toward interpreting the European Conven-
tion is consistent with the interpretive approach toward international
261. See Re Southam and the Queen (No. 1) 146 D.L.R.3d 408, 419-20 (Ont. C.A. 1983);
Canadian Newspapers Co. v. A.-G. Canada, 16 D.L.R.4th 642, 660-61, 5 C.R.D. 425.20-12
(Ont. C.A. 1984); Quebec Ass. of Protestant School Bds. v. A.-G. Quebec (No. 2), 140
D.L.R.3d 33, 89 (Que. S.C. 1983), aff'd, I D.L.R.4th 573 (C.A. 1984); see also Bender, supra
note 163, at 679.
262. Doswald-Beck, supra note 252, at 287.
263. F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (1975). Accord-
ingly, he concludes, the general presumption that treaty obligations should be interpreted re-
strictively does not apply to the Convention; instead, he argues, "the interpretation of the
Convention must be 'dynamic' in the sense that it must be interpreted in the light of develop-
ments in social and political attitudes." Id. at 17-18.
264. Preamble, Statute of the Council of Europe, May 15, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103.
265. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 62 (1978).
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human rights treaties generally, as reflected in article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 266 This clause provides that a treaty
will be interpreted both in accordance with its plain terms "and in the
light of its objects and purpose." Commentators have observed that this
formulation requires an "evolutive" or "teleological" interpretive
technique.2
67
A relatively early example of the European Court's "evolutive inter-
pretation," specifically in the privacy context, is the Marckx case.268 The
Court agreed with the Belgian Government's argument that, when the
Convention was drafted, many European countries permitted discrimina-
tion against children born out of wedlock. Nevertheless, the Court de-
clared that Convention standards would evolve with general European
law reform trends, regardless of whether a particular country had altered
its own national laws.269 The Dudgeon Court employed a similar analy-
sis. It recognized that homosexual relations had been widely banned
throughout the Contracting States when the Convention was adopted.
270
Nevertheless, by the time Dudgeon was decided in 1981, there was a gen-
eral European movement toward decriminalization, which strongly influ-
enced the Court's invalidation of Ireland's remaining ban.
271
The Convention organs also have considered progressive develop-
ments in evaluating restrictions on other privacy rights, including a pris-
oner's right to marry272 and transsexuals' rights to change their legal
266. Although the U.S. has not ratified the Vienna Convention, the U.S. may be bound by
the Convention's terms on the theory that they reflect customary international law principles.
See supra note 19.
267. Drzemczewski, The Sui Generis Nature of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 54, 57, 60-61 (1980).
268. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
269. See Marckx Case, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1978). The Court recalled that the
Convention is to "be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions"; it could not but be
struck, it stressed, by the evolution in the domestic law of the great majority of the Member
States towards equality between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children. Id.
270. Id. at 23.
271. See Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23-24 (1981).
As compared with the era when [the challenged Northern Ireland] legislation was
enacted, there is now a better understanding, and in consequence an increased toler-
ance, of homosexual behaviour to the extent that in the great majority of the member
States ... it is no longer considered to be necessary or appropriate to treat homosex-
ual practices of the kind now in question as in themselves a matter to which the
sanctions of the criminal law should be applied; the Court cannot overlook the
marked changes which have occurred in this regard in the domestic law of the mem-
ber States ....
272. See Draper v. United Kingdom, 20 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 72, 78 (1980) (distinguished
earlier Commission ruling that refusal to allow prisoner to marry did not violate article 12,
because current decision must be based on present-day conditions and there is general trend in
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gender identifications. 273 This "evolutive" interpretation characterizes
the Commission's and Court's process of enforcing additional Conven-
tion rights as well. 274 Additionally, even when the Convention tribunals
do not rule that evolving standards warrant the invalidation of a chal-
lenged state measure, their opinions still may urge the state to undertake
reform. Such suggestions may constitute signals that currently accepta-
ble measures in the future will run afoul of dynamic European human
rights standards.
275
This dynamic temporal facet of the Convention tribunals' legal pro-
cess, like other facets, is followed by the Canadian courts in enforcing the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In determining whether challenged
rights limitations "can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society" 276 as required under article 1, the Canadian courts commonly
examine similar measures in other western democracies. 277 Although
this article 1 language could have been invoked to automatically uphold
any presently or previously sanctioned limitation, it instead has been
used to push Canadian law toward progressive reform.
278
Another feature of the Convention organs' legal process facilitates
their enforcement of evolving standards, consistent with progressive, re-
forming trends: they discern those standards not only by considering the
laws that are technically in force, but also by taking into account law
enforcement patterns. The Convention tribunals do not assume that con-
European penal systems toward reduction of differences between life in prison and life at lib-
erty, and increasing emphasis on rehabilitation).
273. See Rees v. United Kingdom, reprinted in 7 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 409, 432-33 (1984)
(in distinguishing previous Commission decision that had not recognized transsexual rights,
notes changed medical opinion and fact that several member states had recognized sex change
rights in interim).
274. See Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15-16 (1978) (stressed that "the Conven-
tion is a living instrument... which must be interpreted in the light of present-day condi-
tions," and that it could not "but be influenced by the developments... in the penal policy" of
other member States regarding corporal punishment); Warbrick, supra note 8, at 711 (Euro-
pean Court has adopted "progressive" or "dynamic" approach to Convention interpretation,
taking account of changing political, social, and economic circumstances).
275. For example, in the Case of Klass and Others, the European Court upheld the Ger-
man secret police surveillance system despite its lack of judicial supervision, but stressed that
such supervision was preferable. In the subsequent Malone Case, Judge Pettiti's concurring
opinion urged the Court to rule squarely that any police interception of communications dur-
ing a criminal investigation must be judicially authorized. The majority did not address this
issue. See Hovius, supra note 13, at 247 n.159 (Convention organs typically urge states to live
up to higher standards even though their present laws or practices do not violate Convention).
276. Art. 1 (emphasis added).
277. See Layne v. Reed, 5 C.R.D. 725.300-03 (Ont. C.A. 1984); R. v. Keegstra, 5 C.R.D.
525.100-04 (Alta. Q.B. 1984); Re Southam, Inc. and The Queen (No. 1), 146 D.L.R.3d 408
(Ont. C.A. 1984).
278. See Gibson, supra note 12, at 40.
temporary standards are necessarily reflected by a nation's laws simply
because they are in place. Rather, if certain laws are not regularly en-
forced, the Convention organs may infer that they are inconsistent with
contemporary standards. This approach is exemplified by the Dudgeon
case. In concluding that there was "increased tolerance ... of homosex-
ual behaviour" throughout the signatory states, the European Court
stressed not only that many member states had decriminalized such be-
havior, but also that "[i]n Northern Ireland itself, the authorities have
refrained in recent years from enforcing the law."
'279
(8) Broad Geographic Context
The Commission's and Court's reluctance to consider the asserted
government interests of a particular country, in geographic isolation,
parallels their reluctance to consider such interests in temporal isolation.
A scholar of the European Convention system has observed that
"[p]robably the most important factor [influencing the scope of the Con-
vention organs' deference to state decisionmakers] is the existence of a
consensus in the law or practice among the Contracting States. 2 80 The
fact that a particular state's practice is less rights-protective than that of
other European states will not automatically lead to invalidating the
challenged practice.28 1 The less protective state, however, must bear a
substantial burden of proof, and the more fundamental the right, or the
more severe its infringement, the heavier this burden becomes. If some
states can manage without certain restrictions, there should be at least a
presumption that such restrictions are not "necessary in a democratic
society.
'282
The Convention organs' assessment of rights-limiting measures in
accordance with evolving, liberalizing trends across Europe as a whole,
rather than in accordance with the parochial current judgment of the
national government at issue, has the effect of moving all states parties in
the direction of rights-enhancing reforms. This is consistent with the
Convention's purpose of promoting human rights, rather than merely
279. Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23-24 (1981).
280. Hovius, supra note 13, at 257; see, e.g., The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 276 (1979) ("The domestic law and practice of the Contracting States reveal a fairly
substantial measure of common ground in this area .... Accordingly, here a more extensive
European supervision corresponds to a less discretionary power of appreciation.").
281. The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 277 (1979); Dudgeon Case, 45
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 165-66 (1981); see also X v. United Kingdom, Application No. 7215/
75, reprinted in 3 Eur. Hum. Rts. Rep. 63 (1978).
282. Note, Secret Surveillance and the European Convention on Human Rights, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 1113, 1133 (1981) (authored by G. Griffith).
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maintaining them.283 Thus, while European-wide human rights stan-
dards could have been defined in terms of the "lowest common denomi-
nator"-only those rights that were universally respected among the
Convention signatories-they have in fact been defined in terms of a
higher common denominator.
The European Court of Justice apparently shares a similar view of
its role in defining those "basic individual rights" that it has held to be
implicitly protected by European Community law.28 4 As one member of
that court explained:
The Court... will be compelled.., to defer every time to the highest
standard of protection, since it is difficult to see how Community law
can maintain its authority if it fails to reach a level of protection con-
sidered essential in any individual member State. For once, the
method of reconciling and levelling will be in an upward direction, that
is to say, towards solutions giving the best protection to individual
rights. 2
85
(9) Actual Evidence of Tangible Harm
As noted above, the Convention organs refuse to defer to govern-
ment assertions that a rights-limiting measure is justified on the ground
of some intangible benefit to public morals. 286 This position is one spe-
cific manifestation of another more general process that the Convention
organs follow in reviewing any rights restriction: they insist that the gov-
ernment produce actual evidence of some tangible harm expected to re-
sult from the right's unfettered exercise. The Convention organs refuse
to allow the government to rely on unsubstantiated assertions about any
speculative or intangible harm, such as moral offense.
287
This methodological approach was demonstrated in the Dudgeon
case. The European Court stressed the absence of "evidence" that the
actual "effects" of tolerating homosexual conduct were injurious to the
public.288 Indeed, the Court noted that this assertion was belied by the
experience in Northern Ireland itself, where such acts had not been pros-
ecuted in recent years. As the Court noted, "No evidence has been ad-
duced to show that this has been injurious to moral standards in
283. See supra text accompanying notes 263-65.
284. See supra text accompanying note 186.
285. Pescatore, supra note 114, at 79.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 223-24.
287. See Warbrick, supra note 8, at 724 (European Court's rejection of arguments based
on states' original intentions makes it less likely that majority prejudice or conviction in partic-
ular region can justify rights restriction).
288. Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1981).
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Northern Ireland or that there has been any public demand for stricter
enforcement of the law."
2 89
Parallel to the European Convention, the Canadian Charter also has
been construed as requiring the government to adduce actual facts to
justify any rights limitation and as not permitting the government to rely
on sheer speculation.2 90 This reading is consistent with the wording of
the Charter's general limitations clause, which allows only such limita-
tions as "can be demonstrably justified."'291
(10) Good Faith Requirement
Another feature of the European Convention organs' process for re-
viewing a rights-limiting measure is their demand that the government
have a good faith intent to promote its alleged interest through the cho-
sen measure. 292 This good faith factor also appears to be required under
the emerging Canadian Charter jurisprudence.
293
(11) Importance of Government Interest
Article 8 of the European Convention expressly enumerates the par-
ticular government interests deemed sufficiently important to justify re-
strictions on privacy or other rights (assuming the additional criteria for
permissible restrictions are also satisfied). Along with other Convention
289. Id. Significantly, the judges who dissented from the Dudgeon ruling would have im-
posed different evidentiary standards, allowing the government to rest its asserted justification
upon speculation, rather than actual evidence, regarding the societal harm allegedly caused by
homosexual activity. See id. at 30 (Zekia, J., dissenting) (legalizing homosexual activities "is
very likely to cause many disturbances" and thus government is justified in not reforming the
law "for the preservation of public peace"); accord id. at 34 (Matscher, J., dissenting) (criti-
cizes majority's reliance on lack of evidence that Northern Ireland's failure to prosecute homo-
sexual conduct has injured moral standards).
Similarly, in invalidating Ireland's proscription on male homosexual acts, the Norris
Court emphasized that "the Government [has] adduced no evidence which would point to the
existence of factors justifying the retention of the impugned laws which are additional to or are
of greater weight than those present in the ... Dudgeon Case." Norris Case, 142 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1988).
290. See Bender, supra note 163.
291. Article I (emphasis added); see Gibson, supra note 12, at 46 (this word "seems to
have been intended to require more by way of proof of justification than a mere assertion by
government or an assumption by the court").
292. See, e.g., Case of Klass & Others, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 231 (1978) (law's
actual aim is "indeed" what government asserted it to be).
293. See R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 1 S.C.R. 295, 354 (1985) (purpose of legislation
prohibiting certain activities on Sundays was to safeguard public morality); see also Gibson,
supra note 12, at 39 ("good faith" is required to justify rights-limiting measure under Charter;
"the means employed must be genuinely intended to advance the intended purpose" (citing
Christian, The Limitation of Liberty: A Consideration of s. I of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, (1982) U.B.C.L.R. (special Charter edition) 105)).
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limitations clauses, article 8(2) allows restrictions to promote "the inter-
ests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others."
This Convention language is similar to language in other interna-
tional human rights instruments. The ICCPR, for example, sanctions
limitations to promote interests in "national security, public order, public
health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. ' 294 The ICCPR
further provides that some rights may be abridged only to promote an
even narrower, even more urgent, class of government interests.295 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 296 the American Convention on
Human Rights,297 and the American Declaration of the Rights and Du-
ties of Man298 all prescribe similarly limited categories of government
interests deemed sufficiently important to justify infringements on pro-
tected rights. By contrast, the Canadian Charter does not expressly list
the types of interests that may justify rights infringements. Nevertheless,
it has been interpreted as permitting such infringements only to advance
"substantial or compelling (not merely legitimate)" government inter-
ests.299 Canadian courts have ruled that considerations of government
efficiency or convenience are insufficiently important to override Charter
freedomsaco
294. See European Convention, supra note 10, art. 23 (liberty of movement and freedom to
choose residence); art. 18(3) (religious freedom); art. 21 (right of peaceful assembly); art. 22
(freedom of association).
295. For example, article 8(3)(c)(iii) permits exceptions to the prohibition on involuntary
servitude for exacting service in cases of "emergency or calamity threatening the life or well-
being of the community." Similarly, article 4(1) permits derogation from some protected
rights only in case of a "public emergency which threatens the life of the nation."
296. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR 71,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1984) art. 29(2) ("[E]veryone shall be subject only to such limitations...
determined solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights... of
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in
a democratic society.").
297. See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 at 1,
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser. L/V/II, 23 doe. 21, ser. 6 (entered into force July 8, 1978), reprinted in
9 I.L.M. 99 (1970), art. 16(2) (freedom of association may be restricted only "in the interest of
national security, public safety or public order, or to protect public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others"); art. 22(3) (rights to move and reside may be restricted only to
promote same interests).
298. See American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, signed May 2, 1948,
O.A.S. off. rec. OEA/ser. L/V/II doe. 21, ser. 6 (English 1979) art. XXVIII (The rights of
man are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the
general welfare and the advancement of democracy.).
299. See Bender, supra note 163, at 679.
300. See Singh v. Minister of Employment & Immigration, 58 N.R. 1 14 C.R.R. 13
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IV. Legal Process Analysis of Recent Supreme Court
Constitutional Rights Jurisprudence
In terms of legal process, the Supreme Court's recent constitutional
rights cases are sharply distinguishable from the international human
rights trends. Employing the various methodological approaches ana-
lyzed above, the European Commission and Court have applied an invig-
orated standard of judicial review to claimed rights violations. This
standard defines protected rights broadly and construes the government's
latitude to limit such rights narrowly. By contrast, U.S. Supreme Court
decisions increasingly have displayed the opposite tendencies.
These trends in the process facets of U.S. rights jurisprudence, and
their divergence from the European developments, were demonstrated
graphically by decisions issued during the Court's most recent term. A
consistent theme unifying Supreme Court rulings on various constitu-
tional rights during the 1988-89 term was the Court's application of
weakened judicial review standards. These standards gave stingy scope
to rights and broad deference to government decisions limiting rights.
These most recent cases, however, manifest judicial process trends that
have been developing over a longer period.
In case after case decided recently by the Supreme Court, a crucial
battleground 30 1 has been not only the particular result that should be
(S.C.C. 1985) (invalidating lack of appeal process for refugee claims where asserted justifica-
tion was that such appeals would unduly burden government resources):
I have considerable doubt that [this] type of utilitarian consideration ... can consti-
tute a justification for a limitation on the rights set out in the Charter. Certainly the
guarantees of the Charter would be illusory if they could be ignored because it was
administratively convenient to do so.
301. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3098-101 (1989) (major issue is
what standard should apply to determination whether government display of religious symbol
violates establishment clause); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3050-
53 (1989) (major issue is standard of review applicable to regulations on abortions); Board of
Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3032 (1989) ("[T]he major issue
here [is] the last element of the Central Hudson analysis [concerning lawfulness of restrictions
on commercial speech]."); Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2979-80 (1989) reh'g de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 23 (1989) (only relevant issue in reviewing penalty under eighth amendment is
whether it is approved by national consensus; rejects argument that, to survive challenge, pen-
alty must be proportionate to defendant's blameworthiness and must make measurable contri-
bution to acceptable goals of punishment); Ward v. Rock against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746,
2753 (1989), reh'g denied 110 S. Ct. 23 (1989) ("We granted certiorari ... to clarify the legal
standard applicable to governmental regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected
speech."); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1879 (1989) ("The question here... is what
standard of review this Court should apply to prison regulations limiting [publishers'] access"
to prisoners.); Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1594 (1989) ("The dispositive question in
this case is the level of judicial 'scrutiny' to be applied to the city's ordinance [regulating
teenagers' associational rights].").
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reached on the facts at issue, but more generally, the judicial process that
determines the result. The Court must decide which standard of review
and analytical or methodological approaches to use.30 2 Some Court
watchers have been quick to decry the substantive incursions that recent
Supreme Court decisions have made on a spectrum of civil liberties.
30 3
Commentators have been less alert, however, to this more subtle, but
ultimately more invidious, aspect of the recent rulings. In many cases,
the Court's immediate substantive holdings, in terms of resolving partic-
ular factual controversies, were substantially less significant than the
processes by which the Court reached such results. The Court's resolu-
tions of process issues will have long-range significance that transcend
differing factual contexts and substantive law. This phenomenon was
noted in Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 304 which upheld regulations on musical performances in a pub-
lic park:
[T]he majority plays to our shared impatience with loud noise to ob-
scure the damage that it does to our First Amendment rights. Until
today, a key safeguard of free speech has been government's obligation
302. The significance of the issues concerning methodology, independent of the issues con-
cerning particular factual outcomes, is underscored by the role that Justice O'Connor played
in several important cases. In each of these cases, Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concur-
ring opinion in which she rejected the majority's less exacting standards for scrutinizing the
challenged government measure and agreed with the dissenters' view that the appropriate de-
gree of scrutiny should be more demanding. Although Justice O'Connor applied the same
more rigorous analysis employed by her dissenting Brethren to the facts at issue, she neverthe-
less arrived at the same result, upholding the challenged measure, that the majority (or plural-
ity) had reached pursuant to a less stringent standard of review. See, e.g., Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3060-64 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) (rejected plurality's alteration of Roe v. Wade's analytical frame-
work for reviewing abortion regulations, but concluded that challenged regulations should be
upheld under Roe framework); Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. at 2982 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in part and concurring in judgment) (agreed with dissent that "proportionality analy-
sis" was essential element of eighth amendment scrutiny, but concluded that juvenile death
penalty survived that analysis); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2346-47 (1989) reh'g
denied, 110 S. Ct. 22 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part) (disagreed with plurality's
"mode of historical analysis to be used when identifying liberty interests protected by the Due
Process Clause," but, applying less rigid historical analysis, agreed with plurality that rights
asserted by natural father and daughter to maintain relationship with each other are unpro-
tected); see also County of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U., 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3120-24 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (agreed with plurality that "endorsement"
test is appropriate standard for reviewing government display of religious symbol under the
establishment clause of the first amendment, rejecting less strict standard advocated by four
dissenters, but disagreed with three dissenters who, applying same stricter standard, concluded
that both challenged displays violated the Establishment Clause; O'Connor concluded that
menorah display did survive stricter scrutiny).
303. See, eg., Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV.
43 (1989); Olsen, Comment: Unravelling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REv. 105 (1989).
304. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
to adopt the least intrusive restriction necessary to achieve its goals.
By abandoning the requirement that time, place, and manner regula-
tions must be narrowly tailored, the majority replaces constitutional
scrutiny with mandatory deference.
30 5
A. Narrowing Definition of Prima Facie Rights
As analyzed above, the judicial process employed under interna-
tional human rights instruments, as typified by decisions under the Euro-
pean Convention, defines rights broadly in two respects: first, by
including within the prima facie definition of rights a wide range of inter-
ests, including those not expressly protected by the governing instru-
ment; and second, by imposing on government affirmative obligations to
secure rights against infringements by both governmental and private ac-
tors. In both respects, the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has dis-
played contrasting legal process developments: the range of
unenumerated interests deemed to be protectable rights has been nar-
rowed, and the government has been exempted from any affirmative duty
to protect rights, even when the government's actions arguably have re-
duced the rights in question.
(1) Narrowing Range of Rights Secured
The Supreme Court's 1988-89 term constitutional rights decisions
were characterized by the Court's shrinking conception of what interests
are sufficiently important to be protected constitutionally as a prima facie
matter. In several cases, the Court upheld challenged measures without
even reaching the government's asserted justifications for such measures,
because it concluded that no constitutionally protected rights were impli-
cated.30 6 Dissenting Supreme Court Justices, as well as lower court
judges, maintained that what the Court majority dismissed as mere un-
protected "interests" in fact constituted "rights" entitled to constitu-
tional protection, at least as a prima facie matter.
30 7
The Court's tendency to define narrowly the scope of prima facie
protected rights dovetails with its tendency to review rights limitations
pursuant to only undemanding judicial review standards. In legal pro-
cess terms, the most immediate consequence of holding that an asserted
305. Id. at 2760 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (joined by Brennan, J. & Stevens, J.). Because
Justice Blackmun concurred in the result only, see id., four Justices rejected the majority's
analytical approach.
306. See infra notes 308-19 and accompanying text.
307. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2354 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 851 F.2d 1071, 1081 (1988), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 3040
(1989); Dallas v. Stanglin, 744 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
April 1990] U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL PROTECTION 869
right is a mere "interest" is that any government measure restricting its
exercise need survive only a low level of judicial scrutiny to be held con-
stitutional. In Dallas v. Stanglin, for example, the Court described this
"rational-basis scrutiny" as "the most relaxed and tolerant form of judi-
cial scrutiny," noting that "only the invidious discrimination, the wholly
arbitrary act" would not survive such a lenient level of review.
30 8
The Supreme Court's tendency to define prima facie rights narrowly
contrasts with the legal process under the European Convention and
other international human rights instruments. This general distinction
applies to some of the specific asserted rights that the Supreme Court
recently deemed to be unprotected interests. This divergence between
U.S. and international law cannot be explained in terms of different lan-
guage in the governing human rights instruments. Both the U.S. Consti-
tution and international human rights treaties contain ambiguous terms
that are subject to more or less expansive interpretation. While the Euro-
pean Convention expressly protects certain privacy rights,30 9 this guaran-
tee no more explicitly extends to matters of personal autonomy than does
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, which the Supreme
Court has found implicitly to protect some aspects of personal auton-
omy. 310 Thus, the fact that adults' choice to engage in homosexual sod-
omy is protected under the Convention's privacy guarantee, but not
under the Constitution's due process clause, cannot be justified on the
basis of the words in these two provisions.
Interests that a Supreme Court majority or plurality deemed unpro-
tected include the following: a young teenager's interest in associating
with older teenagers and adults at a dance hall; 311 the interests of a "nat-
ural" father and his daughter in maintaining their relationship with each
other;312 the interest of a homeowner in not having police officers ex-
308. 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1596 (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976)).
309. European Convention, supra note 10, art. 8(l) states: "Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence." Art. 12 states:
"Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and found a family .... "
310. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1963); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1924).
311. See Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989). The lower court had held this "inter-
est" to be protected by the "freedom of association" implicit in the first amendment and other
constitutional guarantees. Dallas v. Stanglin, 744 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 109
S. Ct. 1591 (1989). The Supreme Court in Stanglin, however, narrowed the compass of this
associational right to include only two specific types of association: intimate human relation-
ships and associations for the purpose of engaging in activities expressly protected by the first
amendment-namely, speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise
of religion. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. at 1594 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 617-18 (1984)).
312. Michael H. v. Gerald P., 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
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amine his home and surrounding property from a low-flying helicop-
ter;313 and a woman's interest in terminating her unwanted pregnancy.
3 14
Under the generous scope that the European Convention tribunals ac-
cord to privacy rights, each of these interests probably would be deemed
protected, at least as a prima facie matter.31 5 Moreover, prior Supreme
Court cases had suggested that each of these unprotected "interests"
were actually constitutionally protected rights. 316 Such a classification
would not preclude the government from imposing limitations, but the
limitations would have to survive a more invigorated form of judicial
review to be sustained.
The Court's proclivity toward defining narrowly the scope of pro-
tected rights is illustrated by the plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D. 317 The plurality ruled that a natural father did not have any
constitutionally protected interest in maintaining his previously initiated
relationship with his child when the child's mother had been married to
and cohabiting with another man at the time the child was conceived and
born. The plurality held that the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause did not protect this particular type of father-child relationship.
The dissenters urged that the relevant right should be viewed more
broadly as that of maintaining any natural parent-child relationship, and
that this traditionally protected general right should subsume even rela-
tively unconventional factual variations.318 Consistent with its narrow
313. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
314. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 164-207.
316. Regarding the asserted right to social association that Stanglin rejected, see Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) ("right to freely associate is not limited to 'political'
assemblies in the customary sense, but includes associations that 'pertain to the social, legal,
and economic benefit' of citizens") (emphasis added). Concerning the unmarried father's
claimed right to a relationship with his child that Michael H. rejected, see Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983) (father's biological link, combined with substantial parent-child rela-
tionship, guarantees him constitutional stake in ongoing relationship); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 393-94 (1979) (same); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978) (same);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972). Respecting the asserted right to remain free
from police surveillance of domiciles from low-flying helicopters, which Riley rejected, see
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 528 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886). Finally, regarding a woman's asserted right to choose an abortion that
Webster rejected, see Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 759 (1986); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
426-27 (1983); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973).
317. 109 S. Ct. 2333. 2341-46 (1989).
318. See id. at 2350-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (if such narrow, fact-specific approach had
been used in past cases, Court would not have found fundamental rights in cases such as
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
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focus, the plurality opinion viewed the due process clause as protecting
only "the unitary family," which it defined largely in terms of traditional
marital relationships.319 In so ruling, the plurality stressed the tradi-
tional common law "aversion to declaring children illegitimate ...
thereby depriving them of rights of inheritance and succession. ' 320 The
plurality summarily concluded that neither natural parents nor their
children have a constitutionally cognizable right to maintain relation-
ships with each other. The Court further intimated that children born
out of wedlock may have fewer legal rights than other children. In all of
these respects, the Supreme Court departed from rulings of the European
Commission and Court, which have steadfastly protected the rights of
children born out of wedlock, including their rights to relationships with
their natural parents and other relatives.
321
In what is probably the most controversial ruling of the 1988-89
Term, the Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services322 signifi-
cantly curtailed a woman's right to choose an abortion, which Roe v.
Wade 323 had deemed to be a fundamental right. Only Justice Scalia ex-
pressly said that Roe should be overturned, 324 and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's plurality opinion purported merely to narrow, rather than to
overturn, Roe. 325 However, in Part II(D) of the plurality opinion, which
was joined by Justices White and Kennedy, the Chief Justice ruled in
effect that a woman has no fundamental right to choose an abortion by
characterizing that right as a mere "liberty interest.
'326
The plurality's devaluation of the woman's recognized fundamental
right to reproductive choice was underscored by their assessment of the
challenged regulation pursuant to a rational basis test.327 As Justice
Blackmun noted in dissent, "[This] standard completely disregards the
irreducible minimum of Roe: ... that a woman has a limited fundamen-
tal constitutional right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.
'328
For these reasons, notwithstanding the plurality's disclaimer that Roe
319. See id. at 2353 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 2343.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 194-95 (discussing Marckx Case).
322. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
323. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
324. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring, in part and concurring in
judgment).
325. Id. at 3058.
326. Id.
327. See id. at 3057 (challenged regulations should be upheld because they "permissibly
furthered" state's interest in potential fetal life).
328. See id. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id.
at 3077 (refers to majority's level of review as "non-scrutiny").
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was essentially "undisturbed" by their ruling, 32 9 both Justice Scalia 330
and Justice Blackmun 33 '-whose opinion was joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Stevens-agreed that the plurality had effectively
overruled Roe. Thus, the scope of the implied privacy right has been
substantially contracted. At best, a woman's right of reproductive choice
has been markedly curtailed. 332 At worst, Webster may augur an even
more significant contraction of the constitutional privacy right.333 Cer-
tainly the plurality's invitation to future litigants to further narrow the
scope of Roe's holding 334 does not bode well.
In truncating the scope of the implied constitutional privacy right,
Webster is consistent with the Supreme Court's immediately preceding
decision on this issue, Bowers v. Hardwick 335 Bowers held that constitu-
tionally protected privacy does not encompass homosexual sodomy be-
tween consenting adults in a home.336 Bowers is thus squarely
inconsistent with the European Court's rulings in the Dudgeon and Nor-
ris cases.
337
329. Id. at 3058.
330. Id. at 3069 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
331. Id. at 3077 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
332. As Justice Blackmun declared in dissent:
At every level of its review [including] its intended evisceration of precedents and its
deafening silence about the constitutional protections that it would jettison, the plu-
rality obscures the portent of its analysis. With feigned restraint, the plurality an-
nounces that its analysis leaves Roe "undisturbed," albeit "modif[ied] and
narrow[ed]." ... But this disclaimer is totally meaningless. The plurality opinion is
filled with winks, and nods, and knowing glances to those who would do away with
Roe explicitly, but turns a stone face to anyone in search of what the plurality con-
ceives as the scope of a woman's right ... to terminate a pregnancy free from the
coercive and brooding influence of the State... Roe would not survive the plurality's
analysis, and ... the plurality provides no substitute for Roe's protective umbrella.
.... Thus, "not with a bang, but a whimper," the plurality discards a landmark
case of the last generation, and casts into darkness the hopes and visions of every
woman in this country who had come to believe that the Constitution guaranteed her
the right to exercise some control over her unique ability to bear children.
Id. at 3076-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
333. See id. at 3081-82 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (plurality's
opinion is inconsistent with Griswold v. Connecticut, which protected right to use contracep-
tion as aspect of implied privacy right); see also id. at 3078 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[T]he plurality pretends that it leaves Roe standing, and refuses even
to discuss the real issue underlying this case: whether the Constitution includes an unenumer-
ated right to privacy that encompasses a woman's right to decide whether to terminate a
pregnancy.")
334. See id. at 3058.
335. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
336. Id. at 191.
337. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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(2) Government's Lack of Affirmative Obligation to Protect Rights
One of the Court's 1988-89 term decisions emphatically underscores
its resolute position that the Constitution imposes no affirmative duty on
government to safeguard any individual rights--even the paramount
right to life itself-from interference. Instead, in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, 338 the Court stressed that the Con-
stitution forbids the government only from itself taking direct action that
invades individual rights. In DeShaney, the Court ruled specifically that
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause provided no cause of ac-
tion against a state agency for failing to protect a young boy from his
abusive father, even though various individuals repeatedly had reported
past instances of the father's abusiveness to the agency. 339 The majority
stated that the purpose of the due process clause "was to protect the
people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from
each other. ' '34° The Court also reiterated past holdings that the fifth and
fourteenth amendment due process clauses "generally confer no affirma-
tive right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to
secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself
may not deprive the individual.
'341
As the DeShaney dissenters pointed out, the state government had
undertaken various affirmative actions that arguably made abused chil-
dren worse off than they would have been absent these government meas-
ures. 342 At the very least, the dissenters reasoned, the state's creation of
a system for dealing with child abuse imposed on it a corresponding duty
to carry out its responsibilities under this system in a non-negligent fash-
ion. 343 The state had centralized all responsibility for investigating re-
ported instances of child abuse, and securing any necessary judicial
remedies, in the Department of Social Services (DSS). Any other gov-
ernment bodies, doctors, or other individuals with a duty to report possi-
ble child abuse cases were required to channel their reports to the DSS,
which had the sole responsibility for investigation and seeking possible
remedies. 344 As the dissenting opinion observed:
338. 109 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1989).
339. Id. at 1007.
340. Id. at 1003.
341. Id. (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980)) (government has no obliga-
tion to fund abortions even though it funds childbirth, and even though woman has constitu-
tional right to choose abortion over childbirth, with which government may not directly
interfere).
342. Id. at 1012.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1010.
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Wisconsin's child-protection program thus effectively confined [the
abused son] within the walls of [his father's] violent home until such
time as DSS took action to remove him. Conceivably, then, [abused]
children.., are made worse off by the existence of this program when
the persons and entities charged with carrying it out fail to do their
jobs.
345
The Court's view that the government has no constitutional obliga-
tion to confer any aid, even when necessary to protect constitutionally
secured rights, was also conveyed in its Webster decision. The Webster
plurality made this point in upholding Missouri statutes that forbade any
public employee to perform or assist an abortion, and which also forbade
any public facility to be used for the purpose of performing or assisting
an abortion, unless the abortion was necessary to save the mother's life.
The majority reasoned that, by enacting these statutes, the state left "a
pregnant woman with the same choices as if [it] had chosen not to oper-
ate any public hospitals at all," and that these statutes restricted a wo-
man's ability to obtain an abortion only due to her action, that is, her
choice to use a physician affiliated with a public hospital.346 The Court's
characterization of the government as having taken no affirmative action
to thwart individual rights, however, was as inaccurate in Webster as it
was in DeShaney; in both cases, individuals were more vulnerable to dep-
rivation of fundamental rights as a result of the challenged government
policy than they would have been absent government programs. In Web-
ster, this result followed from the state's broad definition of "public" fa-
cilities, which in effect largely proscribed doctors in private practice from
performing privately funded abortions at private institutions.347 Thus, as
345. Id. at 1011 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1012:
My disagreement with the Court arises from its failure to see that inaction can be
every bit as abusive of power as action, that oppression can result when a State un-
dertakes a vital duty and then ignores it. Today's opinion construes the Due Process
Clause to permit a State to displace private sources of protection and then, at the
critical moment, to shrug its shoulders and turn away from the harm that it has
promised to prevent ... I cannot agree that our Constitution is indifferent to such
indifference ....
346. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3052.
347. The Missouri statute defined "public facility" as "any public institution, public facil-
ity, public equipment, or any physical asset owned, leased, or controlled by this state or any
agency or political subdivisions thereof." Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.200(2) (1986); see Webster,
109 S. Ct. at 3068 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part):
[Tihe State not only has withdrawn from the business of abortion, but has taken
affirmative steps to assure that abortions are not performed by private physicians in
private institutions. Specifically, . . . the Missouri statute prohibits the performance
of abortions in institutions that in all pertinent respects are private, yet are located on
property owned, leased, or controlled by the government. Thus,... no abortion may
be performed at Truman Medical Center in Kansas City ... even though the Center
is a private hospital, staffed primarily by private doctors, and administered by a pri-
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Justice Blackmun's dissent explained, the state's affirmative enactment
left "the pregnant woman with far fewer choices [than if the state had
not chosen to operate any public hospitals], or, for those too sick or too
poor to travel, perhaps no choice at all."
348
This negative rights-defining aspect of the Supreme Court's judicial
process sets it apart from the international human rights trend, as exem-
plified by the European Convention tribunals. The latter consistently
have recognized government's affirmative obligations to facilitate the ex-
ercise of individual rights, even to the extent of requiring the government
to protect against private interferences.3 49 Moreover, this tendency can-
not be explained in terms of the express language of the international
human rights instruments. The European Convention's privacy guaran-
tee, for example, as distinguished from the privacy guarantees in other
international human rights instruments, does not explicitly impose af-
firmative rights-protective responsibilities on the states parties. Never-
theless, the Convention tribunals have interpreted this provision as
implicitly creating such responsibilities.
350
B. Expanding Construction of Permissible Government Limits on Prima
Facie Rights
The Supreme Court's recent tendency to circumscribe individual lib-
erties by narrowing its definition of rights subject to prima facie protec-
tion is compounded by a series of analytical approaches that weaken the
degree of scrutiny applied to rights-restricting measures. Throughout its
1988-89 Term, the Court employed these approaches in numerous cases
concerning a wide range of individual freedoms. The Court consistently
refused to apply strict or even "heightened" scrutiny to government dep-
rivations of liberty.351 Instead, it accorded strong deference to executive
vate corporation: the Center is located on ground leased from a political subdivision
of the State.
As Justice O'Connor recognized, Missouri could try to enforce its public facilities ban
against private institutions that used public water and sewage lines, or that leased state-owned
equipment or land. She acknowledged that these and other potential applications of the public
facilities ban could be unconstitutional, but declined to hold the provision facially unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 3059 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
348. Id. at 3068 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
349. See supra text accompanying notes 187-207.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 190-93.
351. See generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 530-32
(3rd ed. 1986) (under rational relationship test, Court asks only whether it is conceivable that
classification bears rational relationship to governmental end that is not prohibited by Consti-
tution; under strict scrutiny, Court requires close relationship between classification and pro-
motion of compelling government interest; under intermediate, or heightened scrutiny, Court
requires classification to be substantially related to important government objective).
and legislative branch decisionmakers and consistently upheld laws
granting them wide discretion, notwithstanding that such discretion
could be-or, indeed, had been-used to limit individual rights.
The Court routinely asserted that it was not reversing prior deci-
sions that had subjected rights deprivations to more exacting levels of
scrutiny. 352 It in fact, however, significantly limited and in effect over-
ruled much prior precedent. Often, the Court achieved this result by
relying on dicta, 353 distinguishable cases, 354 concurring opinions, 355 or
352. Compare Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3058 ("This case.., affords us no occasion to revisit
the holding of Roe... and we leave it undisturbed) with id. at 3064 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (plurality opinion "effectively would overrule Roe v. Wade")
and id. at 3078 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("plurality pretends
that it leaves Roe standing"); compare Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975 n. 1 ("we ... reject[] the
contention ... that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant [to eighth amend-
ment analysis]") with id. at 2985 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Our cases recognize that objective
indicators of contemporary standards of decency in the form of legislation in other countries is
also of relevance to Eighth Amendment analysis."); compare Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2757 ("[W]e
reaffirm today that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech ... need not
be the least-restrictive... means of [serving government interest].") with id. at 2760 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("Until today, a key safeguard of free speech has been government's obligation
to adopt the least intrusive restriction necessary to achieve its goals.").
353. See Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 699 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting):
The Court holds today that police officers need not obtain a warrant ...before
circling in a helicopter 400 feet above a home in order to investigate what is taking
place behind the walls .... [T]he opinion relies almost exclusively on the fact that
the police officer conducted his surveillance from a vantage point where, under appli-
cable Federal Aviation Administration regulations, he had a legal right to be ....
See also id. at 700:
In California v. Ciraolo ... we held that whatever might be observed from the win-
dow of an airplane flying at 1000 feet could be deemed unprotected by any reasonable
expectation of privacy. That decision was based on the belief that airplane traffic at
that altitude was sufficiently common that no expectation of privacy could inure in
anything on the ground observable with the naked eye from so high.... Seizing on a
reference in Ciraolo to the fact that the police officer was in a position "where he
ha[d] a right to be,". . . today's plurality professes to find this case indistinguishable
354. See Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2761 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting):
The majority's reliance on Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. . . . is unnecessary and
unwise. That decision dealt only with the unique circumstances of "businesses that
purvey sexually explicit materials" .... Today, for the first time, a majority ...
applies Renton analysis to a category of speech far afield from that decision's original
limited focus. Given the serious threat to free expression posed by the Renton analy-
sis, . . . its broad application may encourage widespread official censorship.
See also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1398 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting):
Until today this Court had upheld a bodily search separate from arrest and without
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing only with respect to prison inmates, relying
upon the uniquely dangerous nature of that environment .... Today, in Skinner, we
allow a less intrusive bodily search of railroad employees involved in train accidents.
I joined the Court's opinion there because [of] the demonstrated frequency of drug
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41
April 1990] U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL PROTECTION 877
even dissenting opinions356 from past cases. In these ways, the Court
doubly camouflaged the extent of the new restrictions it imposed on indi-
vidual rights. Not only is language regarding modes of analysis or meth-
odology of review relatively unlikely to draw attention-in contrast with
language setting out the actual holdings regarding the specific facts
presented-but this analytical or methodological language appears par-
ticularly unexceptionable if it purports merely to follow established pre-
cedent. The Court's understated, process-oriented method of making
significant substantive changes in constitutional law was indicted in Jus-
tice Blackmun's Webster dissent:
Never in my memory has a plurality ... gone about its business in
such a deceptive fashion. At every level of its review... the plurality
obscures the portent of its analysis. With feigned restraint, the plural-
ity announces that its analysis leaves Roe "undisturbed,".... But this
disclaimer is totally meaningless. The plurality opinion is filled with
winks, and nods, and knowing glances to those who would do away
with Roe explicitly ....
Thus, "not with a bang, but a whimper," the plurality discards a
landmark case of the last generation. 35 7
As noted above, the Court's decreasingly strict scrutiny of rights-
limiting measures is a logical corollary of its tendency to construe the
scope of prima facie protected rights narrowly. The most significant ju-
dicial process consequence of deeming an asserted right to be merely an
"interest" is that government limitations on the right or interest are re-
viewed only under the most lenient test, rather than a more vigorous
form of judicial scrutiny.35 8 Thus, in Dallas v. Stanglin, where the Court
expressly held that the young teenagers' asserted right to associate with
older teenagers and adults was not protected by the first amendment's
implied freedom of association, it explicitly reviewed the challenged re-
and alcohol use by the targeted class of employees, and the demonstrated connection
between such use and grave harm .... I decline to join the Court's opinion in the
present case because neither frequency of use nor connection to harm is demon-
strated or even likely.
355. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989) (cites
prior concurring opinion for proposition that exceptions to fourth amendment's warrant and
probable cause requirements are permissible "when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, make [these requirements] impracticable' ").
356. See Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753 (cites prior dissenting opinion for proposition that mu-
nicipality that owns performance facility may exercise proprietary right to select performances
and control their quality); id. at 2755 (cites prior dissent for proposition that regulations of
expression may be facially challenged only in "extraordinary" circumstances).
357. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3067, 3077 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
part).
358. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
strictions on such association pursuant to a "rational basis" or minimal
scrutiny test.
359
The Court's lenient form of scrutiny was not reserved to cases in
which it had expressly ruled the asserted right to be an unprotected "in-
terest." Rather, even with respect to rights concededly within the scope
of constitutional guarantees, the Court reviewed and upheld government
limitations under a relatively undemanding standard of review. This pat-
tern was evidenced most strikingly in several cases concerning limitations
on speech. The first amendment right to free speech traditionally has
been viewed as a "preferred freedom," with the consequence that any
infringements on it are subject to the most exacting judicial scrutiny. 36°
Nevertheless, in several speech cases decided during its 1988-89 term, the
Court jettisoned crucial elements of this traditional strict scrutiny.
36'
The Supreme Court's deferential posture toward other government
branches sets it apart from international human rights tribunals, such as
the European Commission and Court. The Convention tribunals have
accorded increasingly narrow "margins of appreciation" to determina-
tions by government officials and instead have subjected those determina-
tions to increasingly invigorated scrutiny.362 With respect to each
element of this more penetrating scrutiny, the Supreme Court has em-
ployed a contrastingly undemanding judicial process.
(1) Rejection of Necessity Standard
A key element of strict judicial scrutiny, which the European Com-
mission and Court zealously enforce, is the demand that a government
359. See Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. at 1594 ("[Ilt need only be shown that [challenged laws] bear
some reasonable relationship to a legitimate state purpose.' ") (quoting San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973)); see also id. at 1596 ("only the invidious
discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act.., cannot stand" under rational basis scrutiny) (quot-
ing New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976)).
360. See McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182, 1184 (1959)
("[F]reedom of expression is so vital in its relationship to the objectives of the Constitution
that inevitably it must stand in a preferred position."); Spece, Justifying Invigorated Scrutiny
and the Least Restrictive Alternative as a Superior Form of Intermediate Review: Civil Commit-
ment and the Right to Treatment as a Case Study, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1049, 1062-67 (1979)
(nature of right is an important factor in determining appropriate standard of judicial review).
361. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3032-33
(1989) (regulation on commercial speech need not be least restrictive means for advancing
government end); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2757 (1989) (time, place, or
manner regulation of protected speech need not be least restrictive means of serving govern-
ment interest); Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1880-81 (1989) (prison may generally
censor inmates' correspondence and receipt of publications without adhering to least intrusive
alternative principle; this limitation applies only to outgoing personal correspondence).
362. See supra text accompanying notes 252-61.
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measure limiting individual rights be necessary for promoting the govern-
ment's countervailing interest.363 By contrast, the Supreme Court has
recently upheld rights-abridging measures that were clearly not neces-
sary to advance the asserted government ends, but rather were at most
reasonable or desirable.
During the Court's latest term, this aspect of its legal process first
appeared in two decisions upholding mass drug testing programs. Under
these programs, individuals were subjected to highly intrusive searches
and seizures; they had to submit blood and urine samples for government
inspection. These programs lacked both of the usual prerequisites for
constitutional searches and seizures: judicially authorized warrants and
probable cause (or at least some other level of individualized suspicion)
to believe that each individual subjected to the invasive procedure had
committed a crime, or was about to do so. In the first of these two cases,
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 364 the Court said that
exceptions to the usual fourth amendment requirements can be made
when "special" government needs make them "impracticable. ' 365 As
Justice Marshall noted in dissent, "The process by which a constitutional
'requirement' can be dispensed with as 'impracticable' is an elusive
one."' 366 Nevertheless, seven Justices concurred in this approach in up-
holding regulations requiring railroads to conduct drug tests after certain
major train accidents.
In the companion case of National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 367 four dissenting Justices specifically questioned the majority's
expansion of the "impracticability" rationale for abandoning fourth
amendment protections. 368 In Von Raab, the challenged drug-screening
program required urinalysis tests of all Customs Service employees who
held or sought positions that directly involved drug interdiction, or
which required carrying firearms or handling "classified" material. 369 As
the majority recognized, this program "was not implemented in response
to any perceived drug problem among Customs employees," and it had
"not led to the discovery of a significant number of drug users."' 370
Although Justices Scalia and Stevens had joined the majority opinion in
363. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13.
364. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
365. Id. at 1414.
366. Id. at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
367. 109 S. Ct. 1334 (1989).
368. Id. at 1398-1402 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting; Scalia, J., joined by
Stevens, J., dissenting).
369. Id. at 1388.
370. Id. at 1394.
Skinner, they were unwilling to extend the newly-minted "impractical-
ity" exception to the fourth amendment's individualized suspicion re-
quirement to the Von Raab situation. As distinguished from the Skinner
scenario, in Von Raab the government had made no showing that the
testing program was causally related to ameliorating some actual drug
problem or was even necessary. 371 Consequently, the four dissenters
concluded, the Customs Service testing program imposed a "needless in-
dignity" on "vast numbers of public employees.
372
The Supreme Court's abandonment of the necessity standard was a
consistent theme in its 1988-89 term decisions regarding other rights, in
addition to those protected by the fourth amendment. This aspect of the
Court's judicial process also characterized its decisions concerning the
eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punish-
ments, 373 the free speech rights of prisoners and those who seek to com-
municate with them, 374 a woman's right to choose an abortion, 375 the
government's power to impose "time, place, and manner" restrictions on
speech or expressive conduct, 376 and the government's power to regulate
commercial speech.
377
371. See id. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
I joined the Court's opinion [in Skinner] because the demonstrated frequency of drug
and alcohol use by the targeted class of employees, and the demonstrated connection
between such use and grave harm, rendered the search a reasonable means of protect-
ing society. I decline to join the Court's opinion in the present case because neither
frequency of use nor connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely. In my view
the Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation of privacy and human dignity in
symbolic opposition to drug use.
372. Id. at 1400-01.
373. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2979 (1989) (rejected notion that death
penalty imposed on individual who was under 18 at time of offense must be shown to promote
societal goal of retribution or deterrence).
374. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1876, 1883 (1989) (regulations restricting
prisoners' receipt of incoming materials will be upheld so long as "reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests"; prison may exclude materials even if not "likely" to lead to vio-
lence, so long as warden determines that they create "intolerable risk of disorder").
375. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3055 (1989) (upheld
requirement that doctors perform tests to determine fetal viability for any abortion performed
at or after 20 weeks gestational age on ground that "these tests permissibly further the State's
interest in protecting potential human life," although it was undisputed that viability was sci-
entifically impossible at 20 weeks and many prescribed tests would endanger health of both
fetus and mother).
376. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2758 (1989) (so long as regula-
tion not "substantially broader than necessary" to achieve government interest, it will not be
invalidated simply because government's interest could be served adequately by narrower
measure).
377. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3035 (1989)
(commercial speech may be subject to regulations that may exceed what is necessary to serve
government interest).
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The Court's decision in Stanford v. Kentucky 378 vividly illustrates
its abandonment of the necessity element of strict scrutiny. Stanford re-
jected a challenge to the imposition of the death penalty on individuals
who were juveniles when they committed the crimes in question. In re-
pudiating the contention that the juvenile death penalty should be invali-
dated unless it could be shown to advance a legitimate penological goal,
the Court went much further than eschewing the requirement that the
state's chosen means be necessary to promote its asserted ends. Rather,
the Court refused to enforce a requirement that the state demonstrate
any degree of means to end connection whatsoever. 379 Specifically, it
said that evidence concerning the inefficacy of the juvenile death penalty
in promoting penological goals would be relevant only if the evidence
established conclusively that there was absolutely no means to end con-
nection. 380 The Court thus applied the lowest level of scrutiny applicable
to a government measure, the "rational basis" or "minimal rationality"
test, although it did not expressly acknowledge that it was doing so.
(2) De-emphasis of Democratic Society Context
As noted above, the European Convention organs interpret the ne-
cessity requirement in the context of a democratic society.381 They have
declared that "hallmarks" of such a society are tolerance and plural-
ism. 382 The European Court's application of these criteria to homosex-
ual conduct was a significant factor leading it to invalidate laws
criminalizing such conduct in the Dudgeon and Norris cases. 38 3 The U.S.
Supreme Court, by contrast, invoked no such benchmarks when it sus-
tained a similar law in Bowers v. Hardwick 384 Indeed, the majority and
378. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
379. Id. at 2979.
380. See id.:
We also reject petitioners' argument that we should invalidate [the juvenile death
penalty] on the ground that it fails to serve the legitimate goals of penology. Accord-
ing to petitioners, it fails to deter because juveniles, possessing less developed cogni-
tive skills than adults, are less likely to fear death; and it fails to exact just retribution
because juveniles, being less mature and responsible, are also less morally blamewor-
thy .... If. . . evidence could conclusively establish the entire lack of deterrent
effect and moral responsibility ... the Equal Protection Clause ... would invalidate
these laws for lack of rational basis .... But ... it is not demonstrable that no 16-
year-old is "adequately responsible" or significantly deterred. It is rational, even if
mistaken, to think the contrary.
381. See supra text accompanying notes 219-29.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 219-27.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 222-24, 253-56.
384. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
concurring opinions in Bowers have been criticized for subverting both
tolerance and pluralism.385
During the Court's most recent term, its relatively intolerant, non-
pluralistic view of the interests and relationships that are sufficiently im-
portant to be deemed protected by the due process clause was manifested
in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 386 The plurality repeatedly intimated adverse
moral judgments against the petitioner, who had fathered a child during
an adulterous relationship with a woman then still living with her hus-
band. The plurality's characterization of this relationship as "extraordi-
nary" 38 7 infected its constitutional analysis resulting in due process
protection for only those interests or relationships that have been tradi-
tionally and historically protected under law. 388 Justice Brennan's dis-
sent took the plurality to task for "ignor[ing] the kind of society in which
our Constitution exists," which is characterized by tolerance and plural-
ism. 389 He stated:
We are not an assimilative, homogeneous society, but a facilitative,
pluralistic one, in which we must be willing to abide someone else's
unfamiliar or even repellant practice because the same tolerant impulse
protects our own idiosyncracies .... In a community such as ours,
"liberty" must include the freedom not to conform. The plurality to-
day squashes this freedom by requiring specific approval from history
before protecting anything in the name of liberty.
390
(3) Rejection of Least Intrusive Alternative Requirement
Closely related to the Court's increasing refusal to demand that
rights-limiting measures be necessary to promote a government interest
is its growing refusal to require that the government promote an interest
through the measure that least restricts individual rights.391 In six 1988-
89 Term decisions, involving a range of first and fourth amendment free-
385. See id. at 215 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the
Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1181 (1988).
386. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
387. The plurality expressed its negative moral judgment on the relationships in question
when it stated, "The facts of this case are, we must hope, extraordinary." Id. at 2337 (emphasis
added).
388. See id. at 2341-42.
389. Id. at 2350.
390. Id. at 2357 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581,
1588, 1590 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticized majority for permitting law enforcement
officials to conduct searches and seizures based solely on "imprecise stereotypes of what
criminals look like," or on "irrelevant personal characteristics, such as race"; majority repeat-
edly alluded to defendant's unusual attire as apparent justification for search and seizure).
391. A variation on this standard requires the government to employ a less restrictive
alternative, even if not the least restrictive one. See supra note 230.
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doms, the Court expressly repudiated the least restrictive alternative re-
quirement which it had previously enforced in these contexts. In this
respect as well, the Supreme Court's judicial process is sharply distin-
guished from that employed by the European Convention organs and
other international human rights tribunals. the least intrusive alternative
requirement appears to be a universally enforced prerequisite for sus-
taining any rights limitation under international law, just as it was until
recently under American law.
392
In the Skinner case, which upheld mass drug testing of railroad em-
ployees, the Court relegated to a footnote its dismissal of "less drastic
and equally effective means" for addressing the government's safety con-
cerns, including training supervisory personnel to detect drug-impaired
employees. 393 The majority cited previous fourth amendment cases in
which it had declined to hold particular searches and seizures unreasona-
ble on the ground that the government could have pursued its objectives
through a less intrusive alternative measure. 394 The Court, however,
never before had rejected categorically the less intrusive alternative anal-
ysis as an element of fourth amendment reasonableness. Moreover, the
Court previously had enforced this requirement with respect to the few
categories of searches that-like those at issue in Skinner-it had author-
ized on less than probable cause. 395 In addition, as the dissent noted, the
Skinner majority countenanced "needlessly intrusive" aspects of the
challenged testing process, which did not advance the government's as-
serted interest at all.396 Specifically, the government conceded that the
mandated urine tests, in contrast with the required blood tests, do not
measure current impairment and therefore are wholly irrelevant to the
government's safety goals.397 Thus, by sanctioning such tests, the Court
not only failed to require the government to use less or the least intrusive
means for pursuing its end, but to the contrary permitted the government
392. See supra text accompanying notes 231-34.
393. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1419 n.9.
394. Id.
395. See, e.g, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985) (in holding that school offi-
cials could search student property on basis of "reasonable suspicion"-as distinguished from
"probable cause"-that law or school rule had been violated, Court said students' privacy
should be "invaded no more than is necessary"). For a comprehensive survey of the Supreme
Court's rulings concerning the least intrusive alternative test in fourth amendment cases, see
Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the
Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1173, 1215-31 (1988).
396. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1432 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
397. Id. at 1421.
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to use "wholly excessive" means that did not promote its end in the
slightest. 3
98
The Supreme Court has recognized that the fourth amendment's re-
quirement that any search or seizure be "reasonable" comprises two sep-
arate facets: the search or seizure must be reasonable in its inception-
the government must have "probable cause" or some other specific justi-
fication for undertaking it-and it must also be reasonable in its execu-
tion.399 Some Supreme Court precedents have indicated that the least
intrusive alternative criterion should be a required element of both types
of reasonableness. 4 The Skinner decision, however, refused to enforce
the least restrictive alternative requirement as a prerequisite for finding a
search or seizure reasonable in its inception.
In United States v. Sokolow, 401 the Court similarly declined to en-
force the least restrictive means test as a requirement for finding a search
or seizure reasonable in its execution. In Florida v. Royer, 402 the Court
had held that an "investigative detention" (law enforcement officials'
seizure of an individual for purposes of investigating some suspicion
when they lack the "probable cause" required to arrest) violated the
fourth amendment because it did not comply with the precept that "the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means rea-
sonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short pe-
riod of time."' 40 3 The Sokolow majority, however, refused to apply this
precept to the investigative detention at issue in that case and reinter-
preted the quoted statement from Royer as having been "directed at the
length of the investigative stop, not at whether the police had a less intru-
sive means to verify their suspicions. ' '4°4
398. See id. at 1432 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
399. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
400. For an example of a case imposing the least intrusive alternative requirement as a
prerequisite for finding that a search was reasonably initiated, see Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 659 (1979). For an example of a case imposing this requirement as a prerequisite for
finding that a search was reasonably executed, see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).
401. 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (1989).
402. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
403. Id. at 500.
404. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. at 1587. But see id. at 1591 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
manner in which a search is carried out-and particularly whether law enforcement officers
have taken needlessly intrusive steps-is a highly important index of reasonableness under
Fourth Amendment doctrine." (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-61 (1985))). Signifi-
cantly, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who authored the majority opinion in Sokolow, dissented in
Royer, and specifically repudiated Royer's articulation of a least intrusive means requirement
for carrying out investigative detentions. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 528 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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During its 1988-89 Term, the Court also abandoned the least restric-
tive means test in four first amendment contexts in which it previously
had been enforced: regulations of prisoners' receipt of correspondence
and publications, and regulations of prisoners' outgoing non-personal
correspondence; 40 5 regulations of the time, place, or manner of speech or
405. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1880-81 (1989) (regulations of prisoners'
mail must only be "generally necessary" to legitimate government interest); cf Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (censorship of prison mail would be permitted only if "the
limitation of First Amendment freedoms [was] no greater than... necessary or essential"). In
its zeal to eradicate the least restrictive alternative analysis from judicial review of prison regu-
lations, the Thornburgh Court limited Martinez in two ways. First, it expressly overruled
Martinez to the extent that Martinez had applied the least restrictive means analysis to regula-
tions on prisoners' receipt of mail from non-prisoners. See Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1881.
Second, in dicta, the Court said that even regarding the narrow category of regulations still
governed by the Martinez standard-namely, regulations on prisoners' sending of personal
correspondence to non-prisoners, see id. at 1881-this standard does not include the least re-
strictive alternative criterion.
[T]he Court declined to apply the Martinez standard in [subsequent] "prisoners'
rights" cases because... Martinez could be (and had been) read to require a strict
"least restrictive alternative" analysis....
We do not believe that Martinez should.., be read as subjecting the decisions of
prison officials to a strict "least restrictive means" test .... Martinez required no
more than that a challenged regulation be "generally necessary" to a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest.
Id. at 1880.
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expressive conduct;4°6 regulations of commercial speech;4 07 and limita-
tions on freedom of association.4° 8
The Court's reasoning in these cases is typified by Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 409 which ruled that content-neutral regulations on the
time, place, or manner of speech should be sustained even if the govern-
ment's goals could have been served through less speech-restrictive alter-
natives. Ward upheld New York City's regulations requiring that any
musical performance at the Central Park Bandshell had to use city-fur-
nished sound equipment run by a city-employed sound technician. The
city's asserted justification for this regulation was to control sound vol-
406. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2758 (1989) (such regulation
must be narrowly tailored to serve government's interests, but need not be least restrictive
means of doing so; only regulation "substantially broader than necessary" will be invalidated);
cf Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, (1988) (regulation of expressive conduct must "target[ ]
and eliminate[ ] no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy"); Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988) (invalidated government regulation of picketing because it was "not
narrowly tailored; a less restrictive alternative is readily available"); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (first case enunciating test for constitutionality of regulations on
expressive conduct; one requirement is that restriction on speech be "no greater than is essen-
tial to the furtherance of [government] interest").
407. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3033-34
(1989) (such regulations must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest, but
this does not require eliminating all less restrictive alternatives); cf Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (government restrictions upon commercial speech may be no
broader or more expansive than necessary to serve government interests); San Franciso Arts &
Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539 (1987) (same); Posadas de
Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism C. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 343 (1986) (same); Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 644, 651 n. 14 (1985) (same);
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (same); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
507 (1981) (same); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (same). In light of this extensive prior case law, the dissenting justices in
Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N. Y observed, the majority was able to reach its holding
that least restrictive means analysis does not apply to commercial speech cases "only by recast-
ing a good bit of contrary language in our past cases." Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of
N.Y., 109 S. Ct. at 3038 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
408. See Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1596, 1597 (1989). The Court ruled that the
form of "social association" involved in the case, interaction at a dance hall, was not a funda-
mental right, and therefore that regulations on such association were subject only to minimal
scrutiny. It accordingly rejected the lower court's reasoning that the regulation should be
invalidated on the ground that it was not the least restrictive means for accomplishing the
government's goal of protecting young teenagers. Cf Stanglin v. Dallas, 744 S.W.2d 165 (Tex.
App. 1987). In another case decided during the 1988-89 Term, the Court rejected the less
intrusive alternative requirement that had previously been an accepted element of statutory, as
opposed to constitutional, interpretation. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct.
2115 (1989) (rejected previous requirement that employer defendant in Title VII litigation,
whose employment policy produced "disparate" adverse impact on protected minority groups,
pursue business goals through less discriminatory employment policies, even if such alternative
policies were more costly).
409. 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2757 (1989).
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ume.410 The city's sound technician controlled not only the sound's vol-
ume, however, but also its "mix," which is an essential aesthetic element
of rock music. 411 For this reason, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
invalidated the regulation.4 2 Applying the least intrusive alternative ap-
proach, the court of appeals found that there were various alternative
means of controlling volume without also intruding on performers' abil-
ity to control the sound mix.
413
In the Ward case, as in the others where it discarded the least re-
strictive alternative test, the Court substituted a requirement that the
challenged measure be "narrowly tailored" to promote the relevant inter-
est. Although the term "narrowly tailored" connotes the least restrictive
alternative approach, the Court's explanation of the term makes clear
that it is a nebulous, deferential criterion, which will result in upholding
most government measures. In Ward, the Court said that the narrow
tailoring requirement would be satisfied "so long as the... regulation
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation. 414 In other words, the regulation may
not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the
government's legitimate interests. '415 But, as the dissent noted, "this
means that only those regulations that 'engage in the gratuitous inhibi-
tion of expression' will be invalidated. '4 16 Even this attenuated tailoring
requirement probably would not be enforced under the majority's analy-
sis because the majority criticized the Second Circuit for evaluating the
comparative efficacy and intrusiveness of the alternative means for
achieving noise reduction.
4 17
The Ward opinion also typifies the Court's approach in abrogating
the least intrusive alternative analysis by using a relatively unsympathetic
factual scenario as a vehicle for eroding a wide range of first amendment
protections. These long-range adverse ramifications were described by
the Ward dissent:
The majority requires only that government show that its interest can-
not be served as effectively without the challenged restriction .... It
410. Id at 2756.
411. Id. at 2751-52 & n.1.
412. Id. at 2752.
413. See id. at 2752-53. The Second Circuit opinion is reported at Rock Against Racism v.
Ward, 848 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1988).
414. Id. at 2758 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 677, 689 (1985)).
415. Id.
416. Id. at 2762 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1482, 1485 (1975)).
417. Id. at 2757.
will be enough, therefore, that the challenged regulation advances the
government's interest only in the slightest, for any differential burden
on speech that results does not enter the calculus.
Today's decision has significance far beyond the world of rock music.
Government no longer need balance the effectiveness of regulation
with the burdens on free speech. After today, government need only
assert that it is most effective to control speech in advance of its
expression.
4 18
(4) Rejection of Proportionality Requirement
As discussed above, restrictions on international human rights are
permitted only in accordance with a proportionality requirement.419
Under this requirement, the extent to which the measure advances the
government goal must be proportional to-not outweighed by-the ex-
tent to which the measure inhibits individual freedom. The fact that a
challenged government measure is the least restrictive alternative for
pursuing a government goal does not insulate the measure from invalida-
tion. The end does not necessarily justify the means.
Until recently, the Supreme Court had enforced a similar standard.
The Court's fourth amendment cases had held consistently that a govern-
ment intrusion on privacy could not be justified on the sole ground that it
was the least intrusive measure for effectively pursuing the government's
goal.420 The least intrusive alternative requirement was a necessary, but
not sufficient, prerequisite for the government's invasion of individual
rights.
In the 1988-1989 Term, however, the Court inverted these previous
holdings in the context of asserted fourth amendment, as well as other,
rights. Now a challenged measure need not be the least intrusive alterna-
tive for advancing the government's goal;42 1 if the measure effectively
promotes the goal, that alone validates it. The government is not re-
quired to show that its interest is promoted proportionately to the curb-
418. Id. at 2762, 2765 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
419. See supra text accompanying notes 235-36.
420. The Court repeatedly has stressed that it "has never sustained a search upon the sole
ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily
confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end." Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967); accord United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914-15
(1984); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1972); see also Olm-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("To declare that in
the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Govern-
ment may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its
face.").
421. See supra text accompanying notes 393-98.
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ing of individual rights. As Justice Marshall stated succinctly in Ward,
"the majority enshrines efficacy but sacrifices free speech. '422 Likewise,
specifically in the fourth amendment context, the Court recently has al-
lowed exceptions to the warrant and individualized suspicion require-
ments on the grourld that it would be "impractical" for the government
to comply with these constitutional obligations. 4
23
The 1988-89 Term decision in which the Justices most extensively
discussed the role of proportionality analysis in reviewing a rights-limit-
ing measure was Stanford v. Kentucky. 424 The Stanford plurality opin-
ion held that the juvenile death penalty survived an eighth amendment
challenge without any consideration of proportionality. 425 In previous
eighth amendment cases, such analysis had comprised the questions
whether the punishment imposed is proportionate to the defendant's
blameworthiness and whether the punishment makes any measurable
contribution to an acceptable penal goal. 426 Because Justice O'Connor
wrote a separate concurrence stressing her view that the Court "does
have a constitutional obligation to conduct proportionality analysis, '427
and because the four dissenters agreed with this position,42 a bare major-
ity of the Court still adheres to it.429 The four-Justice Stanford plurality,
however, said that such analysis is at most relevant to judicial review of
eighth amendment claims, but should never be dispositive. 430 The plural-
ity staunchly maintained that once "the objective indicators of state laws
or jury determinations evidenced a societal consensus" favoring any par-
ticular penalty, such as the juvenile death penalty, then the eighth
422. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2763 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
423. See Von Raab, 109 S. Ct. at 1392; see also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989). As Justice Marshall noted in dissent:
[R]eliance on the importance of diagnosing the causes of an accident as a critical
basis for upholding the FRA's testing plan is especially hard to square with our
frequent admonition that the interest in ascertaining the causes of a criminal episode
does not justify departure from the Fourth Amendment's requirements. "[T]his
Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably
expected to find evidence of a particular crime. .. ."
Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1328 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 356 (1967)).
424. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
425. Id. at 2980.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 2981.
428. Id. at 2987-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
429. Accord Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2955-58 (1989) (Justice O'Connor's ma-
jority opinion, holding that eighth amendment does not categorically prohibit execution of
mentally retarded individuals, engaged in proportionality analysis and found that challenged
penalty satisfied this analysis).
430. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980.
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amendment challenge had to be dismissed, and the Court was not free to
make any additional inquiries.4 31
(5) Permitting Broad Discretion, Only Loosely Constrained by Legal Standards
As outlined above, the European Convention organs and the Cana-
dian courts demand that standards controlling government curtailment
of individual rights be clearly delineated, in order to circumscribe official
discretion.432 By contrast, the Supreme Court's drift away from strict
scrutiny entails its failure to enforce any similar requirement. In two
cases decided during the 1988-89 Term, the Court expressly permitted
the government to abridge fundamental free speech rights pursuant to
open-ended, broadly-worded standards that left much room for the exer-
cise, and hence abuse, of governmental discretion.
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 433 the Court upheld New York
City's guidelines for regulating music performances in Central Park even
though it recognized that the standards were "undoubtedly flexible" and
that "the officials implementing them will exercise considerable discre-
tion. '434 As Justice Marshall noted in dissent, this broad discretion was
particularly problematic for two reasons. First, such discretion would
afford officials leeway to make what were actually content-based regula-
tions under the guise of making ostensibly neutral judgments about vol-
ume.435 He pointed out that, throughout history, newer styles of music
generally have been perceived as "noisier" than old, with the result that
content could be censored on the pretext of regulating volume. 436
A second reason why the detailed legal standards requirement
should have been enforced especially zealously in Ward, Justice Marshall
explained, is that the guidelines constituted a prior restraint on free
speech.437 Thus, they should have been viewed as presumptively uncon-
stitutional and upheld only if accompanied by the requisite procedural
safeguards, including narrowly drawn and definite standards.438
Notwithstanding their general and vague character, however, the Ward
guidelines were upheld by the majority. 439 The Court did not insist that
431. Id.
432. See supra text accompanying notes 244-51.
433. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
434. Id. at 2755.
435. Id. at 2764 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (because judgments that sounds are too "loud,
noisy or discordant" can mask disapproval of music itself, government control of sound mix-
ing equipment should be done only pursuant to detailed standards).
436. See id. at 2764 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
437. Id. at 2763.
438. See id. at 2763-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
439. Id. at 2760.
[Vol. 41
April 1990] U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL PROTECTION 891
the regulations themselves explicitly limit official discretion. Instead, it
was content to rest its approval upon the officials' testimony that, in
practice, they interpreted the regulations' broad standards relatively nar-
rowly.440 The Ward majority emphasized that city officials actually in-
terpreted the guidelines as prohibiting the purposeful determination that
music had inadequate sound quality or volume based on its message.
The guidelines themselves, however, contained no such express
limitation.44,
Thornburgh v. Abbot"4 2 was the second 1988-89 Term decision evis-
cerating the requirement that rights-restraining government action be
undertaken only pursuant to specific, detailed standards. There the
Court upheld regulations that gave prison officials broad discretion to
control prisoners' receipt of publications and other materials if they de-
termined that such materials might be "detrimental to the security, good
order, or discipline of the institution or if they might facilitate criminal
activity. ' '443 As the dissent noted, these "standards" are so ambiguous
that they give prison officials virtually free rein to censor incoming
materials.4 4
(6) Broad Deference to Government; Burden of Proof
The areas in which the Supreme Court recently has lessened the de-
gree of scrutiny applied to rights infringements particularly manifest the
Court's general tendency to defer to the challenged determinations of
other government decisionmakers. Thus, in multiple decisions issued
during its 1988-89 Term involving a range of constitutional rights, the
Court consistently stressed that it should respect the judgments of execu-
tive and legislative officials at the federal, state, and local levels." 5 The
Court essentially presumed government decisions to be correct and im-
posed substantial burdens of proof upon individuals who challenged such
decisions. In these areas, too, the Court's legal process diverges from
that of the European Commission and Court." 6
440. Id. at 2756.
441. Id. at 2754-56.
442. 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989).
443. 28 C.F.R. § 540.71(b) (1985).
444. Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1889 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
445. See infra notes 446-64 and accompanying text.
446. See Warbrick, supra note 8, at 699 (Supreme Court cases "show a remarkable solici-
tude for state autonomy," which paradoxically contrasts with European Court's lesser defer-
ence to national sovereignty).
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The dissenting Justices in these cases viewed the majority's deferen-
tial posture as inconsistent with the Court's responsibility to enforce con-
stitutional standards and safeguard individual rights. The Justices who
advocated a more deferential stance minimized the importance of judicial
review in our system and assumed government measures reflecting
majoritarian values and preferences to be legitimate.
Perhaps the plainest statement of the often prevailing view that the
Court should defer to the majoritarian branches of government, and
strictly curtail its judicial review power, was contained in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Texas v. Johnson. 447 A narrow major-
ity in Johnson overturned a criminal conviction for burning the Ameri-
can flag for expressive purposes.448 Yet the view of the Court's
appropriate role expressed by the Chief Justice in his Johnson dissent
informed numerous majority or plurality opinions as well. He declared:
"Surely one of the high purposes of a democratic society is to legislate
against conduct that is regarded as evil and profoundly offensive to the
majority of people .... -449 This statement is starkly inconsistent both
with prior Supreme Court pronouncements 450 and with declarations of
international human rights tribunals.
451
447. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
448. Id. at 2548.
449. Id. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The opinion continued: "Our Constitution
wisely places limits on powers of legislative majorities to act, but the declaration of such limits
by this Court 'is, at all times, a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if ever, to be
decided in the affirmative, in a doubtful case.' " Id. (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.)).
450. Ironically, a leading opinion eloquently articulating this point invalidated another
form of obeisance to the American flag: a compulsory pledge of allegiance. See West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943):
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicis-
situdes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
... fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of
no elections.
See also id. at 642:
[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be
a mere shadow of freedom. [It includes] the right to differ as to things that touch the
heart of the existing order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official
... can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion ....
451. See Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1981): "Although members of
the public who regard homosexuality as immoral may be shocked, offended or disturbed by the
commission by others of private homosexual acts, this cannot on its own warrant the applica-
tion of penal sanctions when it is consenting adults alone who are involved." Accord Norris
Case, 129 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 (1988).
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Other cases decided during the Court's 1988-89 Term implementing
a similarly broad deference to majoritarian values, and a correspondingly
constricted judicial review, involved: regulation of prisoners' correspon-
dence and receipt of publications;452 control of the volume and sound
mix of musical performances in a public park;45 3 regulation of commer-
cial speech;454 limitations on the relationship between a natural father
and his child;455 surveillance of a home and surrounding property from a
low-cruising helicopter;456 and restrictions on a woman's right to choose
an abortion. 457 In addition, four Justices voted to extend this deferential
approach to legislative determinations that the death penalty could ap-
propriately be imposed on individuals who were sixteen or seventeen
years old at the time of their crimes, 458 to government-sponsored displays
452. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1883-84 (broad discretion regulations
gave prison wardens is justified; warden may exclude materials even if they are not "likely" to
lead to violence, if they create "intolerable risk of disorder"; even if warden determined that
only one page of book created such risk, entire book could be banned).
453. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2759 (1989) (court of appeals
erred in not deferring to city's reasonable determination that its interest in controlling volume
would be best served by challenged regulations, even though other regulations may have pro-
moted this interest with less impact on performers' artistic control over sound quality); Id. at
2760 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority replaces constitutional scrutiny with
mandatory deference.").
454. See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3035 (1989)
(such regulations will be upheld so long as there is "a fit between the [government's] ends and
the means chosen to accomplish those ends... [W]e leave it to governmental decisionmakers
to judge what manner of regulation may best be employed.").
455. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2351 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[B]y describing the decisive question as whether [the asserted] interest is one that has been
'traditionally protected by our society,' . . . rather than one that society traditionally has
thought important.. . , and by suggesting that our sole function is to 'discern the society's
views,'.., the plurality acts as if the only purpose of the Due Process Clause is to confirm the
importance of interests already protected by a majority of the States.").
456. See Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696 (1989) (burden of proof imposed on search
victim to demonstrate that low-cruising helicopters were sufficiently uncommon that police
surveillance from such helicopter violated reasonable privacy expectation).
457. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3057 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (state regulations should be upheld so long as they "permissibly further[ ] the State's
interest in protecting potential human life"); id. at 3063 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (pre-viability abortion regulations permissible so long as they do not
"unduly burden" woman's right to choose); id. at 3077 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (plurality's proposed test constitutes rational basis review and "non-
scrutiny").
458. See Stanford v Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. at 2977, 2979 (1989) (those who challenged
juvenile death penalty under eighth amendment had "heavy burden" to establish national con-
sensus against such penalty; focusing on numerous state laws permitting such penalty, plural-
ity concluded that role of judicial review was exhausted by this determination); see also id. at
2977 (fact that theoretically authorized juvenile death penalty was actually imposed only
rarely was irrelevant, so long as penalty was not "categorically unacceptable"). But see id. at
2986-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Court has ultimate responsibility to evaluate appropriate-
of religious symbols on public property,4 59 and to legislative determina-
tions that burning the American flag to convey a political message is
intolerably offensive.
460
The Justices' polarized views about the appropriate degree of judi-
cial deference to the majoritarian branches of government, and the scope
and role of judicial review, were forcefully expressed in Stanford v. Ken-
tucky, 461 the juvenile death penalty case. As noted above, the plurality
rejected the contention that the Court should make independent determi-
nations as to whether the penalty was proportionate to the offender's
moral responsibility or to some legitimate penological goal. 4 62 The plu-
rality explained that these determinations should be made only by popu-
larly elected representatives:
The audience for these arguments ... is not this Court but the citi-
zenry of the United States .... [O]ur job is to identify the "evolving
standards of decency"; to determine, not what they should be, but
what they are. We have no power under the Eighth Amendment to
substitute our belief in the scientific evidence for the society's apparent
skepticism. In short, we emphatically reject petitioner's suggestion
that the issues in this case permit us to apply our "own informed judg-
ment," . . . regarding the desirability of permitting the death penalty
for crimes by sixteen and seventeen-year olds.
4 6 3
In sharp contrast, the four Stanford dissenters urged not only that
the Court should make the determinations that the plurality deemed out
of bounds, but also that it has a constitutional responsibility to do so:
Although the judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh
heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge whether the
Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty in a par-
ticular class of cases .... Under Justice Scalia's positivist approach to
defining rights, the Court abandons its proven and proper role when it
hands back to the very majorities the Framers distrusted the power to
define the precise scope of protection afforded by the Bill of Rights,
rather than bringing its own judgment to bear on that question.
464
ness of death penalty under eighth amendment; plurality's approach entails abandonment of
Court's proper role).
459. County of Allegeny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3146 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (communities should be allowed to make "reasonable judg-
ments" about accommodating or acknowledging holidays with both cultural and religious as-
pects); see id. at 3109 (majority opinion) (Justice Kennedy's proposed test would lower
considerably level of scrutiny in establishment clause cases by imposing burden of "unmistaka-
ble" clarity that government had favored specific sects or undertaken "obvious" efforts to pros-
elytize for particular religion).
460. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2550 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
461. 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989).
462. See supra text accompanying note 43 1.
463. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2979.
464. Id. at 2986, 2987 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although Justice O'Connor concurred in
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(7) De-emphasis of Temporal Trends and Actual Enforcement Practice
The Stanford case also graphically illustrates another facet of the
current Court's drift toward lenient scrutiny of measures infringing indi-
vidual rights: its tendency to assess the strength of a government interest
by focusing on positive law enactments while de-emphasizing other
sources of information-notably, actual enforcement practices. As the
European Convention organs recognize, 465 the pattern of actual investi-
gations and prosecutions may better reflect actual contemporary societal
attitudes than the mere existence of legislation; many laws fall into desue-
tude over time and are out of harmony with prevailing community mo-
res. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's de-emphasis of actual
enforcement practices is one particular aspect of its general tendency to
relegate temporal trends to an unimportant position. This larger trend
also contrasts with the European Convention organs' tendency to empha-
size evolving contemporary developments.
466
The Supreme Court's de-emphasis of temporal trends in general and
actual enforcement practices in particular were both apparent in Stan-
ford. Stanford stressed states' statutory authorization of juvenile execu-
tions and correspondingly downplayed evidence that this authorization
was rarely invoked.467 The Stanford majority recognized that during the
entire period from 1642 to 1986, juveniles accounted for only about two
percent of all executions, and that no one who had been under seventeen
when committing the crime had been executed since 1959.468 The Court
essentially deemed this evidence irrelevant, however, because it did not
establish that the juvenile death penalty was "categorically unaccept-
able."' 469 The Court thus elevated the importance of a state's mere theo-
the judgment, she expressly rejected the plurality's conclusion that the Court should merely
defer to the national consensus about the appropriateness of the juvenile death penalty as
reflected in legislation. In her view, the Court also had a responsibility to undertake a "pro-
portionality" review. See id. at 2981 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
465. See supra text accompanying note 279.
466. See supra text accompanying note 262.
467. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2981 (1989).
468. Id. at 2977.
469. Id. Other examples of the Court's willingness to sustain abridgements of constitu-
tional rights based upon speculative, rather than actually demonstrated, government interests,
are the cases of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1595-96 (1989) (upholding city's prohibi-
tion on older teenagers and adults from using dance halls open only to younger teenagers based
on Court's speculation that city could have concluded that younger teenagers "might" be sus-
ceptible to certain negative influences at a dance hall but not at a skating rink or other similar
environments lacking an age restriction), and Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696-97 (1989)
(absent any evidence as to how common it was for low-flying helicopters to cruise over homes
and surrounding areas, plurality presumed it to be sufficiently common that someone whose
property was surveilled in this fashion had no reasonable expectation of privacy; therefore no
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retical power to impose a certain punishment over its actual decisions to
invoke that power in concrete cases.
Stanford's overlooking of temporal trends in assessing the impor-
tance of asserted government interests was accentuated by its questiona-
ble assessment of the meanings inferable from state juvenile death
penalty statutes. The majority acknowledged that of the thirty-seven
states permitting capital punishment, fifteen decline to impose it upon
sixteen-year-old offenders and twelve decline to impose it on seventeen-
year-old offenders. 470 Reasoning that "a majority of the States that per-
mit capital punishment authorize it for crimes committed at age 16 or
above," the majority concluded that "[t]his does not establish the degree
of national consensus [opposing a punishment] sufficient to label [it] cruel
and unusual."'4 7' The dissent pointed out that it cannot be assumed that
a legislature that never specifically considered the issue made a conscious
moral choice to permit juvenile executions. As the dissent further noted,
of the states that squarely had addressed the issue, twenty-seven refused
to authorize such executions, and only two explicitly had set an age be-
low eighteen as the one at which a person may be sentenced to death.472
A decision from the 1988-89 Term that dramatically illustrates the
Court's emphasis on history and tradition, and its corresponding dis-
counting of evolving trends, is Michael H. v. Gerald D. 473 A natural
father and his daughter urged that their interests in preserving their rela-
fourth amendment rights were implicated); id. at 698-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same).
Both dissenting opinions specifically noted the absence of evidence on this point and argued
that the government should bear the burden of proof. See id. at 704 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
705 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
470. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2971.
471. Id. at 2976-77.
472. Id. at 2983 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the juvenile death penalty context, the
Court's tunnel-visioned focus on positive law, to the exclusion of actual practice, had the effect
of diminishing the degree of judicial scrutiny, and correspondingly weakening the protection
accorded the right at issue. Ironically, in another context-that involved in the Ward case-
the Court used the opposite analytical technique to achieve the same result in terms of lowered
judicial scrutiny and decreased rights protection. Specifically, in upholding government regu-
lations controlling public musical performances, the Court focused on the government's al-
leged actual practice, to the exclusion of the statutory language. The regulations themselves
did not constrain expressly governmental discretion to regulate musical expression. The Court
nevertheless upheld the regulations based on the administering officials' testimony that in prac-
tice they interpreted these regulations relatively narrowly. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109
S. Ct. 2746, 2756 (1989). The Court's contrasting uses of positive law and practice in these
two cases suggests that it is more concerned with employing an analysis that will result in
affirming the government decision in question, and less concerned with choosing a consistent
analysis on a principled basis. This approach contrasts sharply with international human
rights jurisprudence. See supra note 446 and accompanying text.
473. 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2341 (1989).
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tionship were important enough that they should not be eliminated with-
out a hearing. In rejecting this claim, the Court expressed a static view
of constitutional freedoms. The plurality opinion relied heavily on the
common law tradition of protecting the marital family from the stigma of
"illegitimacy." 474 It also stressed that society traditionally has not pro-
tected the relationship rights of a natural father and his child when the
child's mother is married to and living with another man.475 As Justice
Brennan commented in dissent, "the plurality opinion's exclusively his-
torical analysis portends a significant and unfortunate departure from
our prior cases and from sound constitutional decisionmaking ....476
Interreting the due process clause pursuant to a dynamic process, rather
than a static one, is consistent with the constitutional framers' intent.477
(8) Narrow Geographic Context
The Supreme Court's tendency to defer to local government authori-
ties is both demonstrated and reinforced by the relatively narrow geo-
graphic context in which it evaluates government interests. This
approach contrasts with the judicial process employed by the European
Convention tribunals.478 It was illustrated by two cases decided during
the 1988-89 Term: the Stanford case and Sable Communications v. Fed-
eral Communications Commission. 479
The Stanford plurality announced that the standards of other coun-
tries and in international human rights instruments were irrelevant to
determining whether particular punishments are "cruel and unusual," so
long as the American consensus legitimated the penalty. 480 This view is
474. See id. at 2342-43.
475. See id. at 2343.
476. Id. at 2349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
477. See id. (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972)
(constitutional concept of liberty was "purposely left to gather meaning from experience...
[T]he statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only a stagnant society remains
unchanged.") (quoting National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting)). See also Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2351:
The document that the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to me. It is not the
living charter that I have taken to be our Constitution; it is instead a stagnant,
archaic, hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time
long past. This Constitution does not recognize that times change, does not see that
sometimes a practice or rule outlives its foundations. I cannot accept an interpretive
method that does such violence to the charter that I am bound by oath to uphold.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 280-85.
479. 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
480. See Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975 n.1 (citations omitted):
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, re-
jecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici ... that the sentencing
practices of other countries are relevant. While "the practices of other nations, par-
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symptomatic of the Court's increasing deference to the determinations of
the challenged decisionmaker in any case. An aspect of such deference is
the Court's reluctance to evaluate the strength of the local deci-
sionmaker's asserted interests against a broader geographic context. By
contrast, as the dissent pointed out, previous Supreme Court decisions
"recognize that objective indicators of contemporary standards of de-
cency in the form of legislation in other countries is ... of relevance to
Eighth Amendment analysis. '481  Accordingly, the dissent judged the
appropriateness of the juvenile death penalty in the light of standards
espoused not only by various states in the U.S., but also by other coun-
tries and international human rights instruments.
48 2
The Court's relatively narrow view of the relevant geographic con-
text for evaluating government interests also affected its decision in Sa-
ble. 483 This decision reaffirmed the notion that individual communities
should be free to develop their own standards as to which sexually ex-
plicit material is "obscene" and therefore subject to censorship. 484 The
particular factual setting in which Sable upheld this principle magnified
the influence of the least tolerant, most parochial communities. Message
senders challenged a federal statute prohibiting obscene interstate com-
mercial telephone messages.485 They argued that this legislation com-
pelled them to tailor all their messages to the least tolerant community,
thus effectively subordinating the free speech rights of all other Ameri-
cans to the moral standards of the most narrow-minded. The Court re-
jected this argument and sustained the statute.486 Sable thus marks a
sharp departure from the geographic approach of the European Conven-
tion tribunals and the European Court of Justice, which have enforced
ticularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uni-
form among our people is not merely an historical accident, but rather so 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty' that it occupies a place not merely in our mores, but,
text permitting, in our Constitution as well," ... they cannot serve to establish the
first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our people.
481. Id. at 2985 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687
(1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 & n.22 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 593 n.4, 596 n.10 (1977); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 & n.35 (1958)).
482. Id. at 2985-86 & n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that, "[w]ithin the world
community, the imposition of the death penalty for juvenile crimes appears to be overwhelm-
ingly disapproved").
483. Sable Communications v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
484. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 (1973) (established that obscenity should be
determined according to "contemporary community standards").
485. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (Supp. 1988).
486. Sable Communications, 109 S. Ct. at 2835-36.
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European-wide standards that reflect more, rather than less, rights-pro-
tective national standards. 48
7
The distinction between the international and domestic legal pro-
cess, in terms of geographic context, can be summarized as follows: the
international human rights standard is set at the higher common denomi-
nator among differing national or international standards; the U.S. con-
stitutional rights standard is set at the lowest common denominator, both
among differing state standards, as in Sable, and among differing national
or international standards, as in Stanford.
(9) Speculative Harm
Yet another manifestation of the Supreme Court's increasing defer-
ence to other government decisionmakers is its willingness to sustain
measures infringing individual rights on the basis of mere speculation
that the exercise of these rights may have adverse societal consequences
and correspondingly that such measures might have a beneficial impact.
In stark contrast to the European Convention organs and the Canadian
courts, 4 88 the Supreme Court has not consistently demanded actual evi-
dence of tangible societal harm resulting from the exercise of individual
freedoms as a precondition for limiting them.
The Von Raab case489 is a prominent recent example of the Court's
upholding of rights-abridging measures based only on speculation, rather
than actual evidence, of tangible harm. A narrow majority in Von Raab
upheld the U.S. Customs Service's mass urinalysis drug screening pro-
gram even though there had been no perceived drug problem among
Customs employees and the screening had not led to the discovery of a
significant number of drug users.4 90 Instead, the majority reasoned that
these intrusive searches, based on no individualized suspicion, could be
justified by the government's "compelling interest in preventing an other-
wise pervasive societal problem from spreading to the particular
context."
491
The Von Raab majority's failure to demand concrete evidence that
the challenged testing program would address some actual Customs Ser-
vice problem prompted Justices Scalia and Stevens to dissent.492 Both
487. See supra text accompanying note 283.
488. See supra text accompanying notes 287-91.
489. 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1386 (1989).
490. Id. at 1398-1400.
491. Id. at 1395.
492. Justice Scalia forcefully indicted the majority's speculative justification for upholding
the sweeping urinalysis requirement:
Until today this Court had upheld a bodily search... without individualized suspi-
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Justices had voted to uphold the mass drug testing program in Skinner,
which had been justified on the basis of evidence concerning actual drug
problems linked to railroad accidents. Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion
in Von Raab roundly criticized the majority's response to the lack of any
corresponding specific evidence in that case by referring generally to the
"pervasive societal problem" of drug abuse: "[I]f such a generalization
suffices to justify demeaning bodily searches, without particularized sus-
picion ... then the Fourth Amendment has become frail protection
indeed." 4
93
Several other recent decisions parallel Von Raab's justification of a
constitutional rights infringement based on mere speculation, as opposed
to actual evidence, that some societal benefit could result. Skinner, for
example, sustained post-accident mass drug testing of railroad employees
on the rationales that such tests would deter drug use and also identify
drug-related causes of accidents, without any evidentiary support for
either rationale. It was uncontested that no evidence had been adduced
of the program's alleged deterrent value.494 Moreover, as the Skinner
dissenters noted, the "knowledge that some workers were impaired at the
time of an accident falls far short of proving that substance abuse caused
or exacerbated the accident.'495 In another example, the Thornburgh
case upheld prison regulations allowing officials to ban an entire book on
the ground that even one page violated administrative guidelines, without
cion of wrongdoing only with respect to prison inmates, relying upon the uniquely
dangerous ... environment .... Today, in Skinner, we allow a less intrusive bodily
search of railroad employees involved in train accidents. I joined the Court's opinion
there because the demonstrated frequency of drug and alcohol use by the targeted
class of employees, and the demonstrated connection between such use and grave
harm, rendered the search a reasonable means of protecting society. I decline to join
the Court's opinion in the present case because neither frequency of use nor connec-
tion to harm is demonstrated or even likely.
... The Court's opinion ... will be searched in vain for real evidence of a real
problem that will be solved by urine testing of Customs Service employees.
... What is absent in the Government's justifications.., is the recitation of even
a single instance in which any of the speculated horribles actually occurred: an in-
stance.., in which the cause of bribe-taking, or of poor aim, or of unsympathetic law
enforcement, or of compromise of classified information, was drug use.
Id. at 1398-1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
493. Id. at 1400 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
494. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1422 (1989) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring); id. at 1432 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
495. Id. at 1432.
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any evidence that this "all-or-nothing" rule advanced any legitimate pe-
nological interest.
496
The Webster case provides a further illustration of the Court's will-
ingness to accept speculation about potentially averted harms as a justifi-
cation for curtailing individual rights. The majority sustained Missouri's
required viability tests on fetuses believed to be twenty weeks gestational
age when the asserted justification was to avoid aborting viable fetuses. 497
Uncontradicted evidence, however, established that the earliest possible
gestational age at which a fetus becomes viable is twenty-four to twenty-
eight weeks.498 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion attempted to jus-
tify this ruling by asserting the state's interest in "possible viability." 499
But Justice Scalia mocked the sheer speculation inherent in this proffered
rationale by surmising that the Court's next abortion opinion might ap-
prove a government measure designed to account for "the chance of pos-
sible viability. ' '5
°°
(10) No Good Faith Requirement
As just discussed, during its 1988-89 Term, the Court upheld many
rights-infringing measures without any tangible evidence that such meas-
ures redressed an actual societal problem. Given this evidentiaiy vac-
uum, the asserted speculative justifications for such measures may well
have been post hoc rationalizations and the measures might actually have
been designed to advance some ulterior purposes. As the Webster dis-
senters noted, for example, the scientific consensus that fetal viability was
impossible before twenty-four weeks gestational age indicated that Mis-
souri's purpose in requiring viability tests of twenty-week-old fetuses
could not actually be the purported one of protecting viable fetuses.501
Rather, the state's actual purpose likely could have been to prohibit as
many abortions as possible by imposing the maximum number of obsta-
496. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1878 n.8 (1989); id. at 1891-92 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part):
[T]he Court.. . defers to "findings" of a security threat that even prison officials
admitted to be nonexistent.
There is no evidence that delivery of only part of a publication would endanger •
prison security. Rather, the primary justification advanced for the all-or-nothing
rule was administrative convenience.... But general speculation that some adminis-
trative burden might ensue should not be sufficient to justify a meat-ax abridgement
of ... First Amendment rights ....
497. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3044 (1989).
498. See id. at 3055.
499. Id. at 3062 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
500. Id. at 3066, n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
501. Id. at 3076 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
cles to their performance. 502 But neither in Webster nor in any of its
other cases sustaining government invasions of individual rights did the
Court demand evidence that the government's asserted justification was
made in good faith. Instead, in this respect, as in so many others, the
Court simply deferred to the government decisionmakers.
In cases that expressly apply the most deferential level of scrutiny,
"rational basis" review, the Court explicitly has acknowledged that it
will not assess whether an alleged government justification was the ac-
tual, good faith rationale for a challenged measure. 50 3 In constitutional
challenges to economic or business regulations, the Court has even sup-
plied possible justifications that the government decisionmakers might
have had in mind, absent any evidence as to what their real purposes
actually were.50 4 Putting aside the appropriateness of applying this facet
of minimal scrutiny to economic regulations, it is clearly inappropriate to
import such an extreme form of deference to regulations infringing on
fundamental personal rights. Such a step is inconsistent with not only
U.S. constitutional traditions but also, as discussed above, the European
Convention organs' analysis of rights invasions.
50 5
(11) De-emphasis of Importance of Government Interest
A traditional prerequisite for upholding a government measure in-
fringing rights protected by the U.S. Constitution is that the counter-
vailing government interest be very important. Such an interest is
usually labelled "compelling. '50 6 International human rights instru-
ments consistently have been interpreted to authorize rights-limiting
measures only to promote important government goals. 50 7 The U.S.
Supreme Court, however, recently has displayed a tendency to approve
rights infringements on the rationale that they advance government in-
terests which are merely "legitimate," rather than "compelling." Alter-
502. See id. at 3070 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
503. See L. TRIBE, supra note 155, at 1443 ("In applying the rationality requirement, the
Court has ordinarily been willing to uphold any classification based "upon a state of facts that
reasonably can be conceived to constitute a distinction ... in state policy." (quoting Allied
Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959))).
504. See id.:
[The Court's] remarkable deference to state objectives has operated in the sphere of
economic regulation quite apart from whether the conceivable "state of facts" (1)
actually exists, (2) would convincingly justify the classification if it did exist, or (3)
was ever urged in the classification's defense either by those who promulgated it or
by those who argued in its support. Often only the Court's imagination has limited
the allowable purposes ascribed to government.
505. See supra text accompanying notes 292-93.
506. See supra note 299.
507. See supra text accompanying notes 294-300.
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natively, the Court achieves the same result by conclusorily labeling as
"compelling" government interests that traditionally have not been con-
sidered that important.
In Webster, for example, the majority upheld Missouri's second-tri-
mester viability testing requirement on the ground that it "furthers the
State's interest in protecting potential human life," 508 even though Roe v.
Wade had held that this interest did not become compelling until the
third trimester.509 Similarly, in Thornburgh, the Court sustained prison
regulations that significantly abridged prisoners' free speech rights on the
basis of administrative convenience,510 a government interest that had
never been deemed sufficiently important to justify limiting fundamental
rights.51' In the same vein, the Skinner and Von Raab cases upheld in-
trusive, suspicionless searches and seizures-mass urinalysis and blood
testing to ascertain whether government employees had ingested drugs-
on the ground that complying with the fourth amendment's individual-
ized suspicion requirement would be "impracticable. ' 512 Yet, as Justice
Marshall commented in dissent, "The process by which a constitutional




A comparative analysis of the judicial process for resolving individ-
ual rights claims under international human rights law and U.S. constitu-
tional law reveals a striking divergence. Recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions display a narrowing conception of the scope of rights subject to
judicial protection and a correspondingly expanding view of permissible
government restrictions. By contrast, recent international human rights
jurisprudence manifests the opposite trends: toward a broader definition
of judicially protectable rights and a narrower construction of permissi-
508. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3057.
509. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973).
510. See Thornburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 1884; see id at 1891-92 ("[T]he primary justification
advanced for the all-or-nothing rule [permitting prison officials to ban entire publications if
any portion of them ran afoul of regulations] was administrative convenience.") (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
511. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (administrative convenience or cost
savings cannot justify burdens on fundamental rights); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
633-34 (1969) (same); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (these government
objectives cannot justify burdens even upon non-fundamental rights).
512. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989).
513. Id. at 1423 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S.
Ct. 2764, 2763 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority enshrines efficacy but sacri-
fices free speech.")., '
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ble limitations on these rights. The U.S. Supreme Court is thus moving
away from judicial activism in individual rights cases at the same time
that its counterparts in the international arena are moving toward such
activism.
514
This Article has shown that it would be consistent with U.S. foreign
policy positions, as well as U.S. legal traditions, for state and federal
courts to rely on international human rights developments in resolving
process issues concerning the domestic protection of individual rights. It
also has shown that, while the most recent Supreme Court process rul-
ings in individual rights cases depart from their international counter-
parts, such rulings in earlier Supreme Court cases parallel those in
contemporary international human rights law. Therefore, by interpret-
ing process issues concerning individual rights claims in the light of
emerging international norms, U.S. courts would be faithful both to
backward-looking American constitutional traditions, and to the for-
ward-looking international human rights movement.
514. See Warbrick, supra note 8, at 714 (European Court's increasingly active judicial
review process will transform the Convention into a constitutional bill of rights rather than an
international convention).
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